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CHAPTER 1
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION
Research Setting
I studied a regional headquarters of the engineering
division of a large company, ZY&Y.

The location employed

approximately 1100 supervisory, technical, professional, and
clerical personnel, providing equipment engineering services
and sales support to communications customers in five
midwestern states. The unit had a functionally structured
hierarchy, exhibiting many features of Weber's bureaucratic
model of administration.

The details of the structure are

amplified in Chapter 4.
Although the setting was a profit-oriented business,
the researcher can argue that the evaluation problems,
process, and consequences found here also apply to nonprofit settings like schools, colleges, and social welfare
agencies.

The study is informed by data from these settings

to enlighten the research process.
Research Problem
During the past five years, I worked as the management
contact for all issues relating to our local union. During
this assignment, I continued to hear complaints about the
evaluation system used to rate the group represented by our
union, i.e., the Engineering Associates (EA). Surprisingly,
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the criticisms came from both union representatives and the
managers with the task of appraising the EAs. In fact, many
managers griped about their own treatment in the evaluation
process. The appraisal issues are so pervasive and
persistent that they seemed a fitting topic for research.
Thus the problem of this study was to describe and explain
the construction and use of performance appraisals in the
engineering unit of a large corporation.

More specifically,

I analyzed the evaluation process to determine:
How an appraisal was produced? By Whom? Under
what conditions? What impact did evaluations have
for individuals and the organization? What did
evaluations mean? What assumptions surrounded the
evaluation process?
The research produced data which described and
explained the structure, process, and belief system of
evaluation at the organizational and workplace levels and
explored alternative evaluation structures to change the
balance of power between worker and manager.
Dueling Perspectives
Performance appraisals were studied from two distinct
perspectives:

(1) a management (administrative) and (2) a

sociological viewpoint.

Management, as a group of power

producing actors within organizations, define appraisals as
tools to measure, develop, motivate, promote, measure,
place, train, discipline, terminate, or reward employees.
Evaluations are means to manage the organization and make a
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profit for the company.

Much of the mainstream management

literature defines and accepts appraisals as a tool to
provide fair rewards and to develop employees.

(Gibb, 1985;

Graves, 1982; Levine, 1986; Reed & Kroll, 1985).

(The

critical view, which concludes that appraisals are
politically negotiated, subjective control devices, is not
usually presented here (Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Edwards,
1984)). Management articles aimed to improve, not question,
the basis of the existing practices. Performance evaluations
are accepted as normal, ordinary factors of organizational
life.

The focus of articles is to find a better, i.e., more

rational way to produce evaluations -- conduct interviews,
write-up appraisals, and measure performance.

The

underlying assumptions of what appraisals represent are not
considered.
In contrast, sociologists see performance evaluations
as products of social factors such as cooperation,
negotiation, and conflict with layers of unexplained and
implicit meanings.

To sociologists, appraisals are cultural

products that provide data to examine issues like power,
inequality patterns, processes of labeling, legitimation,
and decision-making; structures of opportunity and reward;
construction of shared conceptions like efficiency or
productivity, and conventions to produce a completed
appraisal (Becker, 1986). A growing number of writers
(Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Goldman & Van Houten, 1977;
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Hyman, 1975; Benson, 1977: smircich, 1983) have criticized
the traditional, predominant approach to studying
organizations where problems are framed as disruptions in
the rational, taken-for-granted features of organizations.
The critical view rejects Weber's rational model and
proposed examining the forces that produce organizational
realities like goals, technology, appraisals, and structure
instead of accepting them as givens. In the new view
organizations are not merely tools for efficiency, but the
setting and means for obtaining personal, group or class
interests (Fischer & Sirianni, 1984).
Why a Problem? What's Wrong with Appraisals at ZY&Y?
The essence of the problem is that managers'
conceptions of evaluations are instrumental, political, and
narrow and contain taken-for-granted assumptions, hidden
agendas, and unexplained meanings, creating problems which
sociologists can explain through research and theory
construction. Management values are geared toward achieving
greater efficiency and profits, while there are
contradictions between the intentions and consequences of
appraisals, between what people did and what they said.
These points are developed in Chapters 6 and 7. The problem
for the researcher is to go beyond the common sense
explanations and examine the process that produced
conceptions like "efficiency" or "performance appraisal" and
explain which definitions the organization is using. The
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following discussion is based on initial observations in the
organization and highlight a number of significant issues
and processes.
objectivity -- Subjectivity
Organizational actors assume that appraisals match
performance.

If someone performed well, they expect to have

a higher appraisal than an employee who achieved less.
Appraisals are also viewed as fair and objective, measuring
concrete, observable behavior (Scott & Dornbusch, 1967).
Yet a major complaint from subordinates is that the majority
of appraisals are subjective and judgmental based on
hunches, and personal feelings rather than observable
behavior, measured against a recognized and publicly
accepted standards. Appraisal write-ups do not match
performance levels that members expect, based on activities
stressed by the department (production and quality).
System Limitations
Appraisals tend not to reflect legitimate performance
levels because management review systems arbitrarily impose
bureaucratic constraints on the number of people who can be
placed in each performance category.

Managers decide, for

example, that only 20% of the universe, based on a rank
order of performance, can be rated as "outstanding".

The

definition of performance then becomes a statistic, in this
case, the top 20% of the rank order list.

Appraisals are

more than tools to evaluate workers, but also a means to
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locate people in a hierarchy of value to the organization
(Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983).
visibility:
Evaluations tend to be inaccurate because not all
behavior is seen or known by the supervisor.

An employee

may train new workers, facilitate information flow, and work
toward meeting "team" goals, and yet receive only an average
appraisal because the evaluator is not aware of all the
person's activities.

Contributions then exist only when

they are recognized and noted. Kanter (1977) refers to a
similar process when she explains organizational power

to

have power one has to do important tasks, but these
activities must be visible to others in positions of
authority.
Evaluation Criteria
Appraisals generate contradictions in rules and
underlying values.

Even though departments indicate through

financial reports and results meetings that production and
quality are key survival variables, appraisals are not based
solely on these facts.

When union reps "grieved"

appraisals, managers stress the overall contribution of the
employee (e.g., problem-solving, production, initiative,
potential, etc.) to counter an argument that someone should
be rated higher because he/she had high efficiency.

At this

point, efficiency becomes only one of many factors, while
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prior to this, production is the main driving value of the
unit.
The Engineering Associate (EA) position uses some
precise measures of performance, like efficiency, quality,
and cost reduction savings, yet managers decide to offset
these criteria with more subjective (i.e., less verifiable)
variables, such as, relations with customers, problemsolving, initiative, and relative contribution to
organizational results.
The appraisal decision can be explained by several
arguments.

Managers want to control evaluations and the

resulting salary increases.

It is like saying, "we shape

the rules of the contest, so we can determine the rewards".
Second, supervisors' contention and union representatives'
comments support the argument that many uncontrollable facts
like inadequate resources, difficulty of work, and demanding
customers result in a distorted and unfair account of
performance through the use of solely objective measures
like efficiency and quality.
The Union reps frequently argue that appraisals are
much too subjective and influenced by supervisor's
prejudices and shifting values to be an accurate reflection
of a worker's contribution.

Managers acknowledge various
I

appraisal shortcomings, but hold that it provides the best
available basis for rewarding performance through a meritbased reward structure.

~
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Hidden Beliefs
Appraisals have been a taken-for-granted aspect of most
jobs and the process of their construction is lost in the
everyday life of organizations.

They reflect the culture

and ideology of the organization without usually being the
subject of inquiry (Trice & Beyer, 1984). Employees accept
appraisal systems, with discrete levels of performance,
which reflect stratification system (structured inequality)
of the organization.

In this light, appraisals can be seen

as control systems in all types of organizations.
What's the Big Deal Over Appraisals?
Performance evaluations have been used widely in
organizations to measure performance, grant salary
increases, promote, demote, or terminate employees, and to
generate data for career development.
Virtually all occupational categories of employees
experience and are subject to appraisals. Some groups, like
hourly workers, are more affected than others because they
experience a constellation of factors known as ''blue-collar
stress" (Shostak, 1980), which has an immediate effect on
their job security status. Workers in routinized jobs are
blamed for low motivation instead of inadequate job
knowledge when there are performance problems. In addition
their efforts are devalued because the technology they use
makes their job functions routine.

Supervisors tend to use

harsh, direct orders instead of an "asking" style associated
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with non-routine work (Kipnis, 1984).

Professional

employees also have negative reactions to evaluations
because autonomy and esteem are threatened rather than
enhanced by the review process.
Appraisals affect a number of reward aspects of
organizational life.

Annual salary increases are directly

linked to one's appraisal

a favorable review increases

the chance of receiving a large increase, while low or poor
performance ratings reduce or eliminate the opportunity to
participate in the distribution of rewards.
Performance reviews also label the employee and
establish an historical base, creating a reputational frame
to decide lateral or upward movement into new jobs.
Employees are classified as "strong" or "weak" in various
job skills and this label remains with the person, making it
difficult to alter future perception patterns.
who do not conform to the set of

organi~ational

Individuals
rules are

seen as "deviant" as they vary from managers' norms and
expectations (Becker, 1973).
Building on an interactionist approach (Scott and
Lyman, 1968), I argue that employees can be seen as
resorting to two types of accounts in reacting to appraisal
discussions:
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1. Excuses -- employees acknowledge that some behavior
or results are undesirable but deny responsibility. The
person may explain how various organizational factors -lack of information, conflicting goals -- reduced their
responsibility for various performance outcome, such as,
sales volume or the timeliness of reports.
2. Justification -- the employee accepts
responsibility for poor performance -- low productivity,
inferior quality -- but denies that these behaviors should
be seen as wrong or troublesome. They will claim that the
department or customer was not harmed by their performance
so no infraction occurred. The employee may go on to say
that his/her actions -- taking risks, trying new techniques
-- are in fact worthy of praise instead of blame.
contributions to Theory and Methods
The study investigates a seemingly rational product
performance evaluations -- through an examination of the
non-rational features of organizations.

This approach uses

a perspective that combines three models: power/conflict,
open systems (contingency-dependency) and social
construction.

Each of these offers explanations that are

more congruent with the reality of organizational life as
experienced by actors at various levels in the hierarchy.
The research shows the richer, more insightful power of the
three models when compared to the efficacy of rational or
"management" theory, the historically dominant
organizational model which presented performance appraisals
as a tool to make both the individual and organizational
more effective. Chapter 8 concludes with an extended
discussion of the application and integration of the above
three theories.
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The research method studies the appraisal process as a
"unit of activity" that is socially produced by degrees of
cooperative behavior with resulting consequences for actors
and organizations. The research design is a case study to
develop a theory of evaluation to account for the pattern of
appraisal placement found in the Engineering unit of a
complex organization. The design further adopts theories
from other fields of sociology for use in analyzing
organizational settings.

For example, Becker's (1973) work

on the nature and construction of deviance -- those in power
make rules and define who has broken them -- is applied to
organizations to explain why some employees are not rated
very high

they did not follow the rules of the dominant

coalition

management.

Another example is Brunvand's

(1981) collection of urban folk legends which show that
stories about unverified events act as a channel for beliefs
and sources of social control.

Organizational stories

create and reinforce the rewarding of one type of behavior - compliance -- and punish other activities (e.g.,
"cheating" on expense vouchers). Also included in Chapter 8
is insight from Scott's (1985) analysis of peasant
resistance. This comparison is used because my research
documented an on-going conflict between managers and
subordinates which shared features with Scott's study of
peasant resistance to landlords' unilateral decisions.
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Finally, the research offers managers alternative
procedures to the existing methods for conducting
performance evaluations and interviews.

These new

approaches are based on data from participant observation
and the experiences of the subjects.

Exposing the hidden

values and processes of evaluation can lead to suggestions
for new appraisal methods to lessen the inequality of power
between the supervisor and employee, between the rater and
ratee.
Type of study
The study uses a descriptive and exploratory research
design, based in a field setting, to capture "the patterns
of interaction in a particular context" (Golden, 1976).

The

strength of this approach is to chart the complex day-to-day
behavior of actors in actual settings, which makes for a
richer pool of data for interpretation and theory building.
Even though the researcher is a participant in the setting,
this approach provides the opportunity to explain the
complex and ambiguous actions that define and constitute the
evaluation process. Prior knowledge of the setting offers
clues to guide the data collection, the explanations of
organizational products (e.g., performance appraisals) and
alternative evaluation approaches which the researcher
developed as a result of the study.
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Framework of Analysis
My research began with the goal of describing and
explaining the structure of the Engineering unit, its
dominant belief systems, and the process used to construct
performance appraisals. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 fulfill that
purpose of the research. However, in the course of
interviewing and analyzing, I formulated a new central
conclusion about appraisals which incorporates the original
objectives and functions as the main argument and framework
for the dissertation.
My argument is that performance appraisals are a myth
of organizational life, revealed through several key
variables: the structure of the organization, including the
culture of control, which provided the context for
appraisals; the unit's values or beliefs which explain and
organize appraisal behavior; and the process or activities
managers use to produce appraisals. The key question of my
dissertation is: How do appraisals reflect organizational
myths? I have concluded the following points from my
research:

*

Appraisal placement does not match the "reported"

contributions of employees. Inconsistencies exist between
cell placement and verbalized judgments of performance
those assigned low levels are often described as high
performers. Employees expect larger rewards for their
contribution; the "psychological contract" of the
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utilitarian model (Etzioni, 1961; Schein, 1980) is not
upheld by the Company.

*

The managers' need for allocation of evaluation

categories has priority over the talked-about need for
accurately measuring contributions: bureaucratic methods,
rather than performance, are used to slot or appraise
employees. The culture places the managers' convenience in
determining appraisals before the expressed concern for
accuracy of cell assignment.

*

Political and power issues rather than performance

mediate or filter behavior into appraisal categories. This
introduces the question: What do actors mean by performance?
Cell placement reflects the interaction of other variables
(e.g., allocation, conflict, power, bargaining,
uncertainty), rather than just "behavior" or performance.
Each of the key variables mentioned above -- structure,
control, beliefs, and process -- are examined in a separate
chapter to illustrate important issues, what actors said,
and what this means for the organization. Figure 1
illustrates the framework for analysis.
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Figure 1
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

STRUCTURE
CONTROL
CONTEXT

Bureaucratic Methods

uncertainty/Variation

size

careers

union-Management Conflict

Information/Knowledge

context

VALUES and BELIEFS

Safety

Production, Quality, Achievement

Convenience
Feedback

Fatalism
Qualities

Work Habits
Rewards

Time

Equity
Myth

Limits

PROCESS

Power

Political Tactics (Coalitions)

social Construction

Decision-Making

Conventions, Practices and Special Language

uncertainty
Games (Cue)
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For example under structure (Chapter 4), I discuss
uncertainty, size, careers patterns, union-management
conflict, and general bureaucratic features. The chapter on
the culture of control (5) grew out of an analysis begun in
the previous chapter. The chapter on beliefs (6) discusses
the dominant values impacting on the Engineering unit. These
include equity (fairness), production (achievement), safety
(security), and convenience. The process chapter (7)
examines a number of issues: uncertainty, and use of power
and political tactics; decision-making models; the social
construction of appraisals and the use of appraisal
conventions and language.
Chapter 8 includes a review of the theoretical issues
so the findings can be applied to other organizational
settings. These issues include: decision-making (Thompson,
1967; Cohen and March, 1972); power and control (Pfeffer,
1978; Kanter, 1977; Domhoff, 1979; Kipnis, 1984; Mechanic,
1962); game-like quality of appraisals (Pugh and Hickson,
1989; Buroway, 1979); uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1978; Scott,
1981; Cohen & March, 1972); conflict (Edwards, 1979; Fischer
and Sirianni, 1984; Hill, 1981; Hyman, 1975); social
construction (Becker, 1973, 1982, 1986; Goffman, 1959; Blau,

1967; Berger and Luckmann, 1967); career structure (Becker,
1956; Kanter, 1977; Brass, 1984); and myths (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Brunvand, 1981; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975;
Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Smircich,
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19 a3; Trice and Beyer, 1984; Van Maanen, 1976). Each of the

four main data analysis chapters (structure, control,
beliefs, and process) contains an introduction to its key
issues, actors' quotes, and charts to summarize findings.

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Two broad areas of literature are reviewed:
organization theory to explain power and control issues and
cultural or social construction material to examine values
and perspectives.
The purpose of this review is to show how previous
studies on control and cultural topics raised new issues,
defined problems, and acted as a stimulus and provided
explanations for the study of performance evaluations.

The

literature offered a context for understanding the
construction and use of evaluations as a social process and
means of organizational control.

Only a few of the many

sources cited made a direct reference to a sociological
study of performance appraisals.

The literature review

provided a link between studies on power, control, and
cultural topics (like belief systems, perspectives, and
social construction) and the issues of performance
evaluations as a product of organizational life.
The material on power and control explored topics like
rewards, control, critical research approaches, bureaucratic
structure, type of organization and hierarchical positions
as they related to describing and understanding evaluations.
18
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The material on cultural topics discussed areas like
development of the field and variables such as: myths,
legends, beliefs, and comparable worth; the impact of
perceptions, definitions of the situation/position; the use
of rites, stories, assumptions; and organizational products
such as appraisals as outcomes of cooperation.
The literature is organized along arbitrary dimensions
of time:

"classical" theories on organization from Weber,

Marx and Michels precede a longer and more detailed section
using "modern" theories from researchers like Edwards,
Kanter, Becker, Goffman, Pfeffer, Scott, Deal and Kennedy,
Smircich, Etzioni, and Fischer and Sirianni.

A brief review

of relevant segments of the classical theories is followed
by Scott's 1981 historical integration of three theoretical
time periods which incorporated many of the concepts found
in the early works on organizations.
The third section described features of the Power
Paradigm, including critiques of the rational model; sources
of organizational power such as position, structure, and
resource use; and the impact of reward and technology
systems on evaluation practices.
The final section covered cultural dimensions affecting
performance evaluations. This literature described recent
developments in the field; the use of cultural variables
from sociological and management perspectives such as
stories, beliefs, rites, and language to explain appraisal
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practices; and social construction explanations from authors
like Becker and Goffman.
A. Classical Perspectives

Marx
Marx wrote about the effect of capitalism on workers
from the perspective of the material conditions that
surrounded people where one's position in society is
determined by his/her relation to the means of production.
someone either owned and controlled the mode of production
or worked for and is controlled by the production system.
He described two factors to explain his concept of society.
The substructure represented the economic base or current
mode of production in a society and consisted of two
elements: the means and the relations of production.

The

"means" of production are the technology used to produce
goods and services, for example, some societies hunted,
others farmed or used machines to produce needed items.
second element is the "relations" of production -- the
specific relations developed because of the particular
technology utilized by a society.

Relations are created

between workers, workers and authority, and workers and
owners (Giddens and Held, 1982).
The economic base influences the political
organization, relations, family structure, and various
ideologies or rationalizations for certain actions in

The
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society.

Marx referred to these products as the

superstructure.

In one particularly fitting comment, he

notes that the class which "controls the material forces of
society also rules the intellectual force".
Marx saw class divisions based on man's relations to
the mode of production.

Those in control formed the ruling

class and exploited the propertyless workers who have
nothing but their labor to sell.

One of the striking ways

he described this exploitation is through his concepts of
alienation and surplus value.

The worker loses his ties to

both the product and process of his labor because he has no
control over these, forced into a position of remaining a
wage laborer to maintain his existence.

Work, in Marx's

terms, "becomes another's activity." This form of labor
produced by capitalism alienates man from nature, himself,
and his very nature, which is to control his life.

These

conditions produce dominance by the owner and private
property.
Surplus value is a concept used by Marx to account for
the reproduction of the worker as worker and the owner as
owner.

As mentioned above, the worker's labor power is sold

as a commodity to produce goods which have a certain value.
In Marx's view the value of labor is set by the time needed
to produce something and this is equal to the means of
subsistence required to maintain the worker.

But the owner

saw that he would extract more than the value of the product
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__ the cost of material and wages.

Any extra value

remaining became surplus value or profits for the owner to
produce more capital.

Thus, the worker is exploited because

of his relation to the mode of production and the owner.
Marx saw three classes in society based on the capitalist
mode of production: wage laborer, capitalist, and landowner.
He believed that each class received a specific type of
revenue from a differentiated source.

The worker received

wages from selling his labor power; the capitalist obtained
surplus value (profits) from his capital (machinery); and
the landowner received rent from his property.
one of the important concepts Marx used to explain
change, class struggle, and the transformation of capitalism
into socialism is the notion of contradictions found in the
capitalist economic system.

He described a number of

contradictions to explain change and predict the end of
capitalism.

Although capitalism is based on "private

appropriation", it is the "most socialized form of order"
found in society, because the structure of capitalism
requires cooperation and dependence on one hand, as it
attempts to steer itself, while dependent on the worker.
The fluctuating nature of the capitalist economy results in
large firms expanding during depressions at the expense of
small firms.

As capitalism expands, it produces more

concentration, undermining individual business competition.
Alongside these processes, we find workers developing an
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awareness of their position and of the disparity between the
material conditions and existing unequal relations.

The

very nature of capitalism creates common interests for
workers, transforming them into a class for themselves, thus
intensifying class struggles, and hastening the end of
capitalism (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984).
To briefly summarize Marx's view of inequality or who
gets what and why, the main determinant is one's relation to
the dominant mode of production.

If one owns property and

capital, he/she is on top in the capitalist structure.

You

control the means and relations of production and use the
workers as a commodity bought by wages. Workers are in the
bottom class with nothing to offer but their labor for a set
wage, no longer controlling either the process or product of
their work.

Since the owners are the ruling class, their

ideas are the dominant ones.

This stratification system,

created by capitalism, will be changed due to the internal
contradictions of capitalism, producing greater worker
solidarity and growing class struggle until capitalism is
replaced by the classless society of socialism, placing the
worker in power in a situation of collective ownership.

He

held that profits, created by surplus value, maintain the
system until economic crisis strikes.
Marx's work is important to organizational theory
because it provided many of the original arguments used by
many post-Weberian writers (Edwards, 1979,1984; Rothschild-
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Whitt, 1979; Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Benson, 1977; Ouchi,
19 82) to attack the ideal-type, bureaucratic-rational model
that Weber developed. Organizations represent microcosms of
the inequality found in society.

The bureaucratic model

describes and uses concepts like hierarchy, authority, and
rules, while Marx's critical view provides the basis for
exposing the inequality of most organizations and the
reasons for differences in power.

His ideas provide a

framework to understand that evaluation, although presented
as a reward and developmental tool, is a device to control
workers and maintain inequality because it is a process of
judgment welded by the powerful over the less powerful.

The

dominant means of production -- capitalism -- produced the
values and relations among workers to accept the management
device of evaluations to decide who is contributing the most
to company goals (e.g., profit-making).
Weber
Weber's contribution to understanding organizations is
usually associated with his work on bureaucracy, but I
placed this work in the broader framework he used to
describe stratification or inequality in society.

His model

included the features of class, status, and party, which
represent or are products of the distribution of power in
society.

For Weber, "class is an objective feature of

economic relations based on property relations" (Giddens and
Held, 1982). He informs us that classes are groups of
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individuals who share similar life chances in work and other
exchange relations.

In his view people have skills that are

treated like commodities and exchanged on the market.

So

competition in the market influences life chances -- access
to and use of resources -- and favors owners over workers,
who only have their labor to sell; although free in the
legal sense, workers are forced to exchange skills in the
market.

As society requires more complex skills due to

industrialization, one's life chances may improve if one
possesses the required skills, or decline if these are
missing.
Weber saw status as a set of circumstances or
opportunities affecting someone because of a group's or
community's "social estimation of honor".

Status does not

have to be linked with class and both those with or without
property could belong to the same status group.

status was

expressed in specific cultural "styles of life" expected of
people in various positions and is usually based on
education, heredity or occupational prestige.

Under this

variable, people are ranked according to honor or lifestyle.
The leader of a community group might have prestige in his
group, but little property or economic influence.
For Weber classes are stratified according to their
relations to production and acquisition of goods, whereas
status groups are ranked by their consumption of goods, seen
in various lifestyles.

Even though status appears to hold a
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powerful position in his model, the economic conditions, as
with Marx, are the primary variables affecting life chances
and status.

Weber also recognized that technology and

economic change threatened the status order and pushed the
impact of class to the foreground. Kerbo (1983) pointed out
that status is more important to the primitive, hunting and
gathering societies who often honored the best hunter.

As

societies developed more complex modes of production, status
took a back seat to economic conditions.
The third element in Weber's model and more relevant to
the present study is party or power for action created by
the association of individuals into political groups or
organizations.

Parties are only possible in groups with

rational order and members ready to enforce it.

These

political associations can present class, status, or mixed
types of interests.

Parties reflect the stratification

formats of the communities they exist in or the structure of
domination in society.

The important features of party are

law, power, and organization or rational order. Besides
political parties, these elements most effectively reside in
the bureaucratic form of organization as a form of control.
Weber's discussion of bureaucracy is linked to his views on
capitalism.

For him the most important feature of

capitalism is "the rationalized nature of capitalist
production,"

which focuses on setting goals and using
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technology to control nature to meet goals and solve
problems.
weber saw the growth of bureaucracy as a unavoidable
aspect of the rationalized nature of capitalist society.

He

stressed that it is a means of domination and control which
is almost impossible to stop.

The structure of capitalism

needed the bureaucratic form of organization to meet
production goals and control workers.

Weber saw the effects

of bureaucratic form extending beyond industry into all
types of organizations: schools, churches, banks, insurance
companies.

The result is the "expropriation of the worker"

from his task -- he loses control over product and
especially process.
Also, Kerbo noted above that, historically, Weber's
three variables had varying significance during different
periods.

Class is mores important in the early stages of

capitalism; status is mores evident in caste societies; and
power is most important in modern societies in the form of
bureaucracy.

According to Weber, one has various

opportunities or life chances because of any or all of the
following: class

based on skills and exchange in market

for use by dominant means of production in society; status - social honor due to occupation, education, or heredity
which may conflict with market structure of class; and party
-- the power generated by one's position in the dominant
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organizational form, bureaucracy, which maintains capitalism
bY controlling output and the worker.
The implications of Weber's model for understanding
evaluations is that economic factors, status judgments, and
forms of organization affect the power, stratification, and
life chances of individuals.

People are not expected to

have equal amounts of these variables in Weber's model, thus
some means to determine individual or group variations in
contributions becomes critical and problematic for
organizations.
Michels
Michels, a Weber contemporary, provided a number of key
insights into the factors that produced oligarchy -- a form
of management produced by large organizations.

He grounded

his argument in historical conditions that led poor,
working-class people to form unions as a way to protect
themselves from difficult working conditions.

Union

organizations helped workers, but due to size, cannot
adequately represent workers' interests without some form of
delegation.

As the duties of leaders become more

complicated and the need for special skills and knowledge
increased, leaders became more professional, are less likely
to come from the rank and file, and produced a separation
between leaders and followers.
Michels contends that the very existence of large
organizations produced oligarchy -- leadership by a few
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and less democracy, a principle that provided the basis for
equal representation of the union members.

Once

professional leaders become established, the "conservative
tendencies" of organizations keep them in place.

Leaders

represent a closed caste; make special arrangements which
exclude the masses from their former condition of selfmanagement; worry about being replaced; and develop
strategies to keep new leaders out of office.

Michels' main

point about organizations is that they produced leaders to
manage them and, in the process, leaders organize themselves
and their own interests.

The "masses" tolerate the

arrangement and, being passive, allow the leaders' ideas to
represent the concern of the workers.

He argued that the

main cause of oligarchy is the organization's need for
leadership.

The stages of the leadership process become

progressively more rigid, so that which leaders who
initially arose spontaneously, become professional and
finally entrenched and irremovable.
In a study of ways in which unions can become more
democratic, Nyden {1985) offered Michels' views as one
explanation for the forces operating against democracy in
organizations.

Leaders used self-serving practices that are

contrary to the political interests of members.

The

structure of the organization and passivity among the masses
are two reasons for leadership of many by a few.
work highlights various sociological factors like

Michels'
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organizational size and the resulting specialization which
also produces the need for special leader skills and
knowledge.

Michels also noted the means used by leaders to

maintain their positions.

This type of analysis gave

researchers clues to look for the influence of structural
conditions (size of unit) and arrangements to maintain
practices, such as those used in performance evaluations.
some questions flow from his theory: How does size of the
organization influence methods to appraise performance?

Are

there arrangements that maintain features of evaluations
while concealing employees' true performance or produce
results that are contrary to stated organizational goals?
B.

Rational, Natural, and Open Models of Organizations

Historically, attempts to explain organizations as
instruments for attaining goals (Scott, 1981) by means of
formalized rules and were independent of the individual's
personal attributes. The idea is to make action predictable
through a visible structure that reduces tensions between
roles, and allows for orderly succession to jobs.
The rational model is strongly identified with Weber's
work on bureaucracy as an administrative model to control
large and growing organizations.

A number of features

illustrate this model and signal it as an organizational
form quite different from traditional types.

The

bureaucratic model has the following features: rules to
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regulate activity; specific job qualifications; a hierarchy
containing levels of graded authority tied to position;
decisions based on goals and written documents; separation
of an official's private and office lives; specialized
knowledge; formal decision-making rules determined by rank;
wages based on rank and service; and the use of paid, fulltime professionals who had technical competence to replace
feudal and patrimonial privileges. Weber noted that
bureaucracy is almost impossible to destroy because of its
capacity to lock people into positions due to specialization
of work, rules and regulations, and impersonality of the
structure.
In addition to Weber's contribution, Scott includes
under the rational-closed era Taylor's Scientific Management
paradigm in which tasks are analyzed (measured and timed) to
achieve the maximum amount of production, and people are
motivated strictly by economic incentives.

In the rational

perspective the structural features are tools to realize
ends and give a good deal of attention to specification of
goals and formal rules.

The structure symbolizes order,

with an emphasis on control, featuring centralized decisionmaking, as the way to achieve goals.

The rational model,

however, ignores both the environment, stressed by Pfeffer's
resource-dependency model (1978), and the actual behavior
produced by the formal structure examined by the human
relations paradigm.
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The Human Relations model became popular following
Mayo's research into the link between working conditions and
productivity at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works during
the 1920s and 1930s.

What began as a "rational" study,

produced the unanticipated finding that people do not act as
rational economic actors, but are driven by feelings
generated through work relations and settings.

People

behaved as members of social groups with informal (contrary
to formal structure or rules) status hierarchies and
leadership patterns (Scott, 1981).

The organization is seen

as a self-maintaining system which needed to satisfy both
internal support goals, and output, rational goals.

Under

this model, Homans studied group process, while Likert
examined leadership patterns.

There is a emphasis on

building a team to improve output and a movement to change
the organization.

A great deal of supervisory skills

training is introduced to better understand the worker and
reduce alienation. (Scott, 1981)
Hill (1981) felt that the Human Relations school is a
reaction to the effects of technology on social relations.
Conflict would disappear if people would feel a part of the
company community.

Factors like specialization and

restricted interaction on the assembly line led to low
morale (Chinoy, 1952).

Studies by the Tavistock Institute

about the effects of technology on social relations
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indicated that people became more productive if tasks are
satisfying and less fragmented (Trist, 1976).
The Human Relations school is linked to the Durkheimian
tradition with its concern for community and attempt to end
the anomic work conditions created by technology.

But

instead of changing the work organization, Human Relations
writers made efforts to create a value system which fostered
a sense of community, including building teams through group
incentive programs and establishing employee counseling
departments. This model fits into a larger framework called
the Open Systems perspective, where the organization
interacts with the environment, monitors boundaries and
imports resources from the environment (Scott, 1981).

There

is a close connection between the state of the environment
and that of the organization.

In fact Lawrence and Lorsch

argue in their Contingency Theory Model (Daft, 1986) that
the best way to organize departments depended on the
environment.

Because the environment varies so much,

organizations develop departments with differentiated
features, resulting in a greater effort to integrate the
parts. A variation of the Open Systems framework, Population
Ecology, explains the success or failure of organizations on
how well they find a "niche" in the environment and meet a
need through its present form (Daft, 1986; Scott, 1981).
This model offered a sharp contrast to the rational
model because goals are generated by the environment and not
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by the organization's objectives and desires for efficiency.
oecision-making is no longer as rational and quantified as
previously thought. Decisions are now better explained
they match organizational realities -- by the "garbage can
model" where problems, solutions, and resources float freely
within the organization.

Some problems will eventually link

with resources to solve them, but others never will be
solved.

Resources are wasted waiting for a special problem

to benefit from them (Cohen & March, 1972).

This concept

questions the myth, generated by the rational model, that
any problem is solvable given enough time and resources.

c.

Power Paradigm

Critical View
From the mid-1970s to the present, researchers looked
critically at the rational model. Their attacks pointed out
what is missing in the rational perspective and what the
power or "critical" approach offered as an alternative.
Benson's (1977) new approach to organizational analysis
questioned the production of organizational "realities" like
goals, technology, and structure instead of taking them for
granted.

Researchers are not to ignore the processes (e.g.,

conflict, negotiations) that produced variables like an
organization chart.

Benson also saw power as an essential

issue which produced other organizational features.

He

agreed with Pfeffer that the structure is an expression of
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power, both inside and outside the organization.

The

rational model studied the orderly patterning of structural
features like specialization, centralization, and
formalization, as subject, while the power perspective
viewed these same elements as a means of social control and
not a neutral method for goal attainment as the rational
model argued.
In rejecting the Weberian model, Goldman & Van Heuten
(1977), described five deficiencies of the rational model
addressed in the power paradigm.

studies discuss the

history or the ways an organization has changed.

Variables

like social class {inequality) and conflict are not
excluded.

A political-economy perspective is used instead

of emphasizing micro-analysis, which focused only on the
work unit.

Studies take a working-class instead of a

capitalist perspective, and finally analysis is dialectical,
revealing change through conflict and struggle.
Another recent attack on the current state of
organizational theory (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984) offered
the "critical" or power paradigm as a viable research
alternative. Organizations are more than instruments for
getting work done, but are means for seeking personal,
group, or class interests. Managers set the conditions where
production is controlled and distributed to determine what

is made and who receives it to meet economic and social
interests. According to the authors, Braverman argued that
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production wasn't arranged to achieve efficiency, but to
help managers prevent workers from controlling their own
work. Fischer and Sirianni contend that a number of themes
divided the critical perspective from the rational theories.
They opposed an elitist theory of organizations which
defined managers as the most valuable members of the unit
and devalued workers. Next they called attention to class
conflict because the rational model assumed that
corporations and workers shared similar interests which
maintained the status quo. The third area involved the
limited analysis the rational model afforded to power.
Rarely is this topic seen as "domination or coercion", but
that's what a hierarchy of positions, control by rules, and
a monopoly of knowledge produced. Their fourth factor called
for examining power, conflict, and control in their specific
social, political, and historical contexts. In the rational
models, organizations seemed to evolve by a gradual, natural
process of technological and managerial forces, concealing
the decisions of the dominant coalitions, generally the
managers. The final area called for a new research
methodology, using case studies, historical analysis, action
research, and participant observation to move from the
belief that there is one best structure or process for all
organizations.
The comments of the above three groups illustrates the
contributions of the power paradigm.

Attention is focused
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on the social and historical context, the political-economy,
class interests, and research methods, which are areas not
taken seriously before.

The power approach has opened up

organizational research and questioned many taken-forgranted assumptions of the rational model.
The power paradigm complements the human relations
school, but tends to greatly limit the rational model by
pointing out major shortcomings.

Power and human relations

positions share a number of core values which allows them to
support each other.

In neither case are people seen as

purely rational and autonomous, economic actors, but as
influenced by internal and external forces.

The human

relations school accounted for members creating and then
reacting to an informal system.

Similarly environmental

forces cause realignment of structure to match changes in
dominant coalitions (Pfeffer, 1978). Also both models are
concerned with survival: the human relations school reveals
employees forming cliques and informal leaders, using worksaving methods to survive the formal, rational system; the
power school demands knowledge of the environment
(political-economy) to alter structures to adapt to change
and survive. Both of these paradigms used a variety of
research methods including case studies, document review,
observation, and interviews.

Mayo's Hawthorne studies and

Salancik and Pfeffer's (1974) study of resource allocation
and power at a university used similar methods.

Finally
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both perspectives, based on empirical data, seem to reflect
organizational realities better than the rational model .
.a_tructural Influences
using rational approaches, structures are patterns of
relations among positions, used to produce certain goals.
For Pfeffer (1978), structure reflected the outcome of power
struggles and conflict resolutions.

Power comes from the

formal authority of one's position; control over resources;
access to key information; and the ability to cope with
critical organizational needs and reduce uncertainty from
environmental factors like competitors and government
regulations.

In explaining structures, Pfeffer argued that,

unlike the rational model where structures and subunits are
designed to meet certain goals, power struggles and conflict
resolutions involving coalitions produce a particular
structure.

For him structure is clearly the result of a

political process and not the result of a rational goalsetting process (Pfeffer, 1978).

It shows the pattern of

control over resources, authority, and decision-making.
Pfeffer {1978) also addressed the organization's
requirement to manage interdependence -- the need for
workers with different jobs to work together.

For him

structure -- the product of political contests -- managed
interdependence through several means of organizational
design.

39

Tasks and Role Specialization -- performing a
1
n~rrow range of duties makes replacement easier and
produces less power. Unique skills increases the power
of a position.
2. vertical Differentiation -- the number of levels or
positions affects control because with fewer ranks,
people have more control, where with more levels,
control is lessened through information distortion.
3. Horizontal Differentiation -- this concerns the
number of departments where diffusion creates less
power.
4. Rules -- avoids conflict, builds patterns, makes
actions legitimate and reflects past compromises.
5. centralization -- refers to the degree that
decision-making is concentrated in unit. In a centralized arrangement, problems are pushed up the
organization to be handled by a higher rank.
6. Recruitment -- control attained by selecting
people who share similar values (Rothschild-Whitt,
1979) .
7. Socialization -- devices like training programs,
and media are used to teach new employees the organization's values and expected ways of behaving.
(Pascale, 1984)
Mills (1959) took a macro-level view of power when he
defined the "Power Elite" as the top leaders from the
corporate, military, and political spheres who interacted to
maintain the status quo. One process he noted is the common
nature of executive skills which allowed the elites to
transfer between spheres.

An admiral can also be a banker,

linking two of the three elite groups.
Brass (1984) used a structural analysis to study the
relation between position and influence.

He defined power

using earlier research: control of resources (Salancik &
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pfeffer, 1977); centrality -- access to resources;
criticality -- being irreplaceable (Mechanic, 1962; Pfeffer,
197 s), and found that criticality is strongly related to
influence.
Kanter's (1977) study of the impact of structures on
variables like attitude, mobility, and power illustrated
some key features of organizations.

An individual's power

is a function of his/her position in the system, and the
level of opportunity the positions commands.

Those in

opportunity positions with upward mobility are motivated to
succeed, while those without opportunity withdraw and have
lower aspirations.

Her analysis confirmed that power rests

on the ability to handle environmental domain problems,
i.e., solve dependency problems and control relevant sources
of uncertainty.

Internally, power comes from doing

something extraordinary, like taking a major marketing risk.
Activities build power when they are visible and noticed by
powerful people.

Also the special, visible activity must be

important or critical to the organization.
Inequality Factors
In describing his interactionist theory of deviance
(also known as labeling theory) Becker (1973), commented on
the effects of class differences.

He contends that groups

make rules which define situations, and determining what
rules to enforce, what behavior is deviant, and who's
labeled as an "outsider" are political decisions.

Deviance
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is then the infraction of some rule created by a dominant
group in society.

He notes there are variances in the

application of the rules along class, ethnic, occupational
and cultural lines.

Who defines the situation is a question

of political and economic power. For example, adults make
rules for children; men make them for women; whites for
blacks; the middle class for the lower class; and managers
for subordinates.

Rule-making and application reflect power

differences between groups and between individuals.
Kanter (1977) developed a structural explanation for
the inequality women experience in her study.

The small

number of women in certain professional jobs produced a
"token" status for women, causing them to be perceived
mainly in their ascribed statuses of race, sex, and age.
Since they are more visible due to small numbers, they held
a larger share of attention during interactions.
Differences are exaggerated and extremes emphasized.

They

are assimilated into the group through stereotypes, leading
to further distortions. This visibility created a number of
consequences.

There are performance pressures due to less

privacy, a belief that this particular woman represented all
women, and undue attention to physical appearances instead
of ability.

Secondly, dominants exaggerated differences by

teasing, making sexual innuendos, reacting to the content of
jokes, and maintaining secrets about job performance to keep
women isolated.

Finally tokenism produced role entrapment,
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distorting features to fit generalizations.

Women are given

the wrong identities and treated like secretaries, dates, or
wives.

They are often trapped in roles that men, the

dominant group, can respond to, such as mother, seductress,
pet and iron maiden.

Kanter also noted that secretaries

derived their status from their bosses, who often interacted
with them as though they are husband and wife.

All of these

factors placed women in less powerful positions, but more
stressful circumstances.
Resource Allocation Impact
In 1974 Salancik and Pfeffer conducted a study to
determine which factors explained the funding allocation for
graduate fellowships at the University of Illinois.

They

wanted to know why some departments had more money to spend.
In brief they found the department's ability to provide
resources to the larger organization accounted for its
power. The most highly correlated resource for power is the
department's ability to allocate resources such as acquiring
grants and contracts.

Power is based on the group's ability

to provide resources for the organization, which are
critical, important, and scarce.

Their research also found

that the department is willing to use more power to obtain a
scarce and critical resource.

Since the group's power

increased when it acquired resources, success led to even
more power resource delivery.

Finally power increased when
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departments coped with environmental problems like
investigations into research proposals.
Rewards, Incentives, and Evaluations
A number of studies described how individual rewards
are allocated in a bureaucratic setting (Edwards, 1984).
Edwards argued that the organization rewarded workers who
showed three types of compliance behaviors:
1.

work rules orientation like concern with time,
and attendance

2.

habits of predictability and dependability like
self-control

3.

internalization of units goals and values,
exhibiting leadership and commitment to culture

Compliance with these criteria is enforced through
unequal distributions of rewards, because those who followed
the rules are valuable.

Edwards found that the incentive

structure rewarded the above three control relevant factors
and the traits fit different employee levels.

Work at the

lowest level (hourly) is controlled by explicit rules, while
the middle group (white-collar clerical) is controlled by
mutual expectations and self-control.

The highest level

(professionals, managers) is controlled by the lure of
accepting the unit's values, "becoming one of them".
Rewards are given to those who obeyed the rules.
Other researchers have commented on evaluations,
including Rothschild-Whitt (1979) who argued that
collectivist units offered a larger variety of rewards than
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bureaucratic organizations.

There are flexible hours,

personal use of company cars, and a chance to make decisions
that affected them.

Evaluations are influenced by

supporting the value of community and rejecting the value of
confrontation.
Clark and Wilson (1961) argued that organizations
distributed incentives to induce members to contribute
activity.

Cooperation and conflict are explained as

competition for autonomy and resources, and all units use
incentives as exchanges for contributions.

There are three

types of incentives available, which vary and fit different
types of organizations: material -- money (e.g., business),
solitary -- status (e.g., service oriented -- colleges), and
purposive -- producing a good (e.g., protest, civil rights).
Kipnis (1984) reported about the impact that
routinizing technology has on managers' perceptions of
workers.

When technology routinized work, control of

skilled activities and decision-making are transferred from
people to machines.

The worker loses bargaining power and

skills, while managers control the work flow and become less
dependent on the worker's skills.

But an even larger

consequence is that managers devalue the efforts of those
doing routine jobs.

Bosses directing these people saw them

as less hard-working, loyal, and with less pride.

They

blamed ineffective performance on the worker's lack of
motivation rather than a lack of ability. As the manager
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gains power, influence tactics shift from request to
demands.

Bosses of non-routine employees rated themselves

as having more influence than supervisors of those with
routine tasks.

Also the effective worker in a non-routine

job gets higher ratings than his routine job based worker.
success is credited to talent and skills more in non-routine
settings.

Kipnis argued that human adaptation to technology

created new situations which shape social relations.
Technology changed manager's perceptions about worker's
contributions and in turn altered the manager-employee
relationships.
Another example of how the power paradigm affects
evaluations comes from Etzioni's (1961) work on the link
between organizational type and method of employee
involvement.

Coercive units like prisons force inmates to

remain through control of rewards and punishments (Goffman,
1961).

Utilitarian types, such as corporations, use

contract arrangements and normative units, like religious
groups or political parties, use the person's identification
with group's values.

Each of these organizational types

creates a unique set of manager-subordinate feelings.

The

coercive type produces reactions of dependence, anger, or
loyalty; the utilitarian form engenders caution, concern
with equity; and the normative type produces involvement,
commitment, and dedication.
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Scott and Dornbusch (1967) analyzed authority systems
by evaluating actors' performance.

Problems in the

evaluation process make the authority system incompatible
with actor's goal attainment, where evaluations are used to
distribute unequal rewards.

Performance is tied to the

raters use of evaluations, and actors valued evaluations
because they are linked to rewards.
Evaluators have 4 tasks and

11

rights 11 in the process:

1. allocate goals -- determine what should be done.
2. set criteria -- specify desired performance, and
which standards to use.
3. sampling -- right to select segments of performance
for evaluation.
4. appraising -- right to decide how performance can
be judged from sample; apply criteria to reach
evaluation.
The evaluation process supported the authority
structure because authority (i.e., legitimated power) comes
from the position of significant evaluators, whose actions,
decisions, and judgments influence the distribution of
rewards.

They are "authorized" to make these decisions.

An earlier study of bureaucracy (Blau, 1967) provided a
functional analysis of the impact of statistical records, as
a evaluation device, on behavior and relationships. Blau
reported that written performance reports had a number of
consequences.

On the positive side from management's

perspective, he noted that reports control behavior and
improve performances as workers receive feedback and then
seek to improve to obtain rewards; and improved the boss-
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subordinate relationship due to the written, visible nature
of performance which is measured against bureaucratic
standards and not the personal opinions of various
supervisors.
Blau noted a number of unexpected consequences from
written records.

Social relations between interviewers

changed from cooperation to competition in making job
placements, lowering productivity.

The unit experienced

"goal-displacement" where the means to improved performance
(i.e., appraisals based on written records) became an end
itself.

Getting a good appraisal is more important than

meeting the organization's goals of client placement.
Emphasis is now on establishing a good set of performance
records than in performing well.

Blau found the behavior

measured became the important behavior, so what is visible
and easy to measure became what the agency treated as
important behavior.

Also interviewers did not like

unrestricted observation of their work and they became
afraid to try some techniques, which could aid placements,
because they are afraid to fail and hurt their performance
status.

He also found that new supervisors are more lenient

in applying standards because they hoped to establish a set
of reciprocal, social obligations which could later
effectively control workers. Blau's work illustrates the
unexpected consequences of evaluation techniques and the
methods workers used to handle this organizational force. He
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also demonstrated the importance of the variable of
visibility, as others have (Kanter, 1977), in determining
evaluation ratings.
Kanter's (1977) previously cited work on the impact of
the numerical make-up of organizations on groups which are
vastly under-represented

"tokens" -- provided additional

insight into the process of evaluations.

She argued that

the relative rarity of tokens is linked to various problems.
Tokens got attention because they are noticed for being
"different" from the dominants, resulting in polarization
between tokens and dominants and the exaggeration of
differences.

It is more problematic for tokens to fit in

because dominants employed stereotypes related to their
social status.

These perceptual factors caused a number of

problems especially those related to performance pressures.
Since their performances are more public, they had less
privacy and mistakes became more widely known than those
committed by dominants.

Secondly, there is undue attention

to their physical appearance (e.g., style of dress) rather
than their ability.

Tokens did not want to succeed too much

because dominants looked bad. Faced with these conditions,
tokens either try harder or limited their visibility,
avoided events, kept a low profile, and avoided risks. The
imbalance of numerical proportions in personnel
configurations affected the appraisal outcomes for tokens.
Their behavior is exaggerated, they are more visible, and as
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a result their performance is misjudged or they changed

behavior patterns to cope with the situation, took a low
profile, and received a poorer evaluation because they are
not meeting the unit's standards. Kanter effectively argued
that structure influenced the interactions of the
organization's members, producing negative consequences for
some members' performance evaluations.
Another attempt to explain evaluations (Caplow, 1964)
compared different occupational groups on the basis of who
evaluates, how evaluation occurs, and what is appraised.
caplow pointed out that evaluations are done primarily by
peers (professionals) , supervisors (bureaucratic
organizations), and the public (bankers, political
candidates).

But he noted that in all jobs co-workers

either directly evaluate or affect performance by imposing
norms on acceptable performance, as in the Hawthorne studies
where the work group decided how much skill workers could
demonstrate.

He also noted that some work (professionals)

is performed by those whose contributions are seen as not
interchangeable, while others (machine operators) used
routine skills and are highly interchangeable.

In the

latter group, factors such as seniority, union activity,
personal relations, and education played a more significant
role in evaluation. Caplow's main point is that in no
situations are evaluations based on skill or performance
alone.

Factors such as peers, social relations, ancestry,
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appearance, and age affected the objective judgement of a
person's work performance and subsequent appraisal.
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D·

cultural Dimensions

H.istorical Development of the Field
corporate culture is a relatively new term that may
have been coined by Ouchi (1982) when he compared the
Japanese and American cultures and offered his Theory Z as
an alternative.

A number of journal articles referred to

this field as "Organizational Culture" which broadens its
application to all types of organizations.
An especially helpful article by Ouchi and Wilkins
(1985), provided a historical framework to understand the
development, major themes, and research trends of the field.
They saw organization culture as a continuation of the main
line of organizational sociology which focused on the
normative bases and shared understandings that regulate
social life.

Studies revealed the tension over work

examined explicit, i.e., prone to measurement, variables
versus studies concerned with implicit, i.e., interpretive
phenomenon.
The field has its roots in anthropology following both
the work of Radcliffe-Brown for his functionalist view and
Geertz for his focus on language and symbols.

The popular

works (Ouchi, Deal and Kennedy) used the functionalist
tradition, while Pandy, Smircich (1983), and Van Maanen
(1976) are tied to the "semiotic" or language approach.
Ouchi and Wilkins felt that several streams of
sociological work influenced organizational culture.

Under
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the explicit vs implicit tension, a number of sociologists
emphasized the everyday life aspect of organizations.
Goffman felt there is more meaning here; Durkheim held that
we know symbolic structure through myths and rituals; and
Berger and Luckmann (1967) in describing the social
construction of knowledge, supported the use of
observational methods rather than statistics.
studies of the 1950s and 1960s described the impact of
informal relations on the formal structure.

Although

mainstream studies supported themes of rationality, symbolic
interactionists focused on non-rational aspects.

During the

mid-1940s, Simon combined a belief in rationality with
observations of "non-rationality" in a school system by
stressing the limited information processing ability of
people.

For the next 20 years, from 1945-1965, the authors

found the research continued to reveal tensions between both
formal vs informal and explicit vs implicit issues.

Case

studies now took the researcher's point of view to explain
how "irrational" behavior is rational.

The beginnings of

what would become organizational culture is forming in the
non-rational, implied camp.

The rational model is incapable

of explaining all that occurred. During this period the
growing use of computers and increasing popularity of
multivariate analysis supported the view of organizations as
rational.

However, ethnographers and symbolic

interactionists (Becker, Roy, Janowitz) produced some

53

notable work in the sociology of occupations during the
l950s and 1960s.
A major break occurred when Cohen & March (1972)
observed the resistance of school systems to bureaucratic
interpretations, including the idea that Simon's "bounded
rationality" concept didn't capture the low level of
rational features of school systems.

They referred to this

condition as "organized anarchies", naming the decisionmaking process the "garbage can model".
other studies followed (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) which
described formal structure as nothing more than "myth and
ceremony" detached from the real activities of actors.
According to these researchers, organizations acted in
conflict with the technical goals of efficiency.

Various

myths or unverified beliefs, reflecting environmental
conditions, created organizational procedures and
structures.

This position is contrary to one that

attributes causality to factors like the demands of the
task, resulting in organizations that do not work like the
blueprints used to design them.

The authors argued that a

number of conditions characterized large organizations:
structure did not produce the desired activities; rules are
often violated; inefficient methods continued to be used;
and inspection and evaluation efforts are subverted.
Structures reflected myths, i.e., the understanding of
social life, which identified social purposes as technical
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goals.

Myths defined the appropriate functions, certified

professionals, and established rules of practice.

They made

organizational programs, like appraisals, seem rational and
necessary for efficiency goals.

Structures are made to fit

and accept the myths from the environment, and they
explained work activities to internal and external actors,
while myths revealed the shared understandings of the unit.
Because organizations are closely linked the to
environmental domains, they used external criteria of
"worth" as a basis to determine the value of contributions
to the production of the organization's goods and services.
Success depended on factors beyond efficiency and Meyer
and Rowan argued that if organizations match their
environment, they had legitimacy and are successful.
Another factor is the use of rules to promote trust and
confidence in output and to buffer organizations from
inspection.

Rules can be in conflict with each other and

the goals of efficiency, but their value comes from the
appearances they generated for internal actors and external
constituents.

The gain in positive image from using a

consultant, for example, counted more toward success than
any real measurable gain in efficiency that the consultant
could produce.
The authors suggested that successful organizations
handle conflicts by "decoupling" structure from activity
where managers didn't see or make much of the performance of
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professionals.

There is also less emphasis on the

measurement of results and evaluation practices are more of
a ceremony than a device to measure efficiency.

Goals are

achieved through informal activities, and the willingness of
actors, trying to make things work out.

These last points

are similar to other arguments for the utility of
cooperative actions in organizations (Becker, 1982,1986).
conflict between goals of efficiency and institutionalized
myths are also resolved through building "confidence and
good faith" among members.

This is achieved through

"ceremonial" management which used avoidance, discretion,
and the overlooking of contradictions.

Evaluation practices

are minimized and inspection became a ceremony in order to
protect the unit's ability to remain legitimate in terms of
the environment's needs.
Meyer and Rowan concluded that the drive toward
organizational survival produced decoupling, rituals of
confidence, and avoidances of inspection.

Organizational

actions and programs (e.g., like evaluations) must support
environmental myths.

To help achieve this, departments

remained loosely coupled.
Organizations are now seen as social phenomenon with
its own features separate from the environment and desires
of individual actors.

Some researchers in schools of

management moved away from statistics and sought new
perspectives and techniques in studying community and
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occupational structures.

According to Ouchi and Wilkins

(l985), this break produced the study of organizational
cultures around the 1970s.

The study of informal

organizations, initially a reaction to rationality, is
transformed into the study of organizational culture.
Ouchi and Wilkins then addressed the contribution of
social psychology to organizational culture.

Studies in

persuasion, the non-rational features of people, and the
impact of stories in decision-making, supported the need for
a new paradigm.

The authors reviewed the current theory and

research in organizational culture.

The first body of

theory is macro-analytic, which examined the functions of
culture in maintaining the group.

An example is the

typology of rites used to fulfill social functions (Trice &
Beyer, 1984).

Researchers described the function of the

pattern of beliefs, language and symbols in keeping order.
The second body of theory, micro-analytic, saw culture as
resident in each person and which is understood through
sense-making processes.

Under this more psychological

approach, Schein (1984) viewed culture as the sum of what
individuals have learned.
The final section described empirical studies of
culture, using a variety of methods, including: survey
research, participant observation, ethnomethodology and
symbolic interaction.

Holistic studies include Van Maanen's

work in the socialization of police recruits; semiotic
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studies, focusing on language and symbolism, are represented
by Barley's research of funeral directors efforts to make
sense of their work; and quantitative studies, represented
by ouchi & Johnson's work which used questionnaires to
describe the differences in the cultures of companies "A"
and "Z".
Another attempt to define the theories of
organizational culture is offered by Allaire and Firsirotu
(1984) who argued that culture is a sociocultural and
ideational system.

The first system had four branches of

emphasis which the authors linked to various organizational
theories. In the functionalist branch, culture is a means
for a person to cope with the unit's problems.

In the Human

Relations tradition, it is concerned with the fit between
the organization's and member's needs.
The structural-functionalist branch provided an
adaptive means for people to live a social life as an
ordered community.
needs.

Organizations are systems with goals and

The ecological branch saw culture as a system of

socially transmitted behavior relating groups to their
settings.

Organizations took varied forms as they adapted

to the environment and are selected in or out of existence
by ecological circumstances.

Here we find use of

contingency and population ecology theories.

The last

branch is the historical where culture is produced by the
time, circumstances and place of the unit's birth.
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stinchcombe's work on the permanent nature of some
organizations fits here, as well as Pettigrew's (1979)
description of the origin and development of an
organization's culture due to the impact of its founder.
The notion of culture as a system of ideas also has
four parts, and this set of theories locates culture in
shared meanings, symbols, values and organizational
knowledge.

These variables are seen as separate from and

not in agreement with the social system's structure.
The first branch is the cognitive, where culture is a
system of knowledge, containing what one has to know and
believe in to operate in an acceptable manner.

studies on

organizational climate and learning are found here.

The

structuralist branch is the second part and held that
organizational forms and processes are social manifestations
of widespread and unconscious processes of the mind.

Schein

(1984) touched on this area when he wrote about the degrees
of knowing a culture based on artifacts and assumptions.
The third branch of ideational theories saw culture as a
mutual-equivalence structure -- systems of cognitions
(knowing) which allowed people with different orientations
to organize and participate in the community.

Weick's

position that interrelated behavior produced collective
structures to meet personal needs and Etzioni's (1961)
identification of participant's commitments to the
organization fit here.
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The symbolic school is the final branch, taking an
interpretive view of culture as a system of shared meanings
and symbols, where humans act in "webs of significance" they
created.

Symbols are the raw material for interpreting the

ordered system of meaning in interactions.
further divided into three perspectives.

This branch is
The action

perspective held that organizations are the result of a mix
of variables including their birth, history, context, and
technology.

Pettigrew (1979), as mentioned before,

contended that the organization's founder and its history
created culture in the form of symbols, language, beliefs,
and myths.

The interpretive action perspective emphasized

the unit's history, the dominant actor's definition of the
situation, and sense-making activities.

The last

perspective is ethnomethodology where organizations had no
external reality, but are "social creations emerging from
actors making sense out of ongoing streams of actions".

The

focus is on how individual actors made sense out of events
in the organizational setting.
An interesting note on the symbolic branch is that this
dimension is "not necessarily coordinated, consonant, or
synchronized with the formal structures, goals, or
management processes" (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984).
The authors found three contributing to culture:
1.
2.

Ambient society's values
Organization's history and leadership
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3.

Contingency factors like environment and
technology.

The theories they reviewed focused on different parts
of the social system.

First, culture as a construct found

in values, myths, and artifacts.

Secondly, culture as a

study of individual actors, defining situations and
constructing reality,

Finally, culture as a set of shared

constructions about an organization and how to act in it.
Their view of the field pointed out an often ignored
aspect: there may be a tension between the formal,
structural part of a unit and its symbolic, cultured side.
When markets or technology changed, the organization adapted
by altering goals and structures, but these efforts are
unsuccessful because the unit's cultural system (e.g.,
values, and myths) are not congruent with the revised
social-structural system, producing coping problems.
Trist's study of the social effects of changing coal-mining
technology illustrated this point (Trist, 1976).
The conceptual framework presented contained 3 parts:
the sociocultural, dealing with structure, policies, control
and rewards; the

cultural, covering the expressive and

affective dimensions in shared symbols found in myths,
values and artifacts (e.g., rites, stories); the actors, who
experienced the organization and made sense of the events.
In their conclusions, Allaire and Firsirotu distilled
the theoretical considerations into a few definitive
concepts.

Organizations are social creations and at the
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same time, creators of social meaning.

The classical

literature defined organizations as mainly sociocultural
with the cultural part assumed to agree with the structure.
In the final view, culture is a system of symbols, shaped by
society, the organization's history, its leaders, and
modified by actors making sense of events.

This statement

succinctly linked the elements of the authors' three part
framework.
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~ultural

Variables

corporate culture is useful in the study of
organizations because it focused on factors usually
overlooked, taken-for-granted, considered unimportant, or
not seen as legitimate areas of research.

The relatively

new field looked at implied, interpretative, non-rational
features like decision-making and found new explanations:
assumptions and stories are used more than measurable, hard
data.

Through the concept of culture, the life of an

organization became an appropriate research topic.

This

produced new data concerning symbols, rites, stories, and
beliefs, and led to questioning the underlying assumptions
of bureaucratic groups to uncover how processes really
occurred, instead of taking events for granted.

The field

introduced new metaphors to replace those of the
organization as merely a machine or organism, leading to
deeper research insights into the meaning of myths,
language, and stories.

The field has also helped legitimate

and validate symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology as
research approaches.

One of the most significant

contributions is its ability to organize and integrate a
variety of other paradigms, such as power, ecological, and
human relations.

These seemingly diverse schools appeared

relatively comfortable under the organizational culture
umbrella.
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ftociological Perspectives
Smircich (1983) discussed how the concept of culture is
significant for studying organizations, concluding that
various concepts of culture carried different assumptions
and produced diverse research agendas.

She held that the

use of metaphors -- seeing one variable in terms of another
-- in researching organizations frame and separate
experience.

Organizations are described as : machines

instruments for tasks; organisms -- life-like bodies
struggling for survival in changing environments; theaters - settings to perform roles and dramas, like unionmanagement negotiations; and political arenas -- settings to
pursue and display power (Pfeffer, 1978).

Each approached

offered a different way of knowing the organization.
She proposed 5 different "programs" of research to
study organizational cultures.

The first is comparative

management where culture influenced beliefs in different
countries. (Ouchi, 1982)

The second program is corporate

culture where the organization created a culture (i.e.,
rituals, beliefs), as a by-product, along with its formal
goods and services (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Culture is viewed
as social glue that kept the parts together, in which myths,
stories, and language expressed beliefs.

Here we find the

popular notion, and a value of management, that culture is a
tool to manage and change the organization to achieve
rational goals.

The third program saw culture as a metaphor

64

for seeing organizations, four of these comparisons are
described above.

The idea is to go beyond the traditional

instrumental view and see organizations as systems of shared
knowledge and beliefs.

The task is to find rules, and

research how members saw events.

The symbolic perspective,

the third part, depicted culture as a system of shared
symbols and meanings where the task is to identify shared
understandings that oriented social activity.

The focus of

research is on the way experience became meaningful.
Manning's (1977) work on the world of police officers is
offered as an example, and he showed how people interpreted
their experiences and how this understanding is used to act.
The structural and psychodynamic program is the final one in
which culture is the expression of unconscious psychological
processes, and organizational forms and practices are
projections of unconscious processes.

As noted earlier,

Schein (1984) made a similar point in discussing levels of
awareness in knowing culture. Smircich's point is that
culture provided researchers with a device to frame the
study of organizations differently from the machine and
organism metaphors, focusing attention on subjective,
interpretive aspects such as, language, and myths.
In related research Pettigrew (1979) examined how
organizations created and used culture.

He employed a

historical approach and found that a strong founder created
symbols, beliefs and rituals which changed during "social
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As noted earlier, the concept of culture is applied to
explain apparently irrational, unproductive behaviors. The
authors described six rites used to research corporate
culture.
1. Passage -- events that lead to change in role and
status. The rite helps a person reestablish social
relations. Army induction illustrates the stages of
separation (haircuts), transition (new skills -- guns), and
incorporation (awards). These activities socialize the
recruit into new procedures and language (Goffman, 1961,
1959) •
2. Degradation -- used to remove high status people by
focusing attention on person, discrediting by use of socalled objective analysis, and public removal. This rite
dissolves identities and power.
3. Enhancement
builds status and motivates through
recognition and awards.
4. Renewal -- energize existing social structure
through meetings, team building, and QWL (Quality of
Worklife) programs. It makes members feel something is
being done about the problem, but in cases like QWL, more
conflict is generated over union reactions (Rinehart, 1984;
Parker & Hansen, 1983).
5. Conflict Reduction -- inequalities in authority and
resources produce conflicts which can be disruptive.
Bargaining and arbitration present demands used to disguise
parties' real position. Fights and late sessions symbolizes
resistance, but they actually reflect cooperation. Another
rite is to form a committee or task force to hear problems.
Use of agendas and minutes bring sense of order to
proceedings.
6. Integration -- use of parties, picnics to lessen
social distance, and professional conferences to support the
myth that people are learning important concepts, provide
opportunities for divergent groups to interact more.
Trice and Beyer thought rites led to a "web of meaning"
about organizations because cultural variables are linked to
other organizational variables.

They had clear beginning
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and ending points and are observable, making them easy to
study.

Rites also aided the study of change because they

worked to block change by preserving social life; remained
operative where there is agreement on values; and expressed
the beliefs of dominant elites.

The authors made a clear

and convincing case for using rites to study organizations.
As the discussion showed, researchers studied
organizational culture from two main approaches:
sociological which dealt with the purpose of structures and
processes, and symbolic which focused on shared meanings and
attempts to interpret the organization's activities.
Methods tended to be qualitative (e.g., interviews, and
observation).

Some approaches saw culture as a tool to

manage the unit as it dealt with the environment.

Of all

the contributions the field of organizational culture made,
one stood out in sharp contrast to the rational model: the
exposure of non-rational, implied, everyday life occurrences
that proved interesting and brought the field of
organizational studies to life.
Management Perspectives
A number of researchers produced works which received
wide acclaim from business leaders.

These studies usually

did not meet the demands of more rigorous academic journals.
They fall into the area of "pop" sociology because they
treated current issues in a popular, easy-to-read style
without technical jargon or a strong theoretical base.
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Another feature distinguished them: they framed cultural
concepts, rationally, as tools to manage the business, solve
problems, and cope with the environment.
A number of recent books appealed to business leaders
for their practical advice.

Peters and Waterman (1982)

described traits discovered when they compared successful to
less successful U.S. companies.

One of the factors

responsible for successful companies is their unique set of
cultural attributes which adapted values and practices of
leaders whose role is to manage these values.

The authors

faulted rational models for using too much planning and too
little action.

People are influenced by stories, a cultural

variable, more than empirical data.

Leaders defined

situations, explained and changed symbols, and gained
employee commitment.

Strong cultures are associated with

successful companies where stories, slogans, and legends are
employed to convey the organization's shared values, which
then guided action in the unit.

The organization is

conceived of as "a body of meaning" that must be managed.
Culture is seen as a management tool to regulate variables
and provide meaning for core business purposes.

These

notions fit the functional approach of the sociocultural
perspective, although this framework is not employed for
business leaders who, surely after reading In Search of
Excellence, are oriented toward practical action plans.
Successful companies had clear values that are known to
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members through leaders and heroes.

Corporate culture

called for risk-taking and accepted some failure, thus
promoting innovation and creativity.
Pascale (1984) wrote about the need to assimilate new
employees into the organization's culture, describing steps
of socialization as a "how to" guide.

He felt the process

produced cooperation and conformity, allowing the
organization to work effectively. Some of these steps
included:
1. Use of a rigorous selection process so candidates
would know the unit's values.
2. Experiences to induce humility, question old
values, and accept new norms.
3. Measure results and reward accordingly to promote
the group's values.
4.

Use of stories to teach code of conduct.

5. Role models to teach promising people successful
behavior.
Pascale said that U.S. companies used formal controls
to obtain order and culture to manage ambiguity, reduce
anxiety, and guard against outside threats.

A clear culture

helped in the formation of rules and understanding, and
career paths revealed what is important and required to
succeed. Culture is again conceptualized as a tool to
manage, and this time it is anxiety which had to be
controlled.

Its existence is assumed and its purpose is
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taken-for-granted.

Although no broad framework is

described, culture served a functional purpose.
In the past several years a number of Business Week
articles dealt with corporate culture.

In Byrne's (1985)

article about the shift in management approaches at People
Airlines by the top man, Burr, due to economic problems,
there is only a brief reference to the "family culture" that
People had before environmental conditions forced change.
The culture at People used a participatory management style,
employee-ownership, a flat structure, and job rotation,
which all changed when traffic growth failed to keep up with
Burr's projected growth in routes and schedules.

Culture is

presented as an invisible, taken-for-granted factor that is
changed by the leader's reaction to the environment.
A second article, "Changing a Corporate Culture" (1984)
dealt with Johnson and Johnson's move to more sophisticated
technology markets and desire to change its management style
and culture.

The arrangement required more autonomy,

willingness to make mistakes, and more cooperation between
units.

The company's tradition called for independence but

now cooperation is needed.

To change this, more employees

are moved between companies (cooperation) and information is
now exchanged.

The article pointed out the need to change

the culture when markets or products changed.

In this case

culture is viewed as a set of procedures for doing business.
As discussed earlier, structures may change but cultural
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practices may not match, causing coping difficulties and the
inability to support the system.

The article is presented

as a successful case of change, but no information on the
cultural aspect is developed (Trist, 1976).
The final article described efforts by General Motor's
chairman, Roger smith, to change GM's culture where there is
a need to merge Hughes Aircraft with GM.

Smith wanted to

cut GM's hierarchy and push decision-making down, while
using participatory management.

There is a conflict between

the two cultures because GM is not a dynamic or riskoriented.

Managers felt tension trying to cope with

changes, again indicating that cultural values are not
necessarily consonant with new structures.

The Engineering

group at my location is in a similar situation.

There are a

number of structural and hierarchical changes, but people
still related to supervisors as though they occupied their
former ranks.

Also decision-making did not take place any

lower in the group than before because the reward structure
still valued success and not failure.

Risk-taking is not

rewarded and decisions are still pushed to the top.

The

article did not adequately explain the concept of corporate
culture.

It is a way of doing business, found in the

reporting structure while culture represented a wider
reality.
Deal and Kennedy (1982) wrote a popular, readable and
useful book on Corporate Culture.

They stressed the impact
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of strong cultures (i.e., values) on high performance, and
the uses of heroes and rituals to pass on beliefs and build
conunitment.

A clear indication that this book is intended

to help management included the authors four reasons why it
is important to understand culture:
1.

It provided ways to manage

2.

Systems of informal rules saved time

3.

People understood the setting, felt better and
worked harder

4.

Culture provided standards, so people saw what
skills are needed to succeed.

They also described four kinds of cultures which had no
relevance to anything in the academic literature cited
above.

Their categories described "ideal" types of people

and ways of coping that did not seem transferable to other
organizations.

Their groupings might work as a checklist of

qualities to start a problem-solving discussion, but not for
any serious organizational analysis.

Managers had the

responsibility of shaping culture, balancing conflicts, and
teaching others about the uses of culture, which helped the
organization respond to the environment.
Shared Understandings
Some perspectives took a cultural approach to
explaining behavior such as problem-solving and decisionmaking (Becker, 1986).

Becker's views on what culture is

and how it worked can easily be applied to organizations and
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evaluations as a cultural product. For him, institutions and
0

rganizations are the product of people doing things

together.

Shared understanding allows the concerted

activity needed to do various tasks, including evaluations.
These understandings are socially constructed, based on the
consensus among participants.

Members of the unit agree on

the "rules" of the game, and this knowledge becomes a
resource to coordinate action.

It guides members to do

"things" in line with their understanding of shared ideas,
which result from interaction, persist and are reproduced
after interactions as participants constantly refer to what
is known as they solve problems.
To work on organizational tasks, people must know
procedures, and common ways to conceive of and respond to
situations (Becker, 1986). This exact process can be applied
to evaluations as a product.

Managers know and use

appraisal procedures from the past; they share a common body
of knowledge regarding what is "good", "outstanding", or
"poor" performance; and they use practices to obtain
evaluation levels and communicate them to their
subordinates. Becker also contributed to our understanding
of evaluations as products of joint activity through his
work on art worlds (Becker, 1982).

He argued that art or,

for my purposes, performance evaluations are the result of
joint activity, involving the agreement of actors in a
cooperative network.

Art worlds or organizations use a
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division of labor involving the use of shared ideas, time,
materials, conventions, and "rules of the game" to produce
"art", or in my argument, performance appraisals.
A key to this construction process is the use of
"conventions"

norms, rules, or agreements on how to do

things developed through interactions.

These agreements

guided actors (managers and subordinates) on how to produce
an evaluation, its form (e.g., verbal or written with a
number of variations), and the typical problems encountered.
conventions also placed constraints on evaluations and
indicate when the process is over (Becker, 1982). Just as
moviegoers know when a film is over by various visual cues,
subordinates know when an appraisal interview terminated by
the summary remarks and body movements of the supervisor.
Other aspects of culture involve language which is both
a process within and a product of the culture which framed
or constructed the world for the actors.

Interactions

produced and conveyed meanings of situations through the
type of language used (Becker, 1982, 1986; Berger and
Luckmann, 1967). Specialized types of talk -- accounts
are ways to bridge the gap between expected and actual,
unanticipated behavior (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Justifications
are devices that described the act as less wrong than
initial appearances, while excuses tried to convince the
listener that the act is not completely the fault of the
actor.

Accounts depended on "background expectancies" or
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socially distributed knowledge for their acceptability.
These shared expectations allowed the development of a
"vocabulary of accounts" which became routine within
cultures.

For example, organizations developed accounts to

explain why certain members advanced while others remained
at the same level.

These accounts included blaming others

in the unit, denying that anyone is hurt by an evaluation,
and appealing the "fatalistic" nature of the appraisal
system.
Two other interesting aspects of accounts to control
organizational settings are the status of the account-giver
and the change in role identities caused by the process of
producing accounts.

Accounts worked if they are accepted

but one's status mediated that acceptability.

If one is in

a superior position in the hierarchy, his/her account is
less likely questioned by a subordinate, resulting in
greater legitimacy for evaluation programs.

Also for

accounts to function, the actor is in some role recognized
by each party.

As the account process unfolded, the

identities of actors are negotiated as they tried to
maximize their gains and minimize their losses through the
encounter. (Scott & Lyman, 1968)

Accounts are used by both

managers and workers to protect themselves -- save face -and to maintain the system of shared expectations operating
the organization.
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Goffman (1959) contended that people are aware of the
demands of the situation and attempt to manage how they
presented themselves to favor their definition of the
situation. Organizations are systems of constraint where
actors manage or create their image to gain rewards in the
system.

Earlier Goffman (1952) explained the use of "face-

saving" or defensive strategies that individuals used to
protect themselves from a loss of status, value, or a change
in their image.

This action is often necessary when an

employee received an unfavorable performance evaluation, or
a downgrade into a lower level job. The affected individual
could assume a new role such as a medical student becoming a
dental student.

The person could also tell off the boss or

present the situation to the grievance committee.

It is

also possible to withdraw commitment to goals, conceal
information, "play it safe", or keep
to lessen the impact of the loss.

11

2 irons in the fire"

Goffman noted that some

individuals refused to be "cooled" and continued to
complain, performed less of the job, and sought to establish
their own status.

Organizations exhibited a range of

acceptable "cooling out" techniques, similar to those
developed by individuals, based on shared understandings of
organizational practices, a series of strategies to save
face in situations of failure. (Scott & Lyman, 1968)
Turner (1960) noted that cultures stressed either
"sponsored" (i.e., pre-selected, closed) or "contested"
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(i.e., open) mobility rules in selecting candidates for
admissions to schools.

I applied the concept to

organizations and how actors are selected for participation
in the distribution of rewards, including promotions.
Evaluation conventions (e.g., forms, meeting, lists, cells,
and appraisal write-ups) are used to select workers,
especially in "contested" mobility structures.
The concept of "comparable worth" extended our
understanding of the evaluation process by examining the
relation between work or effort and income produced by that
work.

Mahoney (1983) looked at three schools of thought to

develop the idea of comparable worth

"a measure of

individuals and work, a measure that in some way ought to
dictate income".

The first source is social philosophy

which generated related concepts like "social comparison"
and "distributive justice".

Here people that are "equal in

some critical sense ought to be treated equally", and
earnings should equal contributions.

The second background

source is economics which defined comparable worth of people
in terms of their value derived through marketplace
exchanges.

Buyers and sellers assessed the worth of

exchanges, based on opportunity costs, and placed different
values on the exchange.

Mahoney noted disagreement in this

theory, contending that the exchange process is not
attainable because of political-economy barriers to
"mobility, competition, and freedom of access and exchange".
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certain groups like women and minorities may be denied entry
to occupations, thus reducing competition in those jobs and
increasing competition in other occupations.

The third

source to explain comparable worth came from administrative
practices in organizations.

Job evaluation techniques are

the primary method to determine relative worth of different
jobs within an organization.

The job is studied to decide

the relative worth of that position to the employer.

The

criteria are arbitrary and based on work inputs like needed
skills, responsibility, and physical/mental demands.

Work

output is minimized in the analysis.
Mahoney argued that the subjective social norms of
justice, taste, and preference appear in all attempts to
define worth.

In his attempt to explain the concept, he

mentioned the process of social consensus, which is related
to the shared understanding or social construction
approaches in explaining behavior or the way activities
acquired meaning.

From a power perspective, it is critical

to note that the worth of a class of jobs or workers is
defined by those in power positions, such as personnel
specialists or managers who request certain types of jobs
for their organizations.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter addresses the issue of how the research
problem was approached and the perspective used to study the
myth and construction of performance evaluation.

Below I

describe my theoretical position, beliefs, and methods
employed to produce the best results considering questions
such as the research problem, purpose, type of
organizational unit under study, and specific setting.

In

other words, this chapter addresses how I saw the social
world and planned to collect and analyze data from this
world. My theoretical approach to performance evaluations
encompasses complimentary features from the following
sociological perspectives: power/critical, social
construction, and open systems.
Power/Critical
This view, described at length in the preceding
literature review chapter, rejects the rational model, which
has dominated much of the mainstream management literature,
and seeks to examine the social forces that produce
organizational variables like goals, technology, structure,
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and appraisals instead of accepting them as givens (Benson,
1977) .
In rejecting the Weberian model, Goldman & Van Heuten
(1977), describe five deficiencies of the rational model
which would be addressed in the power paradigm.

Studies

discussed the history or the ways an organization changed
where variables like social class (e.g., inequality) and
conflict are now included.

A political-economy perspective

is used in place of an emphasis on micro-analysis which
focuses only on the work unit.

Studies take a working-class

instead of capitalist perspective, and analysis is
dialectical, revealing change through conflict and struggle.
Another recent attack on the current state of
organizational theory (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984) offered
the "critical" or power paradigm as a viable research
alternative. Organizations are viewed as more than
instruments for getting work done and are means for seeking
personal, group, or class interests. Managers set the
conditions for the control and distribution of production to
determine what is created and who receives it to meet
economic and social interests. According to the authors,
Braverman argued that production was not arranged to achieve
efficiency, but to prevent subordinates from controlling
their own work.
Fischer and Sirianni contend that a number of themes
divide the critical perspective from the rational theories.
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These authors oppose an elitist theory of organizations
which define managers as the most valuable members of the
unit and devalue workers. Next, they call attention to class
conflict because the rational model assumes corporations and
workers share similar interests which maintain the status
quo. The third area involves the limited analysis the
rational model affords to the concept of power. Rarely was
this topic defined as "domination or coercion", but that is
the result of a hierarchy of positions, control by rules,
and a monopoly of knowledge. Their fourth factor calls for
examining power, conflict, and control in their specific
social, political and historical contexts. In the rational
models, organizations seem to evolve by a gradual process of
technological and managerial forces, concealing the
decisions of the dominant coalitions. The final area calls
for a new research methodology, using case studies,
historical analysis, action research, and participant
observation to move from the belief that there is one best
structure or process for all organizations.
Social Construction
This approach also includes and emphasizes concepts
like definition of the situation, rule making, analysis of
events and accounts, labeling, and cultural concepts such as
shared meaning, and "patterns of cooperation, using shared
knowledge of conventional means of doing things" (Becker,
1982).

For Becker, institutions and organizations are the
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product of people doing things together. Shared
understanding allows the concerted activity to do various
tasks, including evaluations.

These understandings are

socially constructed, based on the consensus among
participants.

Members of the unit agree on the "rules" of

the game. This knowledge then becomes a resource to
coordinate action.

It guides members to do "things" in line

with their understanding of shared ideas, which result from
interaction, persist and are remade after interactions, as
participants constantly refer to what is known as they solve
problems.
To work on organizational tasks, people have to know
procedures and common ways to conceive of and respond to
situations (Becker, 1986). This exact process is applied to
evaluations as a product.

Managers know and use appraisal

procedures from the past; they share a common body of
knowledge regarding what is "good", "outstanding", or "poor"
performance; and they use practices to obtain evaluation
levels and communicate them to their subordinates.

It is

essential to determine whose point of view defines the
situation.
Pettigrew (1979) examined how organizations create and
use culture.

He employes an historical approach and found

that a strong founder creates symbols, beliefs, and rituals
which changed during "social dramas", points of leadership
succession when new beliefs or power relations are
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introduced.

His point is that symbols, rituals, and myths,

which promote action, carry meaning, and establish and
maintain what is legitimate, are socially constructed.

The

founder's vision, representing values, becomes the
organization's culture.
Goffman (1959) contends that people are aware of the
demands of the situation and manage how they present
themselves to favor their definition of the situation.
organizations are systems of constraint where actors manage
or create their image to gain rewards in the system.
Earlier Goffman (1952) explained the use of "face-saving" or
defensive strategies individuals use to protect themselves
from a loss of status, value, or a change in their image.
This action is often necessary when an employee receives an
unfavorable performance evaluation or downgrade into a lower
level job.
Open Systems
In this perspective (Scott, 1981) , the organization
interacts with the environment, monitors boundaries and
imports resources from the environment.

There is a close

connection between the state of the environment and that of
the organization.

In fact, Lawrence and Lorsch argued in

their Contingency Theory Model (Daft, 1986) that the best
way to organize subunits depends on the environment.
Because the environment varies so much, organizations
develop departments with differentiated features, resulting
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in a larger effort to integrate the parts.

The Population

Ecology model, a variation of the Open Systems framework,
explains the success or failure of organizations based on
how well they find a niche in the environment and meet a
need through its present form (Daft, 1986: Scott, 1981).
This paradigm offers a sharp contrast to the rational
model because goals are generated by the environment and not
by the organizations' objectives and desires for efficiency.
Decision-making is no longer as rational and quantified as
previously thought. This perspective, follows the theories
of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Pfeffer (1978) contending that
events, resources, and social factors in the environment,
influence and account for the structure and processes inside
an organization.

This relates to the Critical and Social

Construction views because power is dependent on the
organization's ability to meet critical contingencies
(Scott, 1981) and formal structure results from the outcomes
of various struggles among coalitions, seeking to influence
the organization with their definitions of the situation
(Pfeffer, 1978).
I have used the above theoretical positions and studied
performance evaluations from the actor's perspective, using
their various positions in the organization. The final
section of Chapter 8 contains an expanded discussion of the
combination of these paradigms.
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lli!search Questions
This study describes and explains the construction and
use of performance evaluations from the different
hierarchical positions of the actors. Since my research does
not explicitly test hypotheses, I have stated a number of
research questions and related "hunches" that could answer
each question.

This acted as a guide to direct, but not

constrain, the investigation.
I asked a series of questions (Appendix 1) which
exposes the process that creates evaluations, how they
acquire meaning, and how they are used within the
organization.

My inquiry is informed by participant

observation and previous research, but I gathered data and
constructed explanations from the experience and comments of
the actors.
1. How do organizations' beliefs and values shape
evaluation programs? What explains the use and acceptance of
appraisals?
la. Related Hypothesis: Belief and value systems
(e.g., distributive justice, comparable worth, and equity
theory), supporting dominant institutions, build and support
evaluations structures within the organization. The goal is
to examine myths, culture, perceptions, traditions, and
language.
2. How do organizational types and control structures shape
the nature of evaluation programs?
Related Hypothesis: Control structures vary by
type of organization and environment. Structures are
developed to control workers, reduce uncertainty, and
increase profits. The task is to examine dominant groups,
the environment, evaluation and salary opportunity
structures, information sources, hierarchical position,
stratification and the impact of unions.
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3 • How do cultural variables affect and explain evaluation
systems?
Ja. Related Hypothesis: Organizations are more
accurately described as open systems where daily
negotiations and interpretation shape and control the
behavior of members. The goal is to examine labeling,
legitimation, media, norms, problem-solving, decisionmaking, socialization, participation, social construction of
the situation, and shared understandings.
The questions ask how the organizations' beliefs,
structures, and processes produce the appraisal system, with
the latter two variables having an interactive effect on
each other.
variables/Concepts
A number of variables and terms used in the setting are
studied to explain their construction, meaning, and use as
products of social cooperation.

These specialized terms

include efficiency, quality, on-time delivery of "specs",
appraisal form (APs), performance levels (cells), appraisal
balancing point, cost reduction cases, union activity, and
salary increases. These constructs are defined throughout
the dissertation.
Research Design - Data Collection and Analysis

This research is a case study of the process of
evaluation in a 600-plus member engineering organization of
a large corporation. Since I was situated in the
organization, I used a participant observation methodology
to examine how activities within the setting became an
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.
"evaluation
o b.Jee t" •

The unit of activity was the appraisal

process, from setting and communicating standards, deciding
relative performance ranks, to discussing performance with
employees.
In addition to learning about the natural functioning
of the Engineering Organization from daily participation, I
interviewed 22 employees at various occupational levels
(e.g., clerical, union-represented engineering associates,
engineers, professionals, and managers). Comparisons between
the different levels were examined to see if evaluation
practices differed by occupational level.

The interview

questions (Appendix 1) served as a guide and were modified
after the first 2 interviews because, for example, data on
values have to be interpreted from comments and not asked
directly.
Since I knew a large number of employees in the
organization, I initially selected those who expressed an
interest in my study and who are likely to provide good data
based on our previous interaction. I protected the subjects'
anonymity by using only first names and the first letter of
the surname and by not identifying the interviewees at a
later time.
The interviews were conducted on-site with notes
written during each session without the use of a tape
recorder. Later, the notes were transcribed and expanded
into field notes, based on the probable categories of
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significant themes, problems, accounts (e.g., excuses and
justifications), cooperative processes, beliefs, evaluation
conventions, and special vocabularies of evaluations.

At

the end of the interviews, I asked the managers to identify
subordinates who would be a good source of data for an
appraisal biography (Appendix 2), which was distributed to a
sample of 15 engineers and engineering associates identified
through managers' referrals.

This instrument asked the

subject to write a personal history or biography of their
evaluation experiences during the iast 2-3 years in the
engineering unit.

This provided data from those unavailable

for interviews and saved time.

Content analysis techniques

were used to look for common stories, problems,
vocabularies, and explanations for events.

The questions or

categories are a generalized, open-ended version of the
interview guide, geared to determining specific appraisal
actions affecting employees.

I also used the "snowball"

technique, a non-random process, based on previous contacts,
to identify new subjects for interviews and document
collection.
The attached "observational guide" (Appendix 3) was
used to supplement data from interviews and prior
observation.

The guide helped record themes, special

language, stories, problems, possible meanings, and
frequency of events during a specific time period. The major
use of this tool was to form categories for analysis of the
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large of data and was not used to record events daily.
However, I occasionally wrote notes about uncommon events.
Finally, available data such as company instructions,
memos, bargaining minutes, and publications were analyzed
for their meaning and impact on the evaluation process.

In

summary, the data collection design used observation,
interviews, self-reports, and available data to provide
multiple sources of qualitative information for analysis.
The qualitative data were further analyzed through the
construction of categories which I saw in the interviews,
supervisory meetings, bargaining sessions, surveys, informal
conversations, and observations. For example, I constantly
heard managers mention a number of common themes such as
performance attributes, appraisal standards, rewards,
variation, and individual change. These categories were
constructed by listing comments and expressions actors used,
sorting them alphabetically with word processing software,
and then "looking" for recurrent and persistent themes. I
also calculated three sets of Chi-square to evaluate and
draw conclusions about appraisal category placement based on
work group, service and gender. In Chapter 6,
"Organizational Beliefs and Values", I include a series of
tables which compare two groups' perceptions (managers and
subordinates) of the relative importance of a number of
behaviors on performance appraisal construction.
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The thrust of the data analysis is to employ
qualitative methods, supplemented by a minimum of
descriptive statistics because this is the most appropriate
way to examine a real, functioning organization. This
perspective has allowed me to explain and interpret the
history, structures, and processes active in the engineering
organization by providing a "feel" for what it is like to
"live" in this setting.

CHAPTER 4
THE CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATION
It is important to begin the data analysis Chapters
(4,5,6, and 7) with a description of the context and history
of the organization because this approach fits the newer
"critical theory" perspective which several articles suggest
in place of the dominant rational model (Benson, 1977;
Fischer and Sirianni, 1984).

I include historical and

contextual material to offer a deeper explanation of how and
why members act as they do.

This also resists the tendency

to accept for granted descriptions not grounded in recent
organizational history.

Without such information the reader

will have an incomplete picture of the complex organization.
This chapter will describe the setting of the
engineering unit to illustrate where the actors' beliefs and
appraisal procedures are situated.

A detailed description

and analysis of beliefs follow in Chapter 6. I will discuss
various situational aspects such as mission, occupational
and opportunity structures, restructuring of 1986, and
union-management relations; and I will provide a brief
history of changes, including the formation of the union.
major theme of this section is the uncertainty the members
encounter as they try to meet their goals (Thompson, 1967).
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The appraisal system is another dimension of this
uncertainty which the unit dealt with using a variety of
bureaucratic methods to make the uncertain more rational and
manageable.
Realignment -- 1984 to 1986

z

Y & Y experienced a major change in 1984 when a

government lawsuit resulted in the break-up of its giant
telecommunications system, which produced a number of
significant and culture-centered changes within the "new"
company.

Job security was replaced by profitability;

compensation plans are redesigned to match the market
structure with greater emphasis on tying increases to
profits. One major force in this new world came from the
environmental domain and is specifically located in the
competition (Thompson, 1967).
Divestiture pushed the company face-to-face with
competition and the need to satisfy customers. Since the
former clients are no longer bound to purchase solely from
the company, it shifted from an "order-taking" style to one
focused on the needs of the customer.

In effect the unit

moved from a relatively closed, rational unit to a rational,
open organization (Scott, 1981; Thompson, 1967). A direct
result of this shift has been the heightened importance of
customer relations, noted in the evaluation procedures of
management.

This change greatly increased the impact of the

environment in the form of competition, significantly
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amplifying the degree of uncertainty.

Who is the customer?

How should we relate to the customer?

What are the

dimensions of this new relationship?

Along with greater

uncertainty came the second variable Thompson talked about - the increase of dependence on environmental resources.

In

this case the dependence took the form of making the
customer the driving and defining force in structuring the
unit's activities.
During 1986 changes in the management structure
occurred throughout the Engineering division, realigning the
field organizations. The purpose was to establish a standard
structure in the four Engineering centers and to make it
easier for the customer to deal with the organization. Prior
to this time, EAs reported to a level called section chief,
while engineers reported to a level above section chief,
called department chief.

As the first level of manager,

section chiefs are considered the equivalent to engineers,
although the latter had very few administrative duties,
focusing mainly on the technical work. Figure 2 compares the
pre-1986 and post-1986 reporting structures.

Figure 2
COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING STRUCTURES

PRE-1986 STRUCTURE

Director, Engineering

POST-1986 STRUCTURE

General Manager,
Engineering

Engineering Director
Manager, Engineering

Assistant Manager

Business Line Manager

Department Chief

Operations Manager

Engineer

Engineer

Section
Chief

I
Engineering
Associate

Engineering Associate
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The 1986 change was due, in part, to divestiture, with
the resulting need to be more customer-focused.

The

"restructuring" sought to eliminate one layer of management
to streamline the decision-making process and improve
customer responsiveness. The Contingency Model developed by
Lawrence and Lorsch (Daft, 1986) argued that the environment
dictated the structure of internal departments if the unit
are going to survive. As a result, the section chiefs' jobs
were eliminated and converted to department-level
assignments and renamed "operations managers". Engineers and
EAs now reported to operations managers who previously were
on par with engineers. As a result of the change however,
the first line supervisor no longer had direct contact with
EAs, who now received work from engineers but worked through
engineers to arrive at an appraisal recommendation.

This

move was aimed at removing the assignment of technical work
("loading") from the manager and shifting it to the
technical expert, who knew the difficulty of jobs so they
could be more appropriately assigned.

The manager is now

supposed to concentrate on customer relations, financial
controls, and other administrative tasks.
Pieces of a Puzzle -- The Arrangements to Do Work
The Engineering organization of the Z Y & Y company has
approximately 600 employees working in four major job
categories. The mission of the unit is to engineer the
equipment needed to install, update, and maintain
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telecommunications offices in 5 midwestern states.

The

group provides services rather than products. The only
physical outcomes of this activity are drawings, floor
plans, lists of equipment specifications (specs), and
written instructions.
Historically, the Engineering unit has been a rational,
bureaucratic structure reflected in a number of key
variables.

It relied on written rules, procedures, and

policies -- 21 binders containing company instructions
which are continually interpreted by all actors.

For

example, there is a company policy on absences, listing
approximately 25 different codes and reasons for absences.
The instructions defined who are considered "immediate"
family in case of death.

In addition, there is a strong

informal structure which communicated, processed data, and
solved problems alongside the written guidelines. Here you
would find examples about handling information in the form
of rumors about promotions, downgrades, and benefits and
pension changes.
The level of standardization is also relatively high,
since the employees wanted the application of a common set
of procedures across all departments.

This is a strong norm

of the unit, closely monitored by a white-collar union. Last
year during the Christmas season, managers wanted to buy
small gifts for their employees or take them to lunch.
was new since the company was a regulated monopoly until

This
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198 4 and such practices were never done, because they would
not look good to customers and the public. Managers
discussed what would be the appropriate thing to do.

Some

decided to act independently, causing others to worry about
consistency and how they would look to their subordinates.
I attended a meeting where this question became the
issue for 30 minutes.

There is a tug-of-war between those

who wanted to do what they felt is right and those who
sought consistency; and it surfaced again when I conducted a
one-day Labor Relations Seminar, and managers debated the
pay treatment of EAs who travelled "on their time" for the
company.

The strong sense I had is that a standard policy

is needed and would be seen as desirable by many managers
because it would reduce uncertainty.
During this discussion a curious aspect of how time was
defined in this unit surfaced.

The expression "on their own

time" points out a conception of time with rigid boundaries
reflective of large organizations concerned with efficiency
and production.

Even though the organization recently

introduced "flex-hours'', a major concern is the 8-hour day,
because people are very aware of when they started and
stoped work.

Managers told me they are impressed with

employees who are late "but very willing to make up the
time".
The unit was highly specialized due to the size of the
organization and the technical nature of its work, where
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assignments varied by type of equipment installed and the
complexity of the order. Engineers and EAs concentrated on a
narrow range of assignments, developing their expertise and
efficiency.

Specialization could occur in the major

functional business areas of Power, Switching, Transmission,
and Software.

Managers told me it is common for their

technical people to work within one of the four areas for
15-25 years or what could be seen as an entire work
"career." (This specialization factor will be more fully
developed in a forthcoming section on occupational
structure) .
There are 4 levels of management in the hierarchy of
authority. The first level is the section chief; the second
is the operations manager (OM) ; the third is the business
line manager (BLM); and the fourth level is the Engineering
Director. During the last several years, upper management
talked a good deal about pushing decision-making to lower
levels, but most members are accustomed to directions corning
from the top and are uncomfortable with decentralization. In
an attempt to make this change in philosophy a reality, the
company recently introduced an enhanced pension plan for
managers, allowing more to retire sooner, thus easing the
introduction of fewer management levels to empower employees
and to save money and increase profits for stockholders.
In contrast to the myth of empowerment is a different
reality. I attended a meeting where one topic was the
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creation of a flatter structure and its capacity to "push
decision-making to lower levels".

After some time, several

managers said they needed to add or replace engineers who
retired. Larry said: "Several months ago, I selected 2 EAs
for sales jobs, but because of 'the (promotion) freeze',
these people have not available. When will their papers be
signed?" George, Director of Engineering said, "I'll do all
I can to get those 30 requisitions approved.
need people to run your business."

I know you

Regina, the former

staffing manager, asked a pointed question: "George, why
don't you delegate someone locally to be final approval on
additions or hires?"

George's response told me the new

philosophy to push decisions to lower levels is not
practiced yet: "We want to speed the paper work up, but we
still need to follow the procedures in place and get Dave's
[his supervisor] signature."
This issue of hiring approvals seemed like a clear
situation where the organization having the need for people
should decide what to do.

But an apparent contradiction

existed. Executives at a vice-president level must approve
decisions too specific for their level of knowledge and
pointed to the difficulty upper management, which imposed
decentralized decision-making, had in allowing the field
location to exercise more authority.
Although the organization used a complex technology,
requiring specialized skills and a lengthy learning period
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(Daft, 1986), the unit did not possess a high degree of
Brofessionalism as measured by formal education. In
contrast, the Engineering unit defined someone as a
professional because he/she held a job level which managers
considered as "professional". Thus position, not education,
defined one's classification.
The following table summarizes the general structural
makeup of the unit.

Table 1
Summary of Structural Features
of ZY&Y Engineering Unit
Organizational Form

Bureaucratic, RationalOpen

Standardization

High - many routine procedures

Specialization

High - many specialists

Hierarchy

Moderate - 4 levels

Complexity

High - tasks, departments
varied

Professionalism

Low - experience, rather than
formal education

Personnel configuration

35 managers; 93 professional
engineers; 7 administrative;
300 EAs; 165 clerical workers

Source of Categories: Daft, 1986
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.![hO Does What Here?

All managers formally evaluated the work and
contributions of all members within the hierarchy.

The

Engineering Unit contained 3 main occupational groups:
supervisory/management, technical-professionals, and
salaried-graded or clerical support, now called occupational
employees. Each of these groups supplied a unique resource
to the overall mission of engineering, although a good deal
of task overlap is evident, and likely the result of
imperfect information flow, uncertainty, and changing
conditions due to the (recently) open nature of this
organization (Thompson, 1967).
The supervisory/management group contained 35
supervisors, within 4 levels of authority, and 7 managementadministrative employees.

The supervisors are split into 8

business lines (See figure 3 on following page) offering
distinct services for both internal and external customers,
also making it easier to measure profits.

The supervisors

managed the production, quality, and financial results of
their departments which included assigning work, approving
expenditures, planning and problem-solving, and evaluating
the work efforts of subordinates.
The non-supervisory segment conducted studies,
investigated problems, gathered data, and made
recommendations to management.

This group had no direct

influence over appraisals and little decision-making

Figure 3
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authority.

Their main function is to support management and

provide answers to reduce uncertainty.
The technical-professional group had 90 engineers and
information systems employees and 300-plus engineering
associates.

The first group is defined as "professionals"

because their jobs required more skill, application of
knowledge, and independent problem solving.

This group

analyzed the technical aspect of customers' orders to design
the equipment or software needed to upgrade, expand, or
modify telephone offices.
The engineering associates (EAs) comprised over half of
the total organization and completed the hardware
specifications begun by the engineer in what is called
11

analyzation 11 • This group is represented by a local of the

International Federation of Professional and Technical
Employees, a white-collar union selected to represent the
EAs in a close 1966 election.

The union presented numerous

problems for management because of the fear of generating a
grievance or being admonished for an unenlightened decision.
Their existence contributed directly to the perception of
uncertainty which existed throughout the organization. One
manager was very direct about her assessment of the union's
impact. "EA's (appraisals) are handled more carefully than
engineers because of the grievance procedure." According to
the method of numbering grievances, just over 1000
grievances were filed since 1966.

The majority of these
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came in the early years and covered complaints from slippery
floors (working conditions) to attendance records, and
wages. During the last 5 years in which I myself have worked
in labor relations, the grievances are focused on appraisals
and other wage issues, like delivery of overtime pay.
ouring 1988, 12 of the 15 grievances alleged improper
appraisals.

Occasionally, the Union charged that the

company discriminated against its officers for their union
activities, or that the company used improper methods to
select candidates for promotions.
The Union acted as a "watchdog'', patrolling the
building for problems management should handle.

A number of

issues did not reach the formal grievance stage, but are
handled informally through discussions between
representatives and supervisors.

Ed, the president,

confirmed this when he told me, "You know we try to handle
problems before we file a grievance.

But we're not afraid

to file either."
Ironically, filing grievances or conducting formal
discussions as a representative or officer can have an
impact on evaluations.

Representatives and officers have

greater visibility, more contact with management and greater
opportunity for either positive or negative comments during
appraisal sessions (Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1978; Mechanic,
1962). It is illegal for the company to use union activities
as a form of negative information in making appraisals, and
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managers told me they made conscious efforts to set aside
incidents of tense grievance hearings when appraising.
However, both positive and negative impressions are created
from all kinds of contacts and these undoubtly do come into
play. The Engineering Director used to tell me that the
former union president "is a nice guy, but he's not sharp,
not very effective".

Although this EA was rated in the top

third of the universe, no special efforts were made to
"push" him higher.

On the other hand, reps who have shown

"leadership" skills, without being "too radical" became
candidates for supervisor or engineer positions which
managers felt needed more than technical competency.

On the

other hand, some kinds of exposure during union-management
meetings could enhance, at least informally, someone's
chance for a higher appraisal category or even a promotion.
This exposure process worked as a cooptation device for
managers to socialize representatives to understand the
company's perspective on issues that the majority of EAs did
not see.

This informal exchange helped managers deal with

the uncertainty created by the union because both parties
looked beyond their initial role expectations. Managers used
this situation to identify the "best" representatives for
future opportunities.

The union "reps" who are most

respected by management are those who seemed reasonable,
focused on major issues, and who "understood" the manager's
position.
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The last employee group consisted of approximately 165
£lerical workers who provided a variety of support services,
such as typing, filing, making copies, processing orders,
sorting mail, and maintaining the plant facilities.

The

skill and compensation level of this group is lower than
that of the two groups described above, but their services
are essential and their influence is substantial, if often
invisible, to the mission of the organization (Mechanic,
1962) •
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chutes and Ladders, Escalators and Quicksand

The mobility patterns of careers from the 1950s until
the 1980s formed a clear, consistent motif. Mostly men
entered the organization after high school or military
service and began work as a draftsman or clerk.

"Good

performance" (i.e., attitude, production, attendance)
coupled with a growing demand for telephone off ice equipment
created advancement opportunities in two distinct career
paths: management and technical.
The following figure illustrates this division.

Figure 4
Management vs Technical Career Paths

steps

Management Path

Technical Path

1

Draftsman or Clerk

Draftsman or Clerk

2

Group Leader

Spec Detailer

3

Section Chief

Engineering Associate

4

Department Chief

Engineer

5

Assistant Superintendent

senior Engineer

6

Superintendent

Senior Staff Engineer

Management Path
The group leader was an assignment coordinator who
allocated work, but did not evaluate peers.

The section
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gD.iei was the first level management with authority to
appraise, reward, and discipline.

The department chief was

the second supervisory level with engineers and section
chiefs reporting to it.

The third level, called the

gssistant superintendent (now business line manager) , has
the bottom two ranks under its control.

The fourth level is

the superintendent now called an engineering director, a
very powerful position for making local policy decisions.
Technical Path
The spec detailer was a higher level non-professional
who wrote the simplest job requirements for the engineering
associate job which is broader in scope, but still under the
engineer, the primary position for solving technical
equipment problems.

The senior engineer is a position for

the most competent and productive engineer.

It requires

technical skill and ability to guide other engineers without
formally appraising them.
Some employees are promoted through the management
career path. These openings are less plentiful and therefore
more valuable in the eyes of the group. As a manager told
me, "In the past, we had an advancement path which provided
an incentive." Management jobs are judged to be more
prestigious because there are far less chances to be a
manager than an engineer, and employees felt "managers have
it made." The organization had 300 plus EAs, 90 engineers,
and 20 department chiefs.

Secondly, one could advance in
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the technical world by increasing competence via experience
or education.

Though not an automatic route, obtaining an

engineering degree facilitated promotion to the engineer
level.

However, promotion to the supervisory level required

demonstration of leadership skills that did not
automatically come from earning a management degree.
supervisors are selected by the judgment of other managers.
Recently the Company began using the SPR (Supervisory
Profile Record), a paper-and-pencil test to screen those
interested in being a supervisor.

If someone "failed" the

SPR, a dispensation letter was used to approve his/her
promotion to a supervisory position.
Most of the promotions occurred into higher levels of
the technical career ladder, since the majority of
opportunities existed there. Some individuals would move up
to the engineer level, then branch off to the management
path. Very few of these mid-1950s employees had formal
educations beyond high school.

Some acquired skills from

either technical schools like DeVry Institute or from
military experience.
The mobility patterns changed in the late 1970s due to
social and legal pressures to employ more women, especially
in the EA position. The company is a government contractor,
and so subject to Affirmative Action requirements, programs,
and reports, making the hiring process open to review and
criticism. Instead of relying on the former source of
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employees, managers decided to hire a large number of women
with non-technical college degrees and train them for the EA
job.

These employees are at a disadvantage when competing

with experienced males for opportunities in the higher rated
engineers' jobs. The vast majority of women earned liberal
arts or education degrees, had been elementary school
teachers, and lacked any technical work experience.

They

were hired, in part, because they had courses in math and
science, a curriculum perceived by managers to prepare
someone for the EA job.

In later hiring decisions, managers

told me, "I'd rather have someone with an associate's degree
over a BS from DeVry, because they work out better.

They

are less likely to be disappointed in the work I can off er
them." Other managers made similar comments, reinforcing my
observation that educational requirements in the
organization are often inflated to fit the perception that
the current state of technology required an employee with
more formal education.
This influx of educated employees marked a shift in
emphasis on factors that counted for movement -- formal
education began to be more important than work experience.
Upper management felt that these more highly educated
employees could better serve the company as technology
advanced and as customer relations became more important to
the business, which is now more effected by competition. I
believe this new direction is influenced very little by the
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change in and attention given to affirmative action laws.
Managers, encouraged to hire minorities, began to change
their attitudes toward women and minorities because the
external situation changed and then their perceptions
followed.

The company saw these educated employees more

positively because, even if they couldn't learn the EA job,
they created an internal labor pool from which managers
could select professionals and other managers.

An educated

employee is a more flexible employee. A large number of the
women hired were former educators, and managers detected
they had communications skills superior to those with only
high school educations. Some of the more educated
individuals, therefore, went into jobs in training, sales,
purchasing, and personnel.
Two more recent factors also influenced the current
opportunity structure in Engineering.

A growing emphasis on

meeting customer's needs and advancing technology placed a
greater emphasis on formal education.

The EA position,

which once accepted former draftsmen, now required at least
a two-year associate degree in a technical specialty.
Managers decided this position now required more formal
education because both customers and competitors are more
sophisticated in their demands for a large variety of
services. It is more difficult to promote a good EA to
engineer for at least two reasons: first, there are
approximately 3 EA jobs for each engineer position, so
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opportunities are limited.

Many EAs believe they would

eventually be promoted, but one manager had an observation
which fit the organization.

"The EA job is a career

[terminal] job, not a training post for a higher level, but
new people think writing "specs" is a stepping stone, and
they get disappointed." Secondly, the candidate must have at
least a 2-year technical degree.

John, a manager, told me

that a high performing EA was passed over for promotion,
because although Jim is only 5 courses short of a degree in
business with a number of courses in technical areas, he did
not have an associate's degree in engineering and is not
considered "qualified". In order to be hired as an engineer,
one had to have the appropriate engineering or computer
science degree.

Although managers recognized that

experience often produced better performers than just a
degree, graduates are favored because of the belief that
their formal exposure to concepts enable them to handle a
variety of jobs with less learning time, i.e., these
employees are more valuable. Workers could no longer enter
at the lowest non-technical levels and expect advancement to
engineer or even senior engineer without the appropriate
formal education.
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I.t Looked Good on Paper!
This change caused a number of problems. At the outset,
the organization experienced a good deal of uncertainty. EAs
who previously reported to and were appraised by section
chiefs now "reported" to engineers.

They are formally

evaluated by Operations Managers (OMs) who received
performance input from the engineers, in the form of
observation of work habits, use of job knowledge, and
problem-solving. The engineer's job, which is almost
exclusively technical in nature, now assumed an
administrative side marked by scheduling work, recording
attendance of EAs, and offering input on performance.

Some

engineers adapted well to this change while others resisted
the shift to more administrative tasks.
Although the section chiefs appear to have gained the
most (e.g., higher authority level and expanded salary
ranges) they often found themselves in familiar situations
once handled by their supervisor, who still controlled their
area of responsibility. Five supervisors said they lost
ground in the restructuring because many current OMs moved
up to their level, while they remained in place.
How Do We Play This Game?
The operations managers did not feel the business line
managers provided enough structure or guidance for
decisions. During one meeting of OMs, called to define the
new roles of engineers and OMs, managers expressed confusion
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over the very purpose of the meeting we were attending.
Tom, an experienced 2nd level manager, expressed a feeling,
supported by others present.

"Why are we wasting our time

discussing what our jobs should be.

Our bosses (BLMs)

should tell us what they want, and the jobs our engineers
should be doing.

They don't know or won't tell us, so I

guess that's why we're here." These remarks also reveal an
old norm of the unit: people react negatively to failure,
resulting in a low risk posture by most employees.

People

are afraid to fail, so a cautious approach pervaded the
workplace. The managers at this meeting may have been
reluctant to define the manager-engineer interface and
propose changes because of possible criticisms from their
bosses.
The OMs were learning their new roles as they worked
through assignments. One OM told me that customers familiar
with his supervisor, Ken, contacted that person, who then
talked to John's engineer, instead of getting John involved,
making him feel like "a second-class citizen." John also
told me the new second level managers are not "acting like
department chiefs. We don't make decisions like we should,
and we still rely on our bosses to give us direction. We're
acting like a bunch of section chiefs."
The members of the organization reported feeling
confused and uncertain about many events, especially
appraisals, direction of the company and their own
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departments, their job functions, and multiple, competing
goals. This uncertainty is related to group power struggles,
poor communications stratagems, employee apathy, and demands
from competition. The following chapters explore the impact
of this variable on organizational life and evaluations in
particular.

CHAPTER 5
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL

When addressing the problem of uncertainty in
organizations, one can argue that control issues were an
attempt to deal with and make activities more rational.
Thompson (1967) said, "uncertainty is a fundamental problem
and coping is the essence of the administrative process."
But "complete certainty is a figment of one's imagination",
and control structures were partial solutions to handling
behavior and attempting to make it more "organized" or
rational. Two important questions are: "where do we find
uncertainty?"; and "who controls this uncertainty?"

A

preliminary response, which will be developed in this
chapter, is that uncertainty pervades the entire appraisal
process because standards shift and remain unclear.
Meanwhile managers cannot know all the actions of
subordinates so evaluations become abstractions of
impressions.

Three parties -- managers, union

representatives, and subordinates -- sought to control the
uncertainty generated by appraising performance.
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supervisors are expected to be the primary control agents,
but union reps mediate the process by asking questions and
filing grievances, while subordinates manage their behavior
(Goffman, 1959), to create an impression which the manager
will see as positive in making an appraisal judgment.
This chapter will discuss the types of behavior
controlled, the methods used, and the impact of these
structures.

The focus of these issues will center around

the evaluation system of the research setting. Appraisals
are just one fiber of the web of control used by the
organization to achieve its goals (Blau, 1967; Edwards,
1984) .
What is Controlled?

The organization attempts to control, or "to manage" a
wide range of actions related to evaluation. Recently, a
manager told me about his discomfort over a meeting he
attended last year to appraise EAs.

These sessions were

always tense but John's specific problem dealt with a method
of determining cell positions, proposed by another manager,
Doris.

John said, "We had an agreement on how many 'moves'

each supervisor would get, but when Doris defined the cell
structure (outside the actual session), the agreements
changed." John felt his employees would lose ground, and
getting no strong support from other supervisors who
(according to John) "accept a certain procedure if it favors
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their own situation," he went to tell some BLMs (level above
him) about the "unfair" changes.

John took a risk in seeing

sud, because "not only did I tell him what happened, I
strongly disagreed with him about the impact, and we got
into a shouting match.

I hope this incident won't hurt me."

The management appraisals were completed at this point, but
salary increases were being decided.

This incident shows

the concern employees, even managers, have about how they
act because all types of behavior becomes part of the
evaluation process. In this context I saw that all behavior
was "evaluated" against the company values of production,
loyalty, and attendance. In reflection, these values were
not usually talked about directly, but interpreted from
conversations with other employees to find out "what counts
around here."

Twenty years ago I thought all behavior was

evaluated and this idea has been reinforced by informal
conversations about the impressions supervisors have about
employees. Reno informed me: "I evaluate everything I see. 11
Managers in the organization are especially concerned about
controlling the following specific "areas", which will be
further elaborated below: work habits, production, quality,
attendance, financial factors, decision-making, rewards, and
personnel placement.
Work Habits
The key areas that management seeks to control begin
with "work habits" -- the patterned way employees approach
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their job, routinely perform their tasks, use time, and
generally present themselves.

This factor is really a time

usage variable, because good habits were described as
productive, while poor habits waste time. For example, one
manager said: "The EA with a good attitude is sought out,
volunteers, has better work habits, chats less about pay
stubs and retirement." A secretary, describing what managers
want in an employee commented, "They (supervisors) also
consider that you produce no complaints, do what you're
told, and make no waves."
One of the most interesting perspectives came from a
manager of a department working on older technology. He told
me, "I use the concept of 'easy to manage' as a way to rate
people.

The opposite were those who fall asleep during

meetings and make negative comments.

I ask myself,

'can I

comfortably assign work or do I anticipate problems?" Work
habits define the employee's orientation to work.
Productivity
Closely related to the above factor is productivity,
which refers to the number of "specs" delivered (i. e., the
detailed listing of materials to produce an equipment change
or addition to a telephone office), cost reduction cases, or
customers contacted.

The EAs were defined as "direct"

employees, which means their time and efforts were billed
directly to the customer.
revenue.

More hours translate into greater

In the engineering unit, jobs were "scored" or
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allocated so many hours for completion, based on complexity
and size of the order.

EAs who completed the job in less

time than allowed by "score", had a higher production level.
The manager of a service department offered these
observations on productivity: "What's important is getting
the job done and serving the customer.

I notice who does

more, who asks for work."
Quality
Quality was discussed in meetings and as it relates to
customers. Recently a quality council, composed of managers,
was formed to solve problems identified by all employees.
The company introduced the concept of performing all tasks
"with an eye toward quality", which also includes
redesigning a procedure to eliminate unnecessary steps.
This renewed emphasis was, according to official literature,
intended "to make

z

Y & Y more responsive to competition and

customer's needs." The engineering group also used a system
of "checkers", who were EAs sampling the work of peers and
assigning demerits.

Recently the emphasis has shifted from

issuing negative comments to a more corrective approach of
explaining how the cited errors can be avoided. In the past
the checker would award demerits, but now, the EA would
receive a written or verbal notice, pointing out the error
and its importance to the job. The checker position was
usually given to an experienced EA who has broad knowledge
of the department's functions.

In at least one incident

121

reported to me, the checker was in a powerful position,
which allowed him to "put other EAs through their paces,"
producing feelings of resentment. Bob, a short-service EA,
told me, "Jim (the checker) has a lot knowledge about all
the systems we work on, but when you make a mistake, this
guy really acts like a jerk."
Roll Call
Attendance was a behavior which management gave a lot
of attention to, but very little has resulted from the
investment. There was an elaborate system of absence codes
for a wide range of activities, including quarantine,
matching the extensive company policy on absence control
involving progressive consequences for increased time-off.
One problem was that supervisors were inconsistent in
applying the rules, which were open to interpretation and
supervisory discretion, depending on such factors as
employee's reputation, past performance, and type of absence
requested. The policy received more lip-service than it had
bite. There used to be a popular saying about the company's
attitude toward attendance: "the important thing is to show
up, because once you're at work, it doesn't matter what you
dO •II

Purse Strings
Managers control financial results through a computer
tracking system (M-11 report), which compares projected
budget figures against actual expenses and profits. George,
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who provided accounting support for the organization, told
me a number of times about the attention managers give to
the M-11. "Each month I remind each OM to input their
production hours, so we can get credit. The 20 managers
affected by this "road map", seemed to give it a life of its
own. George had constantly to meet with them to explain how
their group was performing concerning costs and profits.
These "results" were reviewed by upper management, who made
very little of the large computer runs, as long as the
organization continued to make a profit.
Expense accounts were controlled by a system of
hierarchical approval limits in which an employee could rent
cars, purchase meals or software, but had to have these
expenditures approved by a higher level supervisor. The
company went to a procedure several years ago in which
managers and professionals were issued corporate American
Express cards mainly for business trips.

Normally, you

completed your trip and then prepared an "expense report
form", which had to be approved by your immediate
supervisor, or higher level depending on the amount charged.
The supervisor reviewed the listed items for appropriateness
by current standards and signed the form.

Occasionally, a

manager would challenge the amount or type of expenditure.
John questioned several EAs who "vouchered the total mileage
from home to O'Hare, when they were only supposed to voucher
the distance in excess of their daily commute. I made them
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change the voucher before I'd approve it. 11 Prior to reaching
this decision, John told me he talked to several other
supervisors to "get a reading" on how they had or would have
handled the problem.
The system of hierarchical authority with its approval
levels limited the spending and decision-making habits of
employees. An example of the accountability rule prohibited
managers from approving their own expense vouchers, even
though they could "sign for" the same amount if it were a
subordinate's expenses they were approving. I coordinated a
meeting for four people at the Airport Hilton, and since the
Engineering Director was present, the relatively small bill
of $350 could not be approved by my immediate supervisor but
was sent to Maryland where the Director's supervisor had to
"sign for" the expense items.

The unfortunate consequence

was a delay in paying the hotel. What was not openly
discussed in this practice was the lack of trust implied in
the unit, and the need for authority -- legitimated power
(Weber) -- to intervene in the fabric of daily
organizational life.
Decision-Making
Management also monitored decision-making though a
number of procedures.

Decisions were the most elusive

product of this organization because of the high degree of
uncertainty, the Union, and the predominantly informal style
of the division's managers.

Decisions were affected by a

124

iack of knowledge about the consequences of actions,
reactions from the Union leadership, and a reliance on a
verbal tradition to recall past actions due to an inadequate
method to research past practices.
These conditions were especially noticeable in the
appraisal system and resulted in a highly politicalized
system which used judgments, and commonly shared concepts of
performance, which were not formally articulated, to reach
evaluation decisions. Two managers reflected on this
situation. Arlin: "The appraisal process is okay, the
problem is putting people into cells.

There is no step by

step procedure for assigning cells." Bud, who supervised
Arlin, elaborated on his subordinate's view: "We try to
group similar performance.

We didn't use a fixed model of

performance to determine cell placement, but we looked at
what was accomplished."
I observed that supervisory decisions in the
Engineering organization were largely made on the basis of
judgment, guesses, and experience (Peters and Waterman,
1982). Managers did not use these words, but talked about
using hunches and successful practices when conditions were
uncertain. The hierarchical structure provides overall
control because the common practice is to push difficult
decisions to a higher level in the organization.

Members of

the unit then operate as though each higher level had more
credibility (Becker, 1970) and was in a better position to
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make decisions -- choosing between alternative causes of
actions with uncertain consequences. The company was now
trying to downsize and restructure itself to save money and
speed up decision-making.
Other factors which controlled decision-making were the
on-going assessment managers made of their own authority to
actually decide the issues, and the decision-maker's fear of
seeming reluctant to fulfill his/her duties rather than to
sidestep the task by "pushing" it up the line. Managers had
only been at their new, higher levels for a few years and
most were not comfortable with the new level of authority.
Bob, a services manager, told me, "Most of the OMs still act
like section chiefs (former lower level occupied by
supervisors).
bosses used to.

We haven't learned to make decisions like our
In fact many of the OMs lack the 'class or

decorum' of the old department chief level.

We have people

who seem to just be able to fight in the trenches." These
comments also illustrate a division of labor between
management levels.

Each level felt it had a main focus of

authority and responsibility tied to their rank and related
compensation level.

Referring to the evaluation process for

illustration of this division, one manager said simply, "OMs
rank people, but the BLMs actually draw the lines" (to
determine cell assignment).
Very often managers took a passive stance, hoping
someone else would assume responsibility for the problem.

A

126

fear of failure was another force mediating against active
decision-making: people were afraid of failure and public
embarrassment that could accompany it (Trice and Beyer,
1984).

Managers sought alliances to confirm their

perceptions, alleviate concerns, and gather strength for
various actions.

This pattern (analyzed in Chapter 7) was

especially visible in the EA appraisal process because of
the dependence on perceptions of performance rather than on
the measurement of actions that were more objective and
discernible, such as the production of manufactured
components rather than service to customers.
Rewards
Managers also attempted to control rewards through
salary increases and cell movement.

The subjects always

cited financial rewards as the main kind of incentive to do
a good job.

Managers restricted the distribution of

increases through the appraisal program, which directly tied
performance level to salary level because they felt the
"better" workers should earn a higher salary (Kerbo, 1983;
Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983).
The organization also had a number of rewards for
attendance, even though this was expected behavior.

The

clerical employees were eligible for a $25 gift certificate
for each 6 months of perfect attendance.

Management

employees received a certificate and might be taken to lunch
by their supervisors.

The message that "organizational
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attendance is important" is taught in American high schools
and carries over to the workplace.

Secondary schools

receive funding based on attendance and have employees
dedicated to monitoring, tracking, and verifying student's
whereabouts through an elaborate set of procedures
(according to my wife who works at a local high school).
Employees in the research setting were told to call their
supervisors when they were to be absent.

This information

was recorded on time sheets and stored for at least 3 years.
These data were input to a program which provided a monthly
listing of attendance, including total days of pay and no
pay.
Personnel Placement
The organization's placement system also controlled
movement of people.

Information on openings became widely

available, but specific policies restricted employee
movement.

For example, if an employee wanted to "bid" on a

certain management level job, he or she needed the
supervisor's approval.

Wishing to avoid confrontation, most

managers approved the forms and placed the decision-making
burden on the department with the opening. One manager
remarked, "I don't want to hurt the EA by past recorded
remarks. The problem could be temporary." A staff manager
agreed: "Managers want to avoid confrontations." Also, the
engineering organization had a policy that restricted
lateral movement if the unit needed people. The corporation
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launched a career Development Program which established more
flexible guidelines for movement and definite time periods
during which an employee might be denied lateral movement.
Transfer policies were overly restrictive. A
dissatisfied EA, who was a problem for management because of
his outspoken nature and sharp criticism of appraisals,
wanted to move laterally to a job outside the Engineering
group, but management refused his request because the
department still needed EAs.

This resulted in an unhappy

employee and more problems for his supervisor.
The system of listing "job qualifications" for openings
also narrowed opportunities for people because artificial
requirements might be included to raise the status and level
of the job.

Educational level worked in a similar way to

impose barriers to entering the job when, in practice, these
specialized skills were often not required as bona fide job
qualifications.

However, the imposition of inflated

requirements guided the movement of personnel. This was
similar to Spring's argument (1976) that the educational
process uses testing and grouping work as a "social sorting
machine" to determine individual potential and increase the
efficiency of industrial society by proper selection and
channeling of manpower resources." Also schools operate in a
way that resembles the work situation, so it functions as a
training ground in work habits, methods and attitudes.
Managers listed qualifications that screen out most
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candidates, leading employees to ask: "Is the job wired?"
Managers wanted to retain control. Job qualifications
operated as a justification for more education, and the
tuition assistance plan reinforced this process by paying
only for courses that were "job-related".

This belief

supported Spring's argument that education was used to
select candidates for increased efficiency, a position
developed in Chapter 6.
The point of the above discussion is that the dominant
position of managers was to control the personnel movement
of the vast majority of their employees.

The main

rationalization for this stance was the right of management
to "run the business", described and conceived as similar to
a living organism with various needs, some more important
than other needs. When managers talked this way they were
actually referring to the wishes of individual supervisors
who had a range of influence in the group due to current
problems, reputation, and perceived knowledge and ability to
work around an impasse (Pfeffer, 1978). Table 2 summarizes
of behavior and methods to control the behavior in ZY&Y
Corporation.
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Table 2
List of Employee Behavior and Methods for Control
in Engineering Unit, ZY&Y Corporation

Employee Behavior

Control Methods

work Habits

Feedback from observation

Production

Reports

Quality of Service

Use of EAs as "checkers"

Attendance

Timesheets, general rules

Financial Results

"Road Map" report

Expense Accounts

Vouchers, approval levels

Decision-Making

Intuition
Past Practices
Hierarchical structure
Assessment of Authority
Fear of Failure

Rewards

Appraisals

Placement/Movement

Bidding System
Job Requirement Policy

The above matrix of factors pose a curious situation
because of possible interpretation. On one hand, managers
actually considered the diverse variables as important
outcomes, which attained this status because these factors
were tangible, measurable, and visible (Blau, 1967).
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secondly, managers have used these "behaviors" for a long
time -- over 20 years -- so they became part of the unit's
culture and tradition.

Finally, because of visibility and

tradition, the parties accepted the variables as
understandable and useful in evaluating performance.
The application of the above methods also reflected an
illusion, because, although talked about, these factors were
not used as much as they appeared to be.

They operate as a

shared myth of what counted, but were ignored because
managers formed an overall abstraction of performance due to
the uncertainty of standards and knowledge of behavior.
There was too much data, and too many employees for the
system to work as these factors might indicate.

However,

the illusion of the application of these methods worked to
control employees.
Factors Affecting Evaluations

A key and pervasive factor in the life of this
organization was the need to control and manage behavior.
This section will examine how the evaluation process
controls subordinates which was important to managers for
several reasons.

First, control activities help to reduce

uncertainty by actually solving problems or at least
creating the illusion of being proactive.

Second, control

procedures define what is important in the organization and
these help make sense of activities.

Third, leaders derive
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power from their positions as control managers, enhancing
their own influence by monitoring and controlling the
behavior of subordinates. Thus, a wide variety of
organizational variables were used to restrict employee
behavior through the evaluation system. These factors
included: job and opportunity structures, appraisal forms,
beliefs about appraisals; group meetings; information;
authority levels; the environment and the Union.

The EAs

knew how the appraisal/salary worked through their
supervisors, but mainly via their peers.

There was a

widespread myth that actual performance counted, but in
practice other social factors, such as, supervisory
perception really accounted for one's appraisal.

These

popular beliefs kept most EAs working at their jobs (and
will be examined in detail in Chapter 6).
It's Not My Job
Jobs differed in their degree of opportunity (Kanter,
1977), offering a greater chance for exposure and less
pressure, so good results were easier to achieve. John, a
manager and one of my key sources of information, told me
how upset he was that Mike, an engineer, was rated above his
four engineers. I told John I understood that Mike
good reputation with a third level manager.
"Sure he's got a good reputation.

s. had a

John said,

But, that's because he's

got a job which allows him to concentrate on one problem at
a time.

My people are getting calls from the field, helping
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EAs, and doing special projects.

Mike looks good because he

does not have a demanding job, one that requires his time
and attention in a variety of areas."
AP Form
Actors also feel that the record of performance -- the
AP -- should be a tool to determine cell placement. A union
officer, commenting on the sequence of appraisal events,
told me, "The AP forms are completed after the rank order
and cells are assigned.

The form should be used by the boss

as ammunition to get moves." Many realized that the AP was a
formality, required to meet legal requirements, and carried
little weight in producing cell movement. Kurt, a new
manager, expressed it this way: "To the EA the form is a
piece of paper that doesn't mean anything. The AP does not
match the cell assigned. They aren't read and exist only as
a formality." However, some EAs held that the document was
valuable because it was written and represented a permanent
record.

The Union took this position and requested APs when

a grievance was in process.
What's Important
The fear of obtaining a poor rating, with the
consequence of no salary increase, kept most EAs performing
to meet department standards.

Behavior that was rewarded

included: production, quality, good work habits, and
timeliness. (Production referred to the number of jobs or
specs the employee wrote within a specified time limit.) As
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Reno told me, "Specs are due on Monday, so I know how my
people do regarding 'on time delivery'." Quality concerns
accurate and complete spec preparation.

Eddy said, "The

most important factors are production, quality, on-time
delivery, and job knowledge." Kurt summed up the factor of
work habits: "The EA with a good attitude is sought out,
volunteers, has better work habits, chats less about pay
stubs and retirement." Even though the possibility of
termination was remote, the concept existed in the
employee's mind, and functioned as a powerful force for
adherence to management goals. Lou, a management staff
employee, had a number of negative reactions to the
appraisal system.

He also reflected the ultimate fear:

"Management could get rid of you if you're a troublemaker."
Group Meetings
Another control technique used in evaluations was a
series of group meetings where supervisors discussed
candidates and used "multiple supervisory judgments" to
produce a rank order list. A supervisor in Personnel
explained how this worked.
"We try to discuss performance, but bosses have their
own idea on what defines performance.

For example, some

people have attendance problems, but were nominated for
'outstanding'. It's nice for the boss to give out an
outstanding rating.

But other supervisors in the meeting
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offer opposing data on a candidate, and the nominating boss
changes his mind and withdraws the candidate."
A manager from another company reported the same
"leveling effect" of the group meeting. "There was a person
pushed for a top spot who had insulted people and was
indignant.

Negative feedback brought this guy down.

Group

discussions were used to 'take away bias'." This technique
rationalized the legitimacy of a subjective process and was
often cited by the bargaining agent to defend his position
during grievance hearings.

Interestingly, the technique

diffused the blame and responsibility for a poor rating by
giving the appearance that the appraisal was the result of
the group process, when in fact the largest weight and
initial recommendation rested with the employee's immediate
supervisor.
Information
Information was a valued commodity which was guarded
and censored to retain its exclusiveness and secretiveness.
Managers controlled the creation and distribution of
information on policies, appraisals, raises, and promotions.
"The AP form is often done after the rank order and cell
assignment are finished."

Another manager said, "The forms

are used carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the
person.

We don't want to hang later.

imply nothing."
feeling.

We are careful to

Another manager, John J., supported this

"Some AP's are written to justify appraisals."
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There was constant discussion about what was appropriate to
tell people, and in what format.

In one curious

contradiction about the use of data, the Union distributed
and discussed performance and salary data, while the Company
considered this to be private information and worthy of
protection. Managers concealed this data to spare the
employees embarrassment and his/her own need to justify the
unequal distribution of raises.

The Union exposed the

salary details to challenge management's decisions, to
reinforce their belief in equality, and to create the
illusion that their own continued existence was vital to the
workers.
An example of these opposing views was the distribution
of the rank order list, containing names of 300-plus EAs
from top performers to lowest performer.

For years the

company had successfully resisted the Union's attempts to
obtain a copy of this list.

The company's practice was to

give each EA's appraisal level and new salary, but not the
relative position of everyone in a rank order.
data with the Union had several implications.

Sharing this
First,

representatives could encourage grievances by showing some
EAs how they "made out" compared to their peers.

This also

revealed the underlying competition between workers and
between supervisors who tried to get the most for their
group.

Third, the list exposed the collective judgments of

managers to criticism, whereas these perceptions of relative
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performance had only been known to managers in the past.
ouring an arbitration case several years ago, the Union
"demanded" rank-order data for the previous 5 years.

our

attorney advised us to provide this information. After this
occasion, the Union officers asked for the rank-order data,
citing our recent submittal in an arbitration case.

our

attorney again told me, "The Company may not like it, but
the Union has a right to the rank order data, just to see if
they should file a grievance.

I'm surprised you got away so

long without having to give them the rank list."
When our managers heard that the Union received this
information, they were upset. John said, "It isn't good the
Union has this information.

It's going to cause trouble.

They're going to file more grievance now, just because they
think some EA should be above another EA, even in the same
performance cell. 11

I explained the lawyer's reasons.

John's response was typical of others I heard: "I don't care
what Jim (the attorney) said.

If the Union has the list,

they're going to show everyone, which will create grievances
we and not Jim will have to answer." The managers sought to
regulate private data to control the unrest of the EAs,
while the Union wanted to reveal management's decisions to
public review.
Grapevine
The informal communications network controlled
management decisions which subordinates questioned. Members
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constantly discussed what the organization was doing and
why.

Recently much talk centered on the unit's plans to

reorganize departments and rotate supervisors.

Once

specifics of the plan were known, upper management began to
deny the finality of the plans, instead contending that "we
are just in the discussion stage." When upper level managers
heard about employees' reactions to rumors, they tempered
their plans and discussions on supervisory changes.
Position and Influence
One's position was also a factor in organizational
control. As Mechanic (1962) has pointed out, even lowerlevel participants

secretaries, staff people -- had a

good deal of power in the organization. Those taking an
active role in discussing the daily problems and issues of a
unit have greater control than others situated in less
communications-linked positions. Judy, a secretary, noted
that it was also "important to make the boss happy, don't
wear jeans, and have good attendance.
on whether they like you.

Your rating is based

They also consider that you don't

complain, do what you're told, and make no waves." Bob, a
manager of staff employees, offered this about his group.
"I notice who asks for more work.

When people are even, we

look at attendance or a person's willingness to do extra."
Both these employees pointed out another feature of the
control question.

Employees did not take a passive role in

relation to their appraisals.

They attempted to manage the
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impression they produce for their bosses (Goffman, 1959).
Individuals who maintained a low, work-focused profile, knew
less, and actually controlled fewer decisions or introduced
fewer ideas into the group.

Managers who were action-

oriented, verbal and visible, exerted a greater influence on
decisions by the sheer volume of their efforts.
Impact of Environment
The organization moved into a competitive environment
after the parent company split up in 1984.

This has

produced a new approach to responding to the environment and
meeting customer's needs. Prior to 1980, the corporation did
not have a traditional marketing group, but relied on
engineers to explain and sell products as a part of their
jobs. Since divestiture pushed the company into the open
market, the organization has made the customer the primary
focus. The environmental domain of competition has directly
shaped the internal structure, values, and processes of the
engineering unit (Scott, 1981). Traditional notions of
efficiency and quality -- managers deciding what the
customer needs -- has been replaced with a customer-driven
workplace.
now.

What the customer wants is the quality standard

This shift caused supervisors to stress customer

relations, selling, problem-solving, and teamwork over
individual productivity and strict adherence to a
schedule.

11

9 to 5 11

Managers become confused on what was important,

and uncertainty increased.

It was necessary to redesign
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appraisal forms for engineers and EAs.

While managers

sought greater objectivity and improved measurement tools,
they found themselves in a workplace immersed in subjective,
shifting performance standards.
Linked to the above environmental changes, I found a
renewed interest in protecting proprietary information, and
one tangible outcome was the "Code of Conduct" and "Conflict
of Interest Questionnaire."

These documents require

employees to declare any economic interests in companies
doing business with the corporation, and to review a set of
company sanctioned practices (use of company property;
honesty and integrity; and other rules of conduct) to guide
employee behavior.

These rules serve as guides to behavior

and occasionally work as moral checkpoints when employees
transgress the norms.

These procedures, for example,

describe the correct way "to voucher" or account for
expenses on a business trip.

Knowledge of the rules through

discussion, videotapes, booklets and memos constitute a
strong device to regulate employee actions.
Union Presence
The local union was one of the most powerful control
factors influencing the engineering organization's decisionmaking, information flow, and benefits.

The company could

not unilaterally change working conditions, wages, or hours
without "negotiating". This legal provision to bargain
filtered management's decisions and created boundaries to
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limit the company's control when assigning EAs to training
classes, overtime, travel time, job duties, etc.

Managers

questioned their ideas against the contract provisions, past
practices, and company policy. During bargaining in 1988,
the company introduced a new salary administration plan
which would have granted supervisors greater discretion in
awarding merit increases.

The Union officers laughed when

they realized the proposal would increase the use of
supervisory judgment, rather than limit it. Ken, a member of
the Union bargaining team expressed his feelings this way:
"We have complained about the problems in the current, so
called 'merit' plan for years, and now you want us to accept
a plan that gives supervisors more discretion? We want just
the opposite. We want to take salary decisions away from our
bosses, and make these increases automatic. You guys don't
listen to us."
Information distributed to employees was often divided
into "management" and "non-management" or "represented"
categories. I've seen that data, which at first appeared
unlikely to produce a reaction from the Union leaders, were
later defined by managers as inappropriate for the Union,
whose presence restricted the unquestioned flow of
information.

In some ways this information was involved in

a turf battle between the parties.

Managers contended that

they would decide what data were appropriate and when they
should be sent.

The Union officers argued that their
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members deserved special consideration because they had
rights under the contract.

Often the discussion was

frustrating for local managers because they did not have
control of information content or distribution which became
an issue between the parties. Because the Union existed,
managers discussed, evaluated, and predicted how the Union
would react.

Supervisors constantly asked, "Do we just

distribute this announcement (e.g., Saving Plan changes) or
must we bargain, discuss, and entertain ideas from the
Union?" One of the main conflict points between the two
parties concerned the Union's demands for a variety of data,
such as timesheets, APs, salary, and memos.

Managers

constantly constrained their actions according to a
prediction as to how the Union could react. This situation
was more evidence of the uncertainty in this organization
created, in this instance, by the presence of a union and
managers' fear of making mistakes in this relationship.

Impact of Control Structures

Balancing Work and Rewards
Elaborate control mechanisms affected the engineering
unit in several ways.

First the motivation level to perform

well was lessened as employees experienced limited
opportunity for rewards due to system limitations and
restrictions (Kanter, 1977). The engineering unit was
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essentially a utilitarian organization (Etizoni, 1961;
Thompson, 1967) which "bought" involvement through rewards,
which when limited, caused employees to "withdraw" their
labor enough to balance the work-reward equation. Employees
recognized the nature of this relationship and the
importance of rewards under the current system.
Bill: "I need rewards to motivate my people.

They meet

all the goals, but I still can't move them." John: "We need
to have some form of reward available." Regina: "No one pays
much attention to appraisals because they aren't an accurate
reflection of performance.

People look at money, not

appraisals." Two non-supervisors saw rewards this way.
Chris: "Appraisals are a carrot to make us try harder." Ed:
"One of the biggest complaints of the EA is that effort
doesn't match the cell.

They say, 'Why work hard if nothing

(movement) happens? Others will be ahead of me no matter
what I do'."
Legitimated Inequality
The elaborate control structures also reflected a
stratification system which revealed structured and
legitimated inequality.

Kerbo (1983) provides a model of

stratification adaptable to the research setting. His model
examines several features of stratification systems: the
degree a system is open or closed; the method of placement;
how the inequality is legitimated; the form of inequality
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(e.g., status, economic, group power); and the degree of
inequality.
The

~

of inequality at ZY&Y was marked by

differentiated access to resources and opportunity within
the organizations.

EAs were limited in upward appraisal

movement because their system required all the performance
bands to balance to cell 5, in a plan where cell 1 was top
performance and cell 8 was low good performance.
Table 3 shows the appraisal cell structure.
Table 3
EA Appraisal Cell Structure

Cell Position

Appraisal Status

Target Pay Percent

1

High

118.6

2

High

115

3

High

110

4

Middle

105

5

Middle

100

6

Middle

95

7

Low

90

8

Low

85

9

Unsatisfactory

80
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These three columns have specific meaning for members
who talk about their relative performance by referring to a
specific cell number, e. g., 5. Although not always directly
expressed, each cell symbolizes a status in the reward
system from high to low. No one has been rated
unsatisfactory for at least the last five years. This means
an EA rated in cell 8 was considered "satisfactory,"
although this specific term was not part of the words
formally used to describe performance.

Everyone rated in

cells 1 through 8 (the latter low satisfactory,) was
eligible for salary increases and bonus payments. Finally,
all the target pay percents had to average at 100% to
provide adequate funds to cover increases in employees'
experience from the past year.
Recently the subdivision of the unit known as "high
tech" was allowed to balance at more than cell 5,
effectively reducing the movement opportunities for other
EAs.

One appraisal norm of the organization was to divide

rewards equally to "share the wealth."

But allowing a part

of the organization to balance over 100%, i.e., give their
EAs better treatment, violated the past practices and was
not easily accepted by the other managers. Upper
management's justification was that this group had more
complex work, requiring more employee development, for which
these employees should be rewarded.

146

The degree of inequality was minimal on some levels,
and moderate on others. EAs and managers shared the same
benefit plan, with the exception of the Pension Plan.

The

management plan required longer tenure, but the payout was
greater. A more noticeable difference centered on the salary
plans.

Management employees were eligible for 3

compensation awards each year: a Team Award -- given to all
members who were rated at least satisfactory; an Individual
Performance Award -- given to 50-60% of the workforce
depending on achievement; and a merit increase which
affected the employee's base rate.
The first two of these were in the form of lump sum
checks which could vary each year. The non-management
employees (EAs) were eligible for a lump sum award and a
merit increase, but did not have an IPA (individual
performance award) in their compensation plan.

The

management plan had the appearance of delivering more merit
money because of the IPA provision.

Another inequality

dealt with the education required for certain jobs.
Technical assignments demanded more specialized and formal
educations, while management assignments had much more
generalized requirements. Usually, salary differences were
moderate, with a good deal of overlap between EAs,
engineers, and lower to middle management people.
Status differences were more pronounced.

EAs and

engineers worked at desks arranged in rows in an
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undifferentiated setting.
room and privacy.

Managers had cubicles with more

They also had far greater discretion in

movement around the office and, though more responsible,
were less accountable for their time, if not their results.
Non-supervisors usually had to "request" permission to leave
early or take time off, while managers had only to "inform"
their supervisors about their intentions.

There was a

qualitative difference in the worklife experience of the
management and non-management groups. Most managers,
engineers, and even EAs perceived EAs to have less prestige
than professional engineers or managers.

At least 10 years

ago a former General Manager told a group of EAs, "You are
overpaid for what you do, and you don't need to attend
corporate training sessions."

When individuals had payroll

or benefit problems, they spoke of themselves as "2nd class
citizens who don't count for much."

EAs also traveled much

less frequently than did engineers or managers. This
activity was viewed as a privilege because the employee was
away from the job, unsupervised, and able to spend company
funds to a limited degree. Managers wore ties and their ID
passes contain the letter "L", signifying a supervisory rank
and ability to "sign in" visitors.

EAs generally dressed

more informally -- what you might expect to see on a day off
form "work" -- no ties, sport shirts, and ID tags with no
special symbols.
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This discussion noted that salary differences between
actors were moderate, while status differences were more
obtrusive.

This has implications which resulted in

uncertainty and social distance.

Since salaries overlapped,

members had similar economic power and felt financial
impacts on the company, producing a heightened sense of
community.

However, the status features tended to drive a

wedge between non-management (EAs) and management (engineers
and supervisors) . The EAs perceived they received less and
held an "underclass" position in the organization even
though salary distinctions were moderate.
Methods of placement were affected by formal education,
achievement (performance), and organizational circumstances.
As pointed out earlier, an employee stood a better chance
for promotion to a higher technical level if he/she had had
formal education in a technical field.

The organization

favored individuals with education because this commodity
was viewed as important for dealing with the customer. Past
performance determined which candidates "merited"
consideration for promotion, because the organization
attempted to reward those who achieved results.

This

practice reflected the myth used to legitimate unequal
rewards -- they were based on contributions. One manager,
Arlin, told me:

"I look at productivity -- the worth of the

individual's work to the department's goals."

Bud, Arlin's

boss added, "What is most significant is giving a job to
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someone and it gets done."

John and Ed, two production

managers felt, "The most important factors are production,
quality, on-time spec delivery, cost reduction cases, and
job knowledge."

Eddy went on to elaborate: "I focus my

appraisals on what each EA contributes toward common goals.
I see the total package of contributions in conjunction with
experience and ability."
As Kanter (1977) noted, some units provide greater
opportunities for development resulting in greater
motivational levels for these employees.

EAs who dealt with

R & D had more chances to transfer there, because of their
position.

Another example covers EAs whose jobs were

reclassified to management positions.

Although the openings

were posted for anyone to bid on, those already in the jobs
had the best chances to be selected because they had the
experience described on the job ad.

This kind of situation

rendered an apparently open system, in essence, closed.
The impact of the control system produced inefficiency,
lower motivation, resistance to company policy, and -- most
significantly -- it helped maintain the Union as a buffer
against the manager's whims. A question follows this
discussion -- If the system was so dysfunctional why did it
continue to exist?

Was management blind to the problems?

Managers did see the dilemmas because they administered and
lived with the results of the system.
reasons the system was reproduced.

There were several

First, as Michels (1984)
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noted, members were apathetic and preferred to be led.

No

strong management coalition emerged to make changes and a
iack of strong EAs kept the status quo.

Second, the current

procedures were known and predictable and helped deal with
most of the organization's uncertainty.

Although highly

imperfect, the appraisal-reward system was a legitimated
form of inequality which delivered satisfactory salary
increases to most members.

The feeling, "It could be

better, but also worse," pervaded the organization.
The company was, in effect, losing productivity and
profits from a faulty system it had developed to reward and
motivate workers.

In partial recognition of this

contradiction and as a way to save money, the company gave
smaller gross raises to employees' base salary and began
using bonus awards linked to company-wide prof its and
performance.

This shifted the compensation plan to one

based on more equal treatment, since a large segment of the
bonus payment went to all employees.
Why Does the Union Remain Strong?
Before I began formally collecting data, I heard
stories that the Union was formed in 1966 in reaction to the
harsh, insensitive treatment of EAs by the former manager of
the engineering group. During the interviews, I asked
several senior managers and a union officer about the
genesis of the Union to verify these stories, but none of
the three people offered any more details, just a
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confirmation of the rumors. The Union was voted in by a
majority of 5 people, has sustained only 2 decertification
elections, and continues today with over 65% of the EAs
paying dues.
Managers' popular beliefs were that the EAs did not
need a union and, in fact, did not gain anything from having
one.

This argument did not hold up on closer examination

because the Union filed a 1980 lawsuit which resulted in
time-and-a-half pay for working overtime.
suit, finally settled in the Union's favor.

This was a 5-year
The Union also

provided a legal means to present problems, file grievances,
and demand arbitration.

The Union had power in the sense it

could make individual supervisors do things (e.g., bargain,
offer benefits) that it would normally not do willingly.
An unexpected pattern of interaction occurred between
the company and the Union.

Managers used a wide variety of

bureaucratic procedures (e.g., AP forms, time sheets,
authority levels) to control members. These procedures
required supervisory action and time to insure the rules
were being kept.

This surveillance then often replaced the

substance of conflict (e.g., appraisals, promotions) and
became one of the points of conflict between the parties.
Issues arose more over the methods and actions of management
rather than the substance of the issue (Hill, 1981). For
example, the Union representatives accepted the company's
right to appraise and grant salary increases, but

152
continuously disagreed over how management determined
appraisals and merit increases.
The Union representatives remained influential because
they could demand data and keep management accountable for
their actions.

They provided a formal means to handle

conflict peacefully and to insure that both parties were
responsive to each other.

It was interesting to experience

the ''institutionalization of conflict" (Hill, 1981) several
years ago during an arbitration hearing at ZY&Y. The leaders
were displeased because management developed a new way to
group EAs by service band which was intended to deliver
money more equitably.

The Union leaders argued that EAs

should be evaluated as a total universe and not as four
separate groupings created when managers divided the EAs by
service.

Managers said this was a fairer way to pay newer

employees who "funded" more money into the raise fund
because their salaries were low, but who wound up receiving
less money.

The Union saw this as a method of favoring the

young, more educated EAs at the expense of the older, more
experienced employees. Here we see a conflict of values
within the ranks of the Union.

They called for equal

treatment of all EAs but actually sought to protect the
senior EAs. The Union debated bitterly before and during the
grievance process.

Emotions ran high and feelings and

communications were greatly strained.

Once the parties met

in a neutral site, and the rituals of arbitration began,
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both sides were more controlled and rational with each
other.

The outcome was mediated by the presence of a third

party, the arbitrator.

The practices and formalities (e.g.,

questioning, cross-examination) made the union-management
interaction more analytical and rational, and removed
emotions from the hearing. The angry words were replaced by
polite conversation to explain the system and how
supervisors had mismanaged it.
Summary of Evaluation Control Methods and Their Impact

As this chapter has shown, a wide array of control
"methods" were active in the Engineering unit, producing a
number of consequences.

Following is a brief summary of

those evaluation related control factors and their impact.
Beliefs in equity strengthens the utilitarian view of
organizations where employees expect rewards for their
labor.

This reduces employee commitment and maintains a

distance between boss and subordinate.

The nature of one's

job affects his/her chance for visibility and movement.
Some positions are less demanding thus freeing up time to
"look good" in other projects.

Appraisal forms reveal

inconsistencies between managers but are a formal record
which carries weight during grievances, so language conceals
data rather than reveals it on the form.

Tied to this is

the employee's fear of receiving a poor rating which will
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limit raises.

This perception generally results in

compliance to work rules and company objective.
Managers use group meetings to reward subordinates,
form coalitions, and maintain inequality.

These gatherings

focus on supervisory conflict rather than assessment of
subordinates' performance.

The continuing belief in formal

authority levels blocks the employee from taking chances and
trying new solutions because these needed to be approved by
the boss.
destroyed.

Independent thinking and creativity are
The use of job qualifications limits employee

movement especially when the requirement has inflated
educational demands to ease the selection of favorite-son
candidates.
Managers act like guard dogs over the use of salary and
personnel data which keeps them more powerful than
subordinates who rely on the grapevine.

However, this

informal device slows some questionable management decisions
by exposing negative reactions.

Changes in the environment

also tends to protect and restrict information flow, based
on what the god-like customer now demands.
Finally, the presence of a union produces conflict,
protects employees, helps maintain itself because of the
tension it creates, and makes managers cautious about
decisions they feel are completely in their domain of
discretion.

CHAPTER 6
ORGANIZATIONAL BELIEFS AND VALUES
My experience in the organization shows that a variety
of beliefs related to the evaluation system were taken-forgranted by the majority of actors. This chapter will expose
these values and demonstrate their impact on the engineering
organization and its appraisal system.

This will be

accomplished by discussing the values/beliefs of management,
the Union officers, and other non-supervisory employees,
using interviews, bargaining sessions, and general
participant observation.

As a point of reference, I define

a value as some action, state of mind, or material object
members of the organization see as important, desirous, or a
good worthy of possessing.
Management Beliefs

These observations are described from most to least
frequently discussed. All comments relating to beliefs are
listed, then grouped into nine categories that reflect a
common theme and include: What Counts; Let's Do This Fairly,
But Easily; How the Pie is Divided; The Payoff; Something is
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wrong Here!; The Blueprint is Good; Sizing Up the Prospects;
Judge Wapner May Need It; and Can They Become Butterflies?.
What Counts
These statements describe what "counts'', i.e., what was
seen as important, in assigning employees to performance
bands, and constitute the largest frequency of responses
from the interviews.
The largest grouping of performance attributes concern
production and contain references to contributing to goals,
completing tasks, using resources, and working consistently
over a long period. Ed told me, "I focus my appraisals on
what each EA contributes toward common goals.

One year

someone could produce $100 in sales and then $150 the next
year, but a second EA who also once produced $100, now does
$300."

Arlin said, "I look at productivity -- the worth of

the individual's work to the department's goals."

Bob

added, "What's important is getting the job done and serving
the customer." A subcategory, hard work, also fits here even
though it covers behavior that went beyond the norm of
performance, or revealed some special effort. Bob said he
"notices who asks for more work and completes it.

When

people are even, we look at a person's willingness to do
extra, stay late."

Kurt saw that "you must do something

extra and have it noticed."
The next grouping centers on personal skills that
managers saw as innate or in sociological terms, ascribed.
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These highly valued attributes, included attitude, loyalty,
commitment, judgment, imagination, ingenuity, and
initiative. This belief established the basis for managers
to use subjective factors (e.g., personality and attitude)
as an acceptable way to evaluate workers. This was a
convenient means to begin or conclude "confusing" appraisal
decisions, i.e., those where little was known about the
person's behavior. A number of managers expressed their
views on this group of skills.

Arlin: "Getting a raise or

not doesn't change the work habits of most people."

George,

a staff specialist, said, "Bosses look at the kind of person
you are, not really hard data."
"flexibility is important to me."
attitude is sought out."

John J. noted that
Kurt: "The EA with a good

The staff manager added, "The most

important behavior is someone going out of his way to do the
job." Supervisors generally agreed upon a definition of
these abstract concepts, but they admitted to using a good
deal of personal judgment when rating people on these
qualities.
This grouping also contained interpersonal behaviors
such as cooperation, teamwork, and handling differences.
Arlin told me, "A cooperative guy knows who's the boss and
is good technically."

Chris, a staff support specialist

felt, "Results are important, but it helps to be cooperative
and listen to what others say."

Chuck noted, "In selecting

EAs for moves we discuss going above and beyond, and quality
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of teamwork."

John W. said, "Work habits, like following

the rules, are important." These were valued because the
work of the engineering unit required a high degree of
interdependence, and the tasks and departmental objectives
were highly specialized, so it was critical for members to
rely on each other in order to accomplish tasks or solve
problems.
I called the third grouping achieved or learned skills
because they reflected valued qualities employees acquired
through experience or training (e.g., job knowledge,
technical and administrative skills, cost reduction ideas,
safety, communications ability, and the capacity to apply
what one knows). Managers had these comments to illustrate
this skill. Bob: "I want my people to conduct themselves as
professionals." John: "I look at the type of work they can
do, like the number of systems they know, and the complexity
of work they handle." Reno: "The top EA does the 'junk' -probing tough jobs, and teaching others."
The fourth grouping focused on the concept of time.
The way the employee used his time for production, and the
timeliness of his/her work gained attention during
evaluation.

Another item under this subgrouping was the

concept of seniority.

Managers valued workers who had "more

time" in the department or with the company. Ouchi's (1982)
research about Japanese organizational structures supported
the use of seniority as a tool to reinforce the corporate
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values. Longer service employees learned the culture and
strengthened it through their routine behavior. This finding
fit the Japanese situation with its monolithic culture and
deemphasis on annual evaluations, but revealed the myth that
actual performance accounts for an appraisal level.
Seniority was not equivalent to job performance and
reflected that "time on the job", in practice, counted for
more than one's achievements. Bill was direct in his view of
tenure.

"I use tenure as a basis of appraisals.

a 4-year person above a 1-year guy.

I'd place

I give preference to

the one who's been producing longer."

Chuck shed light on a

problem related to seniority. "It's difficult to move a
young EA coming on strong because other managers won't
accept taking a new EA over a senior EA.

Mature EAs were

held back in the past due to a shrinking universe, so they
deserve to move now.

11

Kurt supported this position.

"The

more consistent EA would get moved, because he's performed
over a longer period."
Most members believed that people should move up in
performance cells over time, with a shared expectation that
length of service should equate to a higher appraisal band.
Kurt had an insight into the situation.

"EAs feel they

should keep moving up, that they're entitled to a higher
cell, and those who move up aren't motivated because they
feel entitled to the move."

Bob observed, "People feel that

if they're doing the job or some extras, they should move
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up.

People reject the system -- it takes too much time to

move and when it finally comes, people are negative."
Members expressed dissatisfaction when shorter service
people ranked higher than the more senior individuals.
Upper management verbally supported the idea that
performance should not be tied to seniority, but to the
individual's actual behavior. During level 3 grievance
hearings, the bargaining agent argued that "time at the desk
doesn't equate to a cell position.

We still believe that

performance, regardless of service, is what matters." As
indicated above, the myth continued because the practice of
managers was to give credit to an employee's seniority to
the extent that, in the case of "equal" performance, the
more senior worker got the higher cell position.
I classified the above statements into four types of
performance attributes because of the type of behavior
described. The purpose is to show and summarize the types of
behavior managers judged important in the engineering unit.
The theoretical basis for this classification came from
Scott and Dornbusch (1967) who analyzed authority systems by
evaluating actors' performances. Assessments were used to
distribute unequal rewards, and evaluators had four tasks in
the process:
1. define goals

decide what each person should do

2. set criteria

specify desired performance and the

standards to use
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3. sampling -- select segments of performance for
evaluation
4. appraising -- judge performance from the sample,
and apply criteria to reach evaluation decision.
Scott and Dornbusch concluded the evaluation process
supported the authority structure because authority came
from the position of significant evaluators whose actions,
decisions, and judgments influenced the distribution of
rewards.

Since the managers were the "raters" in the

organization, an understanding of the goals and criteria of
performance they defined as significant was enlightening for
the research.
All the performance attributes shared a common theme:
managers valued qualities that improved the department's
goals of greater production and profitability.

These

features were very rational, or results-oriented with little
disagreement among managers on the importance of these
performance attributes, although individual "bosses" might
stress cooperation over quality or inventiveness. These
comments defined that "work" in this organization meant to
be productive, do an accurate job, have a good attitude, be
cooperative, apply technical knowledge, put in one's time,
and do something extra to "stand out." The results were
taken-for-granted but revealed again the distinction between
organizational and individual goals.

Managers valued,

measured, and rewarded those whom they saw as contributing

162
to their department goals (Scott and Dornbusch, 1967).
Individuals enhanced their chance of succeeding in the
system if they learned the rules of the game (Pugh and
Hickson, 1989; Burawoy, 1979}, "played ball" with
management, and hoped their efforts were recognized as
supportive of the results-achievement game. The majority of
actors concentrated on doing their jobs and presenting the
behaviors they thought were valued, recognizing however,
that perceptions of their efforts didn't match the rewards
they received. The Union president told me, "One of the
biggest complaints of EAs is that effort doesn't match the
cell.

They feel why work hard if nothing happens.

Others

will be ahead of me no matter what I do." This group either
gave up chasing the reward carrot, or developed skills to
manage their performance to beat the system.
specialist pointed out a problem.

A staff

"They (boss) can't always

see you (e.g., how you work, what problems you overcame), so
you have to 'play politics' and tell your boss what you're
doing.

It's important to keep the boss up to date on your

work -- it doesn't allow them to ask any questions." Again
it was apparent that appraisals were "window dressing",
hiding the reality that evaluations did not reflect
performance, but variables like personality, seniority, and
the influence and judgment of managers.
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Let's Do This Fairly, But Easily
The following section reflects management's overall
perspective on how appraisals were handled in the
organization. The comments with the highest frequency showed
that managers believed appraisals should be fair and reflect
equity: employees should be rewarded differentially,
matching their contributions, which should come before
rewards.

However, this belief was a myth because equity was

an illusion, a goal, which managers talked about, desired
but never reached.

This wish for fairness remained strong

in the face of employees' dissatisfaction because it was a
way this system of inequality was legitimated (Kerbo, 1983).
If workers lost this belief, the imperfections and
unfairness of the system would emerge above the lake's
surface, like the elusive Loch Ness Monster! In an equalitybased system, everyone performing at some minimal level was
rewarded (Kerbo, 1983). Also the equity concept clearly
recognized that management assigned a different "value" to
each employee, a process contrary to the Union's willingness
to accept the same general reward for all members.

The

equity value again emerged when managers stated that a merit
system provided needed incentives, while an automatic
progression plan would only hurt performance.
Interestingly, the second most frequent set of comments
showed that management "did not want to hurt" employees. Bob
informed me that "we try not to hurt anyone, so we keep the
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positions the same.
someone."

To move someone up, you must drop

The former staff manager said, "Managers did not

want to drop their person because of the negative impact on
salary." This meant that once a raise was granted or a
higher performance band assigned, supervisors were reluctant
to take these back.

Their comments conceded they felt the

employee no longer deserved the prior status, but the
manager did not want to lower the rating and confront the
person and explain what happened. According to Regina,
"Managers want to avoid confrontation."

In addition some

supervisors didn't see much value in confronting employees.
Bill: "I've told EAs about negative things, like tardiness,
and there still wasn't a change."

Kurt supported this

position. "EAs are told the same thing each year and there's
no change in behavior." This practice of not hurting workers
had several consequences.

First, employees missed feedback

which could help improve performance and develop skills.

So

a desire to avoid hurting subordinates now actually "hurts"
them throughout their careers. Second, managers contributed
to the legend of evaluations by retaining workers at levels
which didn't reflect the subordinates' most recent
achievements.

Appraisals affirmed a history of performance

rather than current status.

This further questioned the

value and purpose of this yearly "report card" in the eyes
of everyone affected.
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Another perspective widely shared by managers favored
an appraisal system which was convenient to administer.
supervisors found the whole notion of appraising others
distasteful and saw it as "the time of year during which we
earn a year's salary." Ed B. told me, "At the review
meetings, OMs get worn out and give up on pushing their
candidates.

There's a feeling to just put the EAs

somewhere."

Another manager, Eddy said, "Some supervisors

find it difficult to write so they used the phrase 'met
expectations', instead of being specific." Gen, who
supervised clerical employees, said: "Appraisals are dreaded
by everyone.

They interrupt the daily routine of work and

social relations."

John

w.,

a keen observer of the

organization, told me: "Managers accept a certain procedure
if it favors their situation, like the methods to place EAs
into cells." Managers found the appraisal process
distasteful because it produced a fight for a limited number
of "better" ranks, and supervisors argued with each other to
move their candidates.

Gen told me, "It's a dog fight -- it

depends on how you made your case.

You feel like a lawyer

because you must prove your case to get your candidate a top
spot. 11

John informed me that, "There's fighting for 'my guy

is better' position.

We are rewarding on opinions and

perceptions, not performance."
This system was guided by the value of convenience and
focused primarily on completing the appraisal process,
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rather than producing a list which accurately reflected a
correlation between performance and appraisal band
placement. Bud, a third level manager (BLM), expressed it
this way: "In the past, our goal was to balance at 100% more
than focus on real performance differences." This is further
evidence that appraisals are "window dressing" for what
really happened in the unit.

organizational needs for

efficiency elevated convenience, i.e., completing employees'
appraisals, over working on "accurate" evaluations where
there were better matches between achievements and appraisal
classification.
The value of convenience was also evident in the use of
the 100% balance point for appraisals, which produced an
allocation system rather than an evaluation system.

since

not all people can move to the cells their supervisors
nominated them for, the organization used the

11

100% rule" to

fund the plan with salary increase money, and to establish a
target value (100%) as the average for all appraisals in
order to legitimate a system that failed to recognize all
deserving employees. It was convenient to cite the limits of
the system, rather than to tell the individual that he/she
did not deserve to move up a cell. Mike, a relatively new
manager, justified the failure of his employees to advance
when he told an EA, "I know you're a good performer and I
tried to get a cell move for you, but I was limited by the
system we use." Jim, a veteran manager, criticized Mike:
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"Don't blame lack of movement on the system, say other
supervisors convinced you that their people were more
deserving."
Based on my contact with all levels of employees, the
negative reaction to the appraisal system was linked to lack
of recognition and increased when the person felt he/she
deserved a reward. EAs who were negative had these comments:
"It stinks.

As a member of the support group, it's harder

to compete against the line, i.e., the production group
responsible for writing "specs." Another said he couldn't
understand the process, had "no sponsor", and felt
appraisals were "distortions."
a lot of unhappy people.
don't count for much."
managers.

Apparently, loyalty and hard work
Another EA mirrored comments made by

"The system works on allocation, not skill or

achievement.
movement."

A third EA said, "There are

I'm not higher because there's no room for
Engineers had similar reactions. One said, "The

process is poor. It operates on politics and 'brown-nosing'.
I was told by a boss that nobody gets an outstanding
(rating), then found out some did."

Another engineer felt

he didn't advance because, "I didn't play politics or
socialize."

However, when an individual was rated well,

things looked different: "The system works fine for me.

I'm

at the top and have been treated positively."
One wonders, "How can such an appraisal plan continue
when there are such negative reactions?"

Let me offer some
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explanations.

Employees complained because they weren't

rewarded to the level they thought fit their performance.
However, almost all employees did receive rewards each year.
You could say things are fine, but they just could be
better.

These limited rewards and the possibility that

conditions would improve legitimated the system enough to
maintain it.

Also the majority of subjects told me they

were powerless to change the system because managers
controlled. It was enlightening to see that, when issues
were perceived to be outside one's domain of influence, they
proved to be beyond one's power.

This has elements of the

self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1968).
Supervisors repeatedly commented that they used and
accepted a variety of appraisal methods, taking a "do it my
way" stance; They supported this position by noting the
uniqueness of each job and stressing their individual right
to exercise discretion. Bob: "We face a difficulty because
there are many different kinds of work in engineering and
it's hard to merge the performance lists."

Ed B. : "Work

varies so much, managers have to interpret what produced the
results." Reno: "Numbers like efficiency and quality ratios
don't mean much because departments vary so much." Eddy:
"Groups vary too much by experience and work to treat them
as a single unit." John W.: "There's wide variation in
what's considered good performance.

Some stress numbers,
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others personalities.

Each manager uses his/her own

standards."
Closely tied to this position was the stated belief in
the use of manager's perceptions, judgment, and input from
engineers, which was a relatively recent source of appraisal
data. Arlin: "Since the engineers assign work to the EAs, I
developed a questionnaire for them to fill out on their EAs.
The basis of this was perception, not 'statistics'." Eddy:
"I conducted 3 development reviews during the year in which
I get input from my engineers.

I used sheets for the review

which have categories like problem-solving, and
productivity.

Each item can be rated as 'below' or 'above'

expectations.

I then write a paragraph on what needs to

change.

This was done with engineers and EA present." The

key point was that managers accepted multiple appraisal
factors and rejected the use of a formal set of guidelines,
rendering the entire system even more situational.
Throughout all my interviews and observation of meetings,
only one manager -- Bill -- said he either wanted to or in
fact did use a written set of performance norms.

All

others wanted to control the appraisals of their people.
John J. put it this way: "I want to be able to appraise,
rank, and reward my people according to the conditions
facing my department."
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HOW the Pie Is Divided

Insights about what managers valued occurred when I
examined their beliefs about how appraisals should be
accomplished.

The responses clustered into several

categories, but the most frequent one showed that
supervisors approached the process seeking a fair allocation
of the limited moves.

Recognizing that not all deserving

employees can advance, the managers adapted a system of
upward moves based on size of the sub-branch, number of new,
non-rated employees, and the unit's current balancing point
relative to the 100% target. This practice invalidated the
claim of equity and reinforced the myth of appraisals,
reflecting a whole set of variables beside performance which
accounted for an evaluation. This argument will be expanded
in Chapter 7.
An example will illustrate this procedure, based on the
numerical restrictions defined by management, to average all
appraisals to 100%.

A large subbranch was allowed more

moves because it contained more employees.

The two largest

branches had 130 and 100 EAs, respectively. Managers argued
that group B (100 EAs) should be allocated 30% of any
available moves because they had 30% of the total universe.
New EAs traditionally began their appraisal career in cells
8 or 7 with expectations to move at least, toward cell 5,
the "mid-point."

These lower positions, with values below

100%, allowed more senior employees to be in higher cells
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and still maintained a balance of 100%.

The more new EAs in

a department, the more veteran EAs who were placed higher.
Related to that circumstance was the requirement, cited
earlier, for the appraisals of all EAs to balance at 100%.
Departments below 100 had more opportunity to fill positions
to come up to 100, while groups above 100, were questioned
for placing even more EAs in higher cells, forcing the
overall average to exceed 100%.
The fallacy of this plan was that performance did not
count as much as seniority or prior movement, allowing for
more opportunities.

The parties continued to have the false

impression that achievement counted when, in practice, a
number of "system" factors (e.g. openings, seniority)
determined placement.

Again, the myth that evaluations

reflected contributions was exposed. The words of individual
managers illustrate these points.

Arlin: "We feel we should

share these moves. We determine how many we can move and
then allocate."

John: "It's a numbers game.

people can be in the top categories."
stay higher over time.
hiring."

Only so many

Ed: "Some departments

I got most moves by promoting and

Bill: "We work with the idea of sharing moves --

all departments get a fair share of moves.

The allocation

of moves was based on the department's balancing percentage,
and the number of people in the department."

Reno: "The

BLMs take turns putting EAs into top positions." This
practice illustrates again that the current relative
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performance system was based more on the number of possible
actually available rather than the merit of the individual's
performance.

Management recognized that system limitations

-- need to balance at 100%- "cut back" people nominated for
upward movement. This situation created an interesting
contradiction.

An appraisal system, intended to reward

performance, was modified to accommodate movement limits,
reduced chances, and thus increased the likelihood that
employees would lose faith in the plan, that legitimacy
would be reduced and so cause the plan to "break down."

The

myth was never fully embraced probably because its exposure
would be too devastating for the actors to handle.

The lie

of equity was too large to accept.
However, in contrast to the belief and practice of
fairness in allocation, managers thought they could compare
people and determine each one's relative performance as
expressed in the rank order list, used to determine cell
placement and ultimately the number of moves allowed. The
relative system supported the competitive nature of the work
relationships, where "cooperation gets lip-service."

It was

a long standing practice for managers to preach teamwork and
cooperation, while granting individual salary increases and
promotions. As one manager, Ed, explained it to me:
"Appraisals exist, like in football or baseball, to produce
a starting line-up. You always need competition to get
results." Under this competitive system -- employees vying

173
for a limited number of upward moves

appraisal practices

focused on selected, visible aspects of performance (e.g.,
production, quality, timeliness) while ignoring teamwork,
positive relations, and problem-solving.
Managers also believed that appraisals and associated
rewards were needed to motivate subordinates.

This is a

common, taken-for-granted value in utilitarian organizations
described by Etzioni (1961), or in inducement-contribution
settings (Thompson, 1967).

People must be involved and

committed to the unit's goals and activities through a
tangible reward.

A common expression was, "Do you think I'd

show up for work if they didn't pay me?" This belief fit the
equity concept and resulted in the general acceptance and
justification of unequal salaries, based on varying
contributions.
Managers were also appraised, so they generally "played
the game" to protect or enhance their rewards. crozier (Pugh
and Hickson, 1989) noted the games actors played to increase
their power. His research showed that bureaucratic units
were sites for a series of games between groups of actors:
boss-subordinate, peers, men-women, and young-old. He argued
that at the "heart of the games was the goal to maximize
one's gains (e.g. power, influence, rewards), while
lessening these factors in others." For him "knowledge was a
key variable, and so was reducing uncertainty, which leads
to power." This was not a static situation because the
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"advantages change sides during the game." A number of years
ago, I asked Dennis, a manager, why he was successful, based
on his above-average ratings and salary treatment.

He said,

"I play the game. I give them what they want, and tell them
what they want to hear."

As I said above, most managers

played the game Dennis described, and thus the organization
had a compliance orientation, rather than a risk-taking
stance (Edwards, 1984).
Managers believed that discussion and feedback were
useful to improve behavior.

Interestingly, supervisors

admitted some people did not change after repeated feedback
on shortcomings in the setting of a merit-based system that
should pay differently for compliance behavior. This was a
sign the system's legitimacy was eroding. As Bill, manager
of a software group, said: "I've told EAs about negative
things, like tardiness, and there wasn't a change."
Supervisors also accepted multiple judgments as a way
to allocate moves and check individual perceptions.
According to John W., "The multiple manager meetings offer
checks and balances on some cases. Extreme upward moves are
restricted." There was support for consensus on the
appraisal decisions.

If candidates passed this test of

fire, they were judged worthy of higher cell placement.
Managers recognized that appraisals were largely based on
perceptions and were not produced by a "pure math
calculation."

Group meetings justified candidate selection
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and tested and validated the values and judgment of all
supervisors.
Finally, another set of conflicting beliefs about the
link between salary and appraisals existed in the
engineering organization.

Some managers argued that

appraisals should be done independently of their potential
impact on salary. This would decrease, the perceived impact
of salary on appraisals, but also weaken the motivational
"whip" of salary. If someone were highly paid, managers did
not want to drop the person's appraisal. Since performance
evaluation drove salary level

the equity concept --

knowledge of salary was a factor raters always considered.
However, supervisors told me they calculated the-effect of
appraisals on salary and based some of their decisions on
who benefited most and who would be hurt least. According to
Chuck, "We try to be fair and look at the impact of raises.
If advancing someone (a cell) will not get them more money,
that EA may be dropped or not advanced as much."
more specific on the impact of salary.

Kurt was

"Once we put some

engineers in a higher cell because we were told more money
was available." This practice again pointed out that the
system was driven by a bureaucratic system's need to balance
and allocate moves, rather than managers' desire to assign
people to bands based on their performance during the
period. The value of organizational convenience or task
orientation controlled the system, and it was management's
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way to distribute a limited set of resources (e.g., cell
moves and resulting salary increases).

Employees were

passive recipients, often viewed as a commodity with
varying, unequal value, based on their contribution to the
engineering unit's goals.
The Payoff
It was clear that cell position and salary were the two
key correlated rewards.

The main factor was cell placement

which in turn determined the salary for each person.
Managers said their subordinates felt that cell advancement
was expected and something they were "entitled" to receive.
This belief placed enormous pressure on a system that used a
fixed balancing point and limited allocation of moves.
Individuals viewed the current system as, in my terms, a
long duration "cueing" process which started an EA at the
bottom (cell 8 or 7) and moved him/her toward the middle
(5,6) or even to the top (1,2) over time.

Both supervisors

and EAs valued seniority, loyalty, consistent performance,
and playing the game as factors that helped EAs maintain
their relative position in the cue or allocation system,
which was passed off as a "merit-performance" plan. Again
contributions took a back seat to other factors (e.g.,
waiting your turn for promotion), strengthening the myth of
appraisals as reflections of personal contributions.
Supervisors said appropriate individual rewards
included movement, money, recognition, and personal growth.
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Across-the-board increases were viewed negatively because
they were granted "to everyone regardless of performance,"
failing to differentiate rewards. Once again it became clear
that rewards were intended to reflect differential
performance and had to be earned by the individual
employee's actions.

Compliance with the group's rules

(e.g., work habits, timeliness) were rewarded (Edwards,
1984), and most managers thought their subordinates remained
in the organization because they were satisfied with the
salary, benefits, and working conditions, compared to their
efforts. Chuck saw it this way: "EAs may not like
appraisals, but they are content, have a good boss, work
overtime, and like their benefits." There was a satisfactory
utilitarian arrangement when resignation rate was used as a
indicator of dissatisfaction, because fewer than 5 of 300
EAs voluntarily left the organization each year.
Something Is Wrong Here
Managers expressed a number of value contradictions.

A

dominant theme was the incongruity between an EA's cell
location and the behavior perceived by managers.

There were

highly rated employees who should have been lower, and
others situated in the bottom third (cells, 8,7,6) who
"belonged" in the middle or top positions. Managers had a
number of comments about this issue.
don't mean anything.
in."

Bill: "Appraisals

They don't reflect the cell one is put

Ed: "I believe my own appraisals are accurate, but the
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overall system doesn't match performance and placement."
John J. had even more specific comments: "I don't believe
appraisals for myself or my EAs.

I can compare 3 EAs in one

sub-branch and conclude they all don't belong in the same
performance band."
Supervisors also commented that the AP form, employed
to record job objectives and accomplishments, contained
language which "trapped" the supervisor into taking a
position that could be challenged through the grievance
procedure.

Because of this fear, the form concealed

information instead of revealing specific feedback. John's
reaction to the appraisal form was typical: "I put little on
the AP form because the EA and Union use it against us.

The

statements were general and consistent to fit the overall
appraisal.

I cover myself against challenges.

The form

only forces managers to write something and to talk to his
EAs." This contradiction was one of several associated with
the appraisal process, which purported to develop employees
but actually withheld information, causing dissatisfaction
instead of enhancing motivation.
Upper management advocated communication, while most
supervisors tried mainly to avoid confrontation. However, at
least two managers said they gave feedback to employees.
Kurt: "I let my EAs see their score on production and
quality, so they can track themselves."
similar practice.

John pointed out a

"I use a book of results available for
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all EAs to see.

They get feedback and correct themselves."

When supervisors did not completely avoid these face-to-face
meetings, they sought ways, through the use of forms, to
routinize the job of interviewing 25 EAs and to avoid
unpleasantness. A number of non-supervisory employees
reacted to the use of appraisal forms.

Lou: "I don't think

the MAP [Management Appraisal Plan] form was used at all.
My boss filled it out and gave to me to sign.
me the MAP; there is no discussion."

He just hands

Chris: "We use a 1-

page form, containing different performance levels.

The

boss reviews the form and we're expected to sign it.
basically a 'telling' session."

It's

Judy, a secretary, pointed

out her perception of the private misuse of forms: "My boss
xeroxed an appraisal form for 2 employees who performed
differently.

He used the form during the interview, allows

you to review it, but it doesn't matter what's said because
the level is already decided and it won't change."
Managers also mentioned forms. Regina: "There is a poor
use of forms; they are not always filled out.

Employees are

not given a chance to discuss objectives, but told to sign.
Bosses want to avoid confrontation and ambiguous situations.
They want one set of standards for all engineers, because it
takes too much time to tailor forms to individual
situations."

Reno: "The AP is a tool which prompts verbal

comments not on the form.

It is easier not to talk or

confront EAs, so we like to avoid the situation."

Chuck: "I
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use a questionnaire I developed with my engineers, to write
the AP.

Sometimes I discuss a problem rather than write

them on AP.
remarks.

I don't want to hurt the EA by past 'recorded'

The problem could just be temporary."

Ed: "I use

a 8-item developmental review paragraph, instead of a check
list.

The AP had constraints and some supervisors find it

difficult to write, so they used the phrase, 'met
expectations'.

They might ship significant items." These

comments disclosed another side of appraisals not normally
discussed -- they were situations of conflict and
uncertainty between boss and subordinate which the
supervisor controlled through uses of selected language on
AP forms.

The interview was not a neutral, routine

conversation between the parties, but a setting for the
evaluator to define the situation and control the
subordinate.
A few supervisors said it was not possible to
distinguish and rank 300-plus EAs, while some felt that such
a task was realistic and valid. Chuck told me: "A small
group is easy to compare.
300-plus EAs.

There are a lot of fallacies with

I don't see how we could accurately rank that

many people." John J.: "The large size of departments (30
employees) puts constraints on doing appraisals."

Two

managers contended starting salaries were too high,
resulting in no chance of an increase during the next few
salary reviews. This again indicated that current salary was
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an important factor in determining an EA's appraisal
position, placing 'performance' -- a mythical cliche held by
many to count toward placement -- into a secondary role.
upper management had to justify its policies, so commonly
managers defended the process even while admitting its many
problems. I attended numerous grievance hearings where the
bargaining agent described the use of multiple supervisory
judgments: "We get all the supervisors in a locked room and
they argue for who had the top person.

I know this isn't

perfect, but we believe a merit system is the best way to
handle the type of work you do."
Closely tied to this rational position was the belief
that training could fix problems. several years ago a third
level manager had me conduct a one-day workshop on
appraising employees and conducting interviews.

I presented

a number of concepts, stressed the need for documentation,
and the value of preparation.

Most supervisors listened and

participated, but toward the end of one session, Ed B. said,
"I understand the need to do things in a careful way, using
definite performance norms, but I'm going to continue doing
appraisals like I have for years."

These managers received

the information, but were fixed in their techniques and
weren't going to try another approach. This was just one
example of management's belief, that given enough resources,
any problem could be solved (Cohen & March, 1972; Daft,
1986). Training supervisors might develop their individual
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skills, but a seminar did virtually nothing to influence the
§!YStem of interaction in the organization. Sets of beliefs,
procedures, and norms exerted a powerful, if often
invisible, effect on the decisions managers made.
Managers operated in a system that rewarded production,
quality, cooperation, and achievement.

"Making waves",

trying something new, taking risks, and acting independently
were not perceived as wise actions.

Supervisors called me

to check on contract language to make sure they "aren't
violating the agreement and are consistent with other
managers.

11

The current reward structure recognized

compliance; actors were aware of this as "one of the rules"
and played along quite satisfactorily.

These forces were

talked about, but remained informal, subtle factors and did
not appear in manager's departmental goals.

As John told

me: "Financial goals define department goals because my
appraisal is tied to those results."
The Blueprint Is Good
Managers also viewed parts of the appraisal system from
a functional perspective, claiming the AP form identified
departmental goals. Some used the form to communicate goals
at the start of each year.
they'll be measured on.

John J.: "I tell my people what

I use the AP to describe their

functions, and compare them to the department average."
Bob: "I use the AP/MAP forms to explain responsibilities and
get the person's agreement."

Kurt's comments provided a
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good example of AP usage linked to department goals: "I use
the AP form and 'tailor' it to each job.
department goals which were generic.
toward that goal."

I set up

Each EA contributes

Arlin said, "Department goals are tied

to a questionnaire I developed to rate EAs, which helped me
fill out the AP form." It functioned as both a control and
developmental tool on and for employees.
In the end, supervisors thought they used the proper
techniques and so had the right to evaluate performance and
place employees into unequal categories.

This was a

strongly held belief which I had never heard questioned,
even by the Union president, who usually challenged
individual perceptions and judgments but not the company's
right to appraise.
Sizing Up the Prospects
The managers held contrasting views about whether they
could realistically measure the contributions of members.
Some treated production and quality as real and thought it
was possible to have an objective view of performance and
results. Supervisors also saw the form as reflecting valid,
real facts-of-performance with efficiency or cost-reduction
data as tangible products of the organization. Kurt pointed
this out: "I tried to show differences on APs by using
adjectives showing degrees of the same quality." Some
managers used the AP as an absolute, end-product appraisal,
while others merely used it as a relative guide to

184

determining band designations. Bob: "I use the AP for
discussion, but I can't measure like 'the line' which has
production and quality numbers.

I can't even use the number

of cost reduction cases because they vary in degree of
difficulty." These comments show that evaluations were
interpreted and used differently by various raters, making
them non-standard.

The real evaluations happened on a less

rational and more personal basis than some members were
willing to admit, offering more evidence that appraisals
were "window dressing" for what really took place.
I attended several results meetings where graphs showed
weekly production results for various departments. The feel
of the discussion was that the charts captured the "reality"
of the production process, i.e., it could be quantified, as
if EAs worked on punch presses.

A number of managers made

statements indicating their acceptance of "objective"
factors and the appraisal process.

John: "We sometimes use

last year's rank as a criterion. The EA who was higher keeps
that position."

Kurt: "You look at past appraisals because

you don't turn the pile upside down."

Ed B.: "The most

important factors are production, quality, on-time
performance, and job knowledge."

Arlin: "I look at

productivity -- the worth of the individual's work to the
department's goals." The strong reliance on old data hurt
EAs who had supervisors negligent about keeping good
production and quality records.

The use of talked-about
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observations carried less weight because managers could say
anything about their candidates. Documented data were more
significant because they were substantiated. The rank-order
list appeared as a valid reflection of performance
differences.

Others said the system and its product -- a

rank order list -- were bogus and did not reflect true
relative performance because, if for no other reason, it was
impossible for every supervisor to know the performance of
300-plus EAs and then weigh the relative contribution of
each member to produce a valid list. Bob: "My people want to
know how someone outside of our group could evaluate them."
Ed B.: "Multiple supervisory judgments don't work because we
don't know all EAs well enough.
group."

You can only know your own

Regina: "If a person is not seen by other managers,

he has little chance of getting higher appraisals."

Reno:

"Performance is whatever we see. 11
Almost all supervisors admitted the system relied
heavily on individual, subjective, i.e., non-verifiable,
data to make evaluation decisions. Ed B.: "Cell definitions
vary each year because of the people reviewed and the work
conditions.
year.

Movement is relative to what others did that

The definitions of what behavior fits each cell

depends on the OM's perceptions."
action we take for moving people."

Reno: "We can justify any
Arlin: "Because we don't

provide statistics, you cannot prove who's the top EA."
Chuck was very clear on where he stood: "The current system
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is inaccurate and the final product is shit, it's
worthless."

John

w.:

"I use hard data as much as possible,

because the process is so subjective.

We look beyond

efficiency and attendance to see what numbers mean."
These comments focused on a key problem area: how can
managers argue over performances when the factors used
(e.g., quality, customer service, production) were based on
non-verifiable items? I address this question fully in the
next chapter on the appraisal process, but let me offer a
hypothesis: managers, surrounded by uncertainty (e.g.,
shifting objectives and supervisory perceptions), employed
political tactics, such as coalition formation and ad hoc
rules to select candidates for rank order position and cell
placement. Each supervisor saw the world differently and
could not convince others that his candidate was better
because most EAs were perceived differently. Each manager
justified performances in terms of departmental or
environmental conditions, which varied by department.
Subjectivity was a key factor in this appraisal system.
did one measure subjective factors?

How

Measurement became the

heart of the frustrating debate.
Judge Wapner May Need It
Supervisors also viewed two products of the system in a
legal perspective.

The AP form filled a need to document

performances in case an issue arose due to a grievance, EO
charge, or law suit.

Recall, the AP was written in a
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general way to avoid overstating an EA's performance and
this was likely to be useless in a legal arena. It was
written for one purpose which did not make it suitable for a
lawyer's review (Garfinkel, 1967). The forms contained
general descriptions and conclusions about achievements
which always left the documents open to interpretation by
either side in the debate.

The Union representatives looked

for words they said showed bad judgment or favoritism by
comparing the forms of several employees.

They then

contrasted the contents with memos or other witnesses who
refuted the AP form.

When discrepancies were found, the

Union case became more credible before an arbitrator.

In

most cases the form was not significant enough to make a
case, thus providing more evidence that appraisals and its
products (e.g. lists, AP forms) were charades of what really
happened during evaluations. Kurt: "I noticed I began using
the same words on APs, which read the same even though the
EAs described were in cells 3 to 6.
the cell assigned.

The form did not match

They aren't read and exist as a

formality." However, supervisors believed appraisals
provided evidence for future personnel decisions.

A company

lawyer told me the firm was in a more defensible position if
managers gave the employee clear, direct feedback on his or
her performance.

This way the individual could not contest

a lack of awareness about the problem.

Management clearly

saw appraisals as a tool for their protection.

The
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reluctance to describe and confront problems came back to
haunt management if a problem employee filed a charge,
because the record was often too general to show where the
individual ranked. As Reno said, "The forms are used
carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the person.
we don't want to hang later. We are careful to imply
nothing."
can They Become Butterflies?
Managers held contradictory beliefs about change. Some
thought performance change was possible through feedback and
discussions. Kurt: "I let my EAs see their score on
production and quality, so they can track themselves."
During a one-day training program conducted by a
company representative, the importance of feedback for
developmental and evaluation purposes was stressed.

As I

thought about the concept of "employee development", it
attempted to make the person productive in terms of company
goals and to generate "correct", or as Edwards (1984)
described it, "compliance" behavior.

The speaker attributed

poor performance "to not knowing what was expected."

This

view diminished the impact of the reward system with varying
opportunity situations (Kanter, 1977; Thompson, 1967).
Employees did not change or perform better because the
organization had inadequate or unfair rewards, according to
the perceptions of those affected.
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During the session, a good deal of time was spent on
the technique known as "The one minute manager.

11

But I

began to wonder, if these techniques worked, wouldn't
everyone be rated the same and at the top?

Employees would

"get the message", continue good behavior, and cease "bad"
behavior.

But this didn't happen. This approach represented

the rational, dominant management position, which
legitimated the supervisory status.

However, other

supervisors reported that repeated talks over as much as
five years had not altered performance. Bill: "I've told EAs
about negative things, like tardiness, and their still
wasn't a change." Kurt:

11

EAs are told the same thing each

year and there's no change in behavior." Also supervisors
noticed that some subordinates continued to

11

work hard" even

when conditions for motivation deteriorated, such as a loss
of status through a downgrade, or a lack of a salary
increase.

These managers thought the individual had an

innate quality that remained constant in the face of
shifting situations.

Union Beliefs
During annual union-management bargaining, and at many
grievance hearings, the Union officers attacked the
appraisal system. The officers contended that managers
abused the plan by playing favorites, ignoring
contributions, and employing poor administrative techniques.
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The representatives never used the expression "sham" or
"myth", but their beliefs in essence defined the evaluation
system as an illusion of what really occurred in the
organization.
we'll Tell You What's Wrong
The officers expressed a variety of concerns, the
largest concentration of which dealt with what was lacking
from the Union's perspective.

The first area of beliefs

related to the rewards associated with the current system.
The officers thought that key factors like experience,
productivity, and training others should be, but were not in
practice, rewarded. In fact incentives were missing, and
"favorites" got raises, while productivity did not result in
a merit increase. The heart of the concern was that
performance, commonly thought to affect evaluations, did not
relate to appraisal bands. Recently, during a company
training session, a female EA told me how angry she was
"over working hard, doing a wide variety of assignments, and
not being moved a cell" during the recent evaluation review.
Her efforts were recognized, but did not translate to upward
cell movement, confirming the Union's on-going complaint.
The bargaining minutes also revealed a number of
concerns. Appraisal factors

what counts -- were

~

differently by supervisors and were not specific. The Union
president, told me, "The process is inconsistent in use of
guidelines.

The performance factors described in the
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contract are inconsistently applied.

Managers place

different importance on factors and these can vary each
year.

One time quality is stressed, the next time it could

be efficiency or production." The bargaining team expressed
a need for precise descriptions of performance bands and
target pay points. This problem came from two sources of
concern.

By having specific pay points, the officers could

monitor the treatment of their members for fairness, and
they could reduce the discretion of supervisors to pay EAs
at a range of pay points within a performance cell. For
example, the range for cell 5 was 98% to 102% with 100% as
the mid-point or target pay point.

When the officers

bargained to use only 1 point within the band -- 100% point
-- it eliminated the possibility that some boss could change
this amount.

Managers argued that they could distinguish

higher and lower performance within a band and reward
accordingly.
The Union supported precise descriptions of
performance, based on specific actions, because these formal
standards would more strictly challenge the judgment of
managers. The Union could question the managers on the data
or observations used against the words of band descriptions
to arrive at cell placement. Managers resisted this because
they wanted to control who was assigned to each cell.

Also,

specific performance descriptions made it more difficult to
explain why an EA was not in a particular cell.

The Union
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wanted to reduce management discretion and have a more
predictable process. During bargaining, several years ago,
Ken told the management bargaining team, "You offer us a
plan with more management discretion.

We want a progression

plan, so we don't have to worry about bosses playing
favorites."
The Union officers also said the appraisals were not
taken seriously by EAs, that the higher rated ones did not
get the proper raises, and that the system was rigged and
unfair, meaning the wrong people were rewarded for the wrong
reasons.

The Union and individual EAs preferred a system

based on seniority or some other form of automatic
progression which would treat the majority of EAs the same,
mitigating the effects of supervisory bias. Linked to this
position, the officers said the system produced too many
incorrect rank placements, unfair ratings, and rejections by
EAs. The president said: "Cells are not a true picture of
performance. There's real disparity from the middle (cells)
down. One of the biggest complaints of EAs is that effort
doesn't match the cell (they are placed in)."
The Union valued a concrete, measurable system, rather
than one based on a great deal of management judgment.
According to Thompson (1967), they preferred a
"computational" rather than a "judgmental" approach to
appraisals because it reduced supervisor's judgments and
made the entire process visible and easier to monitor. The
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union thought that production, quality, and cost reduction
statistics were not used much any more, and as a result,
management applied the concept of "multiple supervisory
judgments" as a defense for the lack of good records, and
the presence of poor statistics. The officers saw through
this position and argued bitterly that it was a sham. Again
the Union president, told me: "Managers differ in how they
use material to support evaluations.

One may use large

amounts of documents on quality and efficiency while others
use only observations and mental notes.

Supervisors place

different importance on factors and these vary each year."
Situational Factors
The Union argued that a number of factors, unrelated to
the actual job, resulted in cell placement.

These variables

were classified as social because they included a number of
situational factors.
The first concerned personal factors in which
individuals were in a "popularity contest"

where appearance

carried more value than performance because being liked
filtered out performance problems. As Judy noted, "My boss
doesn't like fat people or those who wear jeans to work."
More senior EAs who demonstrated consistent and loyal
behavior often remained at higher levels no longer warranted
by current performance. What was curious about this position
was that the officers favored "fairness" over merely
seniority, a stance unexpected for most unions. In addition
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the grievance committee also argued against "young, DeVry
educated people the company favors when it comes to cell
assignment." Equity was important and believing in it
legitimated some management appraisal decisions.
The halo effect of past performance locked people into
either high or low positions, no longer justified by
performance. Lou said, "They (managers) don't look at your
ability, especially if you're older." Representatives
heavily involved in union activities could be unfairly
restrained from upward movement. Ken argued: "I was held
back because I was outspoken about the appraisal system. 11
The Union leaders also thought evaluation factors
varied and were seen differently by the boss and the worker.
This supposedly led to misguided employee efforts and lack
of supervisory recognition because the parties sought
different goals. This area also tied into the debate between
concrete, measurable appraisal factors and management
perception and judgment.
Finally, the Union believed the evaluation decisionmaking process was political, noting that group meetings
often changed the initial recommendation of the immediate
supervisor. The president informed me: "Bosses with less
experience come out with lower EA appraisals.

It makes a

big difference if your boss has influence and goes to bat
for you."
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The Boss as Quarterback
The Union officers often stated that immediate
supervisors played a large role in determining cell
position.

When EAs failed to advance, the Union's concerns

covered three categories. Managers lacked knowledge about
how the appraisal plan worked. Ken: "Supervisors don't know
what's happening in the system and don't know how to use and
don't understand the AP system."

Knowing the rules of the

game, made for greater success in a plan with limited and
unequal rewards (Pugh and Hickson, 1989). Second,
supervisors made errors in determining cell position. Dave:
"Some bosses do not use performance factors and don't do a
good job with the AP form and system."
The first two problems could be circumvented, but a
lack of influence was fatal for gaining rewards. Ed: "New or
weak supervisors are at a disadvantage because they lack
influence, support, and experience to get their 'share' of
rewards." The Union's beliefs indicated that managers held a
key role in obtaining cell movement for their employees
through adequate knowledge and influence, again pointing to
the charade of appraisals.

Performance was mediated by the

manager's position and "doing a good job" was often not
enough to gain movement.

Managers resisted this belief

because the responsibility for rewards shifted from the
individual to the supervisor.

Managers sought control but
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not in such a high risk situation as that created by
evaluation techniques.
It's A Mystery
The Union leadership and eight representatives were not
involved in directly creating appraisals, but acquired a
good deal of information by asking questions and filing
grievances. They thought the process was filled with
confusion when efficiencies were calculated and in
determining who actually appraised EAs.

They did not like

what they saw as "forced distribution" of employees, and
they thought deciding cell placement before the APs were
completed, was the wrong sequence.

Appraisal forms, they

argued, should be completed, then meetings held and cells
assigned. Ed, the president, informed me: "AP forms are
completed after the rank order and cells are assigned.

The

form should be used by the boss as ammunition to get moves."
To the EAs, it was illogical to assign cells and then
prepare write-ups to justify positions.
was a convenient, rational sequence.

For management this

Once cells were

assigned and the universe balanced, APs were written to
match the individual's placement. Some managers admitted
this.

Bill: "I don't appraise EAs.

the cell placement."
justify appraisals.

I write the AP to fit

John J.: "Some APs are written to
It becomes a selling job." Writing

appraisal forms first created problems when the language was
too positive or negative for the person's cell assignment.
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The Union then questioned the purpose, fairness, and value
of the document. As Garfinkel (1967) discussed, managers
wrote forms for their rational purposes which did not fit
the information needs of employees or representatives. This
kind of discrepancy fueled the illusion that appraisals
reflected workers' achievements.
The Union president recognized that movement within the
universe (e.g., attrition and hiring) opened chances for
positive cell changes.

This belief reinforced the

evaluation system as an allocation system, and not a
merit/achievement based plan, although many employees still
held to the myth of the importance of performance. When
employees grieved their appraisal cell, the arguments
stressed the overlooked achievements of the EA. Several
years ago, the grievance director, Terry, presented an
appraisal grievance for Bill, who was rated near the top
third of all EAs.

Terry said, "I don't feel the manager

gave Bill credit for his training efforts or his overall
helpfulness.

You can't just look at spec production."

During several recent bargaining sessions the team continued
to voice dissatisfaction.
misrankings.

Ken: "There are too many

The plan is too rigid, and errors are not

fixed even when they are obvious." Ken's reference to
"rigid" concerned the slow movement allowed in the plan.
Employees with either very good or poor performance were
unlikely to move much during the annual review.

The norms
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of movement called for gradual upward steps even though as
individual had superior achievements.

This again pointed to

the insignificant role actual achievement played in cell
movement.

If this were truly an equity-based plan, behavior

should have been most important for placement.

The equity

of the appraisal plan was a myth.
Progression Concept
The Union bargaining team repeatedly argued for a an
automatic wage progression system to replace the judgment
based, merit system, expressing their concern for equality,
rather than management's desire for equity.

This area

remained a fundamental disagreement between the parties.

If

management eliminated the merit plan, they would in effect
terminate the appraisal process as practiced in the
engineering unit for over 25 years.

The Union leaders

thought management had control in this area and wanted to
retain it, thereby restricting movement and merit increases.
Managers feared that an automatic progression format would
destroy or weaken the employees' motivation to work,
ignoring other factors (e.g., work itself, advancement,
recognition) that moved people to achieve organizational and
personal goals (Herzberg, 1959). As I mentioned earlier in
this chapter, Union officers repeatedly argued to reduce
manager's discretion in assigning appraisals and granting
increases. They did not trust or agree with managers'
perceptions and wanted to reduce the uncertainty of a system
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which relied so heavily on judgmental decision-making
(Thompson, 1967) .
Non-supervisory Employee's Views

Disappointment in General
Twenty-three technical-professional, non-supervisory
employees out of 40 responded to my brief, open-ended
questionnaire (Appendix 2) about the impact of appraisals.
The

predominant finding was their belief that the system

failed to reward for achievements and left many employees
unhappy.

The reasons included difficulty in comparing

unlike groups; use of a political allocation system, not one
based on achievement, i.e., extensive use of politics and
"brown-nosing"; lack of a sponsor; short service; no room
for movement; and limited technical knowledge. These
comments highlighted the mythical nature of evaluations, but
did not explain why practices continued when they were not
directly legitimated. I have contended the system has been
reproduced because subordinates are relatively satisfied by
the overall reward arrangement and do not believe they have
any power to change the plan created by managers since their
previous complaints have never altered practices.
Roadblocks to Success
Employees offered a number of interesting viewpoints
about what they believed was important for movement, but
lacking in their performance profile.

They said their
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appraisal position prevented further movement: they were at
the top and could not move higher in the current job
category. This statement disclosed the restrictions of an
allocation-driven plan situated in a bureaucratic
organization.

Opportunities varied by position of the

employee and declined because there were less openings at
the top. Another barrier was the allocation limits imposed
by managers to produce a bell-shaped distribution.

Other

similar comments touched on the lack of open positions, and
a shrinking universe which made movement even more
restricted because of the 100% balancing point.

The plan

simply placed a limit on the number of employees who held
top ratings.
Type of work and perceived value of work were noted as
other reasons why advancement was blocked.

Employees

recognized that some job assignments were seen as more
important and difficult by management and therefore deserved
a larger share of limited rewards. These "higher" valued
jobs were referred to as "spec" writing and dealing with
customers, involving 90% of the EAs. The "lower" valued jobs
were "service and support" which handled cost-reduction case
work (e.g., write-ups, investigation of ideas), costestimating, and quality-control assignments. Short service
was another reason for limited movement: people did not
expect to be rated at the top if they had short service. A
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secretary said: "If you're new, you can't expect to be
outstanding right away."
some cited lack of a sponsor and being of the wrong
gender (male) and color (white) as impediments to movement.
According to the company affirmative action plan, managers
made efforts to hire or promote qualified individuals into
jobs that were underutilized compared to the degree the
protected group existed in the labor pool of the geographic
area. The company was not under a court-ordered quota
system, which would mean that a specified number of future
opportunities must go to members of protected groups.

The

comment by employees about the impact of gender and race
reflected a popular myth for lack of movement, and a curious
one for at least two reasons.

The highest rated woman was

in cell 3 (1 was top, 8 was bottom) and the highest rated
minority person was in cell 2. If the statements about the
"advantages" of being a woman or minority were true, you
would expect greater representation of these classes in the
higher appraisal categories, but this was not the case.
Secondly, when managers discussed performance with me, they
focused on the specific behavior of the person, not his/her
race or gender.

When managers made such a reference, it was

incidental, and a way to supply demographic data to identify
the person.

For example, when John W. discussed some of his

EAs who deserved to advance, he mentioned Hermina, a female
minority, but John never spoke of her ethnic background or
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her gender. He simply said, "Hermina is one of my EAs who
should be higher.

She's constantly working and producing.

What a workhorse"! The supervisors noticed and tended to
discuss performances before demographic variables.
The discussion of the previous section highlighted the
variables of current appraisal, type of work, seniority,
sponsorship, and race and gender as factors affecting
appraisals.

These perceptions were shared by all the

principal actors, i.e., managers, union officers, and
subordinates, yet all parties continued to accept the
appraisal plan.

Why?

The myth of the value of good

performance remained strong because it provided a way to
accept and live with a system containing unequal rewards in
the face of subjective evaluations.

Managers needed this

myth to maintain the power and control of their roles; the
Union's existence was sustained by all the problems
generated by the system; and subordinates found hope for
rewards and reasons to continue participation.

Without this

myth, the entire control-reward system would collapse!
Use of AP Forms
Employees said the appraisal forms were negative in
effect and contained distortions.

The APs were "used by

management to justify salary levels, were repeated for each
employee, and were made to fit the final appraisal." Some
reported that supervisors completed the form and merely had
employees sign it with little or no discussion.

One of the
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continuing complaints was that managers filled in the AP
forms after the cell positions were decided and so fit them
to the rating. Employees believed that the AP should be used
to decide an employee's position, but that this was not the
actual practice. Rather, APs were finalized after appraisal
levels were decided and the rank order was completed. Chuck,
a manager, confirmed this sequence: "The AP form is often
done after the rank order and cell assignment are finished."
The order of appraisal production was a puzzling sequence.
The parties were aware of this pattern, adding another
example of the "window dressing" nature of the evaluation
system.

Setting aside an argument for a "correct" sequence

for managers to produce an evaluation, the subordinate fully
expected the boss to complete the form before deciding an
appraisal.

The parties openly admitted this order was not

used, adding to the myth of appraisals and the continual
questioning of what counted in the organization. It was as
though employees wanted to understand the rules of the game,
so they could have a fair chance at the rewards.
What's Important
I had a sample of employees rank 15 qualities according
to the value they felt supervisors placed on these variables
in rating performance.

A lower mean rank value reflected

greater perceived evaluation impact, while a larger number
indicated less perceived value to managers in assessing
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people.

Table 4 presents a listing from most important

attribute to least important of qualities which employees
perceive managers use in ranking them.
Table 4
Employee Perception CN = 15) of Value Managers Place on
Employee Behavior
Factor

Mean Value

Rank

Production and Quality

5.39

1

Job Knowledge

6.26

2

Attitude

6.52

3

Cooperation with Mgt.

7.25

4

Complexity of Work

7.61

5

Flexibility

7.65

6

Attendance

7.78

7

Follows Rules

8.35

8

Problem-solving skills

8.39

9

8.61

10

Self-Confidence

9.13

11

Seniority on job

9.13

11

Communication skills

9.35

13

Customer Relations

9.96

14

11.10

15

Social Relations with
Managers

Attractive appearance
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The mean scores ranged from a low of 5.39 for production and
quality to a high of 11.1 for attractive appearance. 23 of
30 employees responded to the questionnaire.
Table 5 reflects the frequency with which certain
factors were cited as having a high impact (rank 1, 2, or 3)
and a low impact (rank 16,15,14).
Table 5
Employee Perceptions of High and Low Impact Behaviors

High Impact

Frequency Ranked 1, 2, or 3

Production and Quality

14

Social Relations

8

Attitude

6

Complexity of Work

5

Job Knowledge

5

Problem-solving

5

Low Impact

Frequency Ranked 16,15, or 14

Social Relations

9

Appearance

9

Customer Relations

6

Communication Skills

5
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One could hypothesize that the above perceptions
resulted from the appraisal history of the respondents.
Those with good ratings thought that "production and
quality" were important, while those at the lower end of the
scale supported the use of social relations and appearance.
Although production was cited as important to managers,
respondents know, in practice, social factors mediate the
final appraisal. Clearly, employees believed managers
assigned the greatest importance to an individual's
production and quality, values consistent with managers'
views discussed earlier.

Job knowledge and attitude

followed and fell within the high impact factors, and
employees believed that managers valued a productive and
knowledgeable worker with a positive attitude.
Qualities ranked at the bottom were "customer
relations 11 , which was surprising considering all the
attention this factor has received in company publications
and training courses, and "attractive appearance.'' This
response was probably due to the emerging status and nonspecific nature of customer relations.

Employees did not

know what this variable meant because of its recent
emergence as significant.

Prior to divestiture, the first

priority was production and quality and most members were
socialized under these old values and did not see the
importance of customers.

Secondly, production was still

seen and rewarded as more important than customer relations,
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which received lip-service in the new engineering
organization.
Informally, male employees told "stories" that some
women were promoted due to physical attractiveness and use
of sexual favors. These stories persisted in the face of
demonstrated managerial skills or appropriate educational
background. However, women did not occupy a number of
positions disproportionate to their representation in the
labor market.

Women were found in staff manager jobs, and

of the 34 manager positions, 6 were held by women.

All

these assignments were in the bottom 2 of 4 management
levels.

The accounts were unfounded, and even if true, not

very favorable to women who filled just over 17% of the
decision-making positions.

The stories probably started and

persisted as a way to explain the speaker's failure to
progress in the organization.

It may be a face-saving

device (Goffman, 1952) to justify the storyteller's
persistent, unenhanced status as a non-supervisory employee.
I was always amazed at the anecdotes circulating in the
unit.

Besides the allegedly undeserved success of women,

topics included office romances, illness and other personal
problems (e.g., divorce and drinking problems), defects in
moral character, value as an employee, and degree of
financial resources.

The storytellers stimulated the group

and clarified issues (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), but some
managers saw this behavior as a waste of time and evidence

208

of poor "work habits!" Consistently, the low impact factors
included social relations with supervisor, appearance,
customer relations, and communications skills.

According to

these figures, employees thought managers devalued personal
relations, physical appearance, dealing with customers, and
communicating.
These conclusions were not consistent with beliefs
expressed via stories from some employees who said that
"golfing or bowling with the boss will gain you a higher
appraisal."

It was interesting to see that actors thought

production, knowledge, and attitude were more important than
appearance and social relations.

This position helped

explain the frustration and disappointment of those in a
system that did not adequately reward the expected, commonly
held-to-be-important behaviors, but used an allocation
system based on manager's needs, political methods, and
cueing for movement. These comments were consistent evidence
that the appraisal system had a mythical nature where
beliefs did not match practices.
Other Factors
Non-management employees reported other factors, which
I had not included, as most significant for appraisal
status. A persistent theme here was the negative impact on
movement, compared to what worked for placement. This led me
to conclude that the practices created "losers" who produced
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the following accounts to justify their unsatisfactory
status (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Goffman, 1952).
Many long-service employees thought their greater age
favored younger employees for promotion, while others
believed that supervisors looked at an EA's current level
before evaluating performances.

There was a great inertia

against advancing people a level because there were so few
moves to spread throughout a large universe. Linked to this,
EAs believed that the quantity of available slots affected
their chance for upward movement.
Finally, employees, hinting at the presence of an
organizational paranoia, thought that seeking transfers
through the bidding system indicated they were not
interested in the job, and did not deserve to advance. This
factor was interesting because it exposed a belief in
loyalty not expressed too frequently. Divestiture caused a
breakdown in old values like loyalty and security, which the
company supported through consistent promotions, salary
increases, and "lifelong" employment. The norms changed and
productivity, profits, and customers became the primary
goals of the company, leaving employees afraid to show any
sign of "jumping ship. 11
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supervisory Views of Evaluation Factors

After the previous group of engineers and EAs ranked
evaluation factors, I reasoned it would be useful also to
collect managers' perceptions about the same factors.

In

another section to follow, responses of these two groups
will be compared.
Table 6 lists attributes from most to least important,
according to supervisors who evaluated within the
organization. A discussion of these data follow the tables.
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Table 6
Manager Perception of Weight Managers
Employee Behavior
Factor

Mean Value

(N

25)

Place on

Rank

Production and Quality

3.38

1

Job Knowledge

3.77

2

complexity of work

4.08

3

Flexibility

4.35

4

Problem-solving skills

5.31

5

Attitude

5.38

6

Customer Relations

6.38

7

Communications Skills

6.58

8

Self-Confidence

9.00

9

Attendance

9.46

10

Follows Rules

11.10

11

Cooperation with Mgt.

11. 60

12

Seniority on job

13.00

13

Attractive appearance

13.90

14

14.60

15

Social Relations with
Managers

The mean scores ranged from a low of 3.38 for
"production and quality" to a high of 14.6 for "social
relations with managers." (The lower means= higher
rankings). 25 of 28 managers given questionnaires,
responded.
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The following table reflects the frequency certain
factors were cited as having a high impact (rank of 1, 2, or
3) and a low impact (rank of 16, 15, or 14).
Table 7
Comparison of High and Low Impact Behaviors

High Impact

Frequency Ranked 1, 2, 3

Production and Quality

14

Job Knowledge

14

Complexity of Work

13

Flexibility

12

Attitude

10

Problem-Solving
Low Impact

8

Frequency Ranked 16, 15, 14

Social Relations

23

Appearance

16

Seniority

14

Cooperates with Management

3

Follows Rules

3

Attendance

1

Managers placed the greatest importance on task
completion factors: production and quality; job knowledge;
complexity of work; flexibility; and problem-solving skills.
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Not surprisingly, these same factors fell into the high
impact category, with "production and quality" and "job
knowledge" at the top of the list.

These factors were

achievement directed, something the employee "earned" and
was rewarded for accordingly.
Factors rated at the bottom of the list referred to
non-task or context factors and included social relations
with managers, employee appearance, seniority, cooperation
with management, and following rules.

This was again

consistent with the low impact variables, where social
relations with managers and attractive appearance were cited
most often as having little impact on performance
evaluation.
There were a number of points worth noting about the
low impact group factors.

Supervisors were often criticized

for "playing favorites" with employees with whom they golfed
or bowled. One manager said supervisors had little choice
but to rank a factor like social relations low or else they
would confirm a number of negative comments from employees!
Another 3rd level supervisor, "jokingly" commented that,
"Charlie would be a good candidate for the staff manager's
job because he golfed with me. 11

These comments, those from

grievances, and from informal discussion with employees
disclosed that social relations with managers actually had
far greater impact on performance appraisals than managers
openly confirmed.

They believed in fairness and rewards for
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production, but they knew the system used subjective
factors, including social relations and liking the employee,
to determine the individual's appraisal.

As performance

differences between candidates became less distinguishable,
there was a greater use of subjective factors, such as those
reported in the low impact area.

These variables were quite

powerful when the appraisal process moved from objective,
concrete factors (e.g., production and quality) to
uncertainty, lack of performance knowledge, and into the
area when political variables like friendships, repayment of
favors, and coalition formation came into play.

There was a

difference between what I observed and heard during informal
conversations with managers and what they reported was
important in judging performance.
Other Factors
Managers added a number of other factors, not listed
among the choices I provided, as significant in determining
evaluations. In contrast to the additional factors from nonsupervisors, managers' comments were positive, i.e., they
enhanced chances of upward movement, rather than prevented
employees from progressing. The difference announced the
diverse orientations the two groups took. Non-supervisors
were less powerful and more dependent on their bosses for
career success, while managers, although not happy with
their appraisals, thought they had more control of the work
situation.
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Managers thought that EAs who trained others and shared
solutions contributed to the success of the entire
department.

Linked to this was teamwork where the employee

had "organizational integrity" and built group cohesiveness.
Also cited was cooperation to share workloads and job
information.

Another dimension was relationships, a highly

subjective item which assessed how well the employee worked
with peers and customers. Supervisors favored those who were
self-directed and easy to manage, touching subtly on the
importance of control.

A third factor dealt with how the EA

used time, matching interview data which cited good work
habits as desirable.
The next variable, professional manner, was a curious
item because the EA universe is never referred to as a
"professional" grouping, due to less technical nature of
their job, lack of an engineering degree, and existence of a
union.

With this as background, supervisors wanted workers

who acted maturely, required little supervision, and
"conducted themselves as professionals."

This was in the

sense of appearance and attitude, not the classical notion
of professional, which deals with a specialized body of
knowledge, acquired through formal education and examination
by a licensing group (Larson, 1977). After reviewing these
factors, it became quite clear that all were subjective in
nature, difficult to contest, open to debate, and very
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useful for managers to control the work and appraisal
situation.
summary of Shared Engineering organizational Beliefs

The data revealed many values, some of which were
founded in actors' experiences and were not mythical.
However, a number of beliefs persisted in the face of
contradictory organizational practices. There were three
main categories of beliefs that operated in the culture of
the Engineering organization: achievement, fairness, and
avoidance.
Achievement
Members believed that accomplishing organizational
goals was the common method to attain success, giving
everyone a chance to advance in appraisal level, salary, and
hierarchical position.

They saw the opportunity structure

as open to all who achieved. This was similar to the
explanation Turner (1960) used when he discussed the
difference in ideal-type perspectives taken by British and
American schools toward allowing students to compete for
college entrance.

The British model is "sponsored",

identifying those most likely to succeed, and admitting
those "selected" students.

The American model is

"contested", allowing more students to enter the race and
then eliminate themselves because of performance.

The

second approach is class-centered, competitively fair, and
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declares the American dream of success through hard work.
The ''contested" perspective explains the persistent belief
that the evaluation system is fair, recognizes performance,
and rewards employees.
This myth was contradicted at YZ&Z by those who thought
they, despite having achieved all that was asked of them,
had not advanced.

Traditionally only 10% of the EAs

advanced a cell each year, assuming that new members entered
the unit.

The allocation method more accurately described

the practices of this organization, and not recognition of
achievement. This discrepancy between the belief in
achievement and the attainment of success after contributing
represented the core contradiction of the appraisal plan.
The company's reward system promised graduated levels of
incentives for contributions but continuously fell short of
that goal in the eyes of managers and subordinates.

The

system did not deliver expected rewards because of
limitations in funds and company-defined restrictions in the
number of top appraisal positions.

The existence of limited

rewards created a competitive climate among actors where
teamwork was given lip-service, but rewards were based on
individual variables such as supervisory influence,
seniority, nature of assignment, and appraisal history of
employee.

The myth of equity dominated the belief system

and proved frustrating to all participants. Opportunity to
advance depended on non-production qualities like influence
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of one's manager and structure of individual assignments,
and was differentially distributed.
Fairness
The actors said that good work, achievement, and effort
should be rewarded with money and promotions.

This was

based on the powerful value of equity or distributive
justice which held that rewards should follow and be based
on the individual's contributions (Kerbo, 1983; Mahoney,
1983).

All parties supported this unattainable

organizational belief.

Managers tried to promote their

"best people"; the Union grieved an employee's appraisal
when he/she thought individual efforts were not recognized;
and individuals consistently assessed the status of their
"psychological contract" (Schein, 1980) with the department
and then adjusted their personal efforts, i.e.,
contributions, to match their perceived rewards.

The data

indicated that most employees were not satisfied with the
level of fairness or rewards. Lou, a staff specialist, said:
"Employees know appraisals are "BS."

You get the same old

story -- 'I tried to move you, but I couldn't.'
told I had excessive long distance calls.

Once I was

My boss said the

top group could only have 10-15% in it, and there was no
room for me."

Gen, a supervisor of clerical employees said:

"Employees feel the system is biased with little chance to
advance." Judy, a secretary: "You can have a high rating for
years without any impact.

Appraisals did not mean much
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because there's no money tied to them." Bill: "Appraisals
create very negative morale problems.

Only 2 or 3 out of 30

people can move." Reno: "People don't feel they're rated
right."
Employees sought fairness in a system driven by this
belief because the approach reflected a fair chance at
obtaining a reward.

This was similar to people waiting

patiently in line to buy football tickets.

This might not

be enjoyable, but it was orderly and progress to the
"window" could be estimated with some accuracy.

What

disrupted the sense of fairness was faster than expected
movement and "jumping" beyond others in line. This was like
the anger and frustration caused by "line crashers'' at the
box office.

Workers did not mind the wait, as long as

progress was fair and based on achievements.

However, quite

often this very fairness was missing.
Avoidance -- No Pain or Loss
A powerful and persistent belief and practice was
avoiding confrontations and feedback.

This was seen in the

practice of not taking away past salary increases, even
though an employee's performance level had dropped.
Approximately 10 of 300 EAs dropped a level each year, yet
no one "lost" money, but merely did not receive a raise.
Bob, a service manager, said: "We try not to hurt anyone, so
we keep the positions the same." Regina, a staff manager,
told me: "Managers don't want to drop a person because of
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the negative impact on salary.

They want to avoid

confrontation." In times of layoffs or downgrades, those
affected by the downgrades had their salary protected for 1
year and then reduced over a 3-month period.

In the last 4

years, only 3 new EAs out of approximately 125 hired were
"relieved" for performance or attendance deficiencies.

This

was one value actually consistent with organizational
practices.
The implication of this non-punitive norm may have been
dysfunctional for both subordinate and company. The worker
was unhurt financially in the short term, but was deprived
of data which might improve rewards during a career. The
company, by paying a salary not commensurate with its reward
structure, furthered the claim that appraisals were shams.
This practice also decreased the likelihood that production,
quality, and customer satisfaction indices would improve by
avoiding discussions to "turn around" the worker. The
practice of problem avoidance contradicted the company's
goal of production and service, but it made the workers more
controllable by not irritating them with feedback.
comparison of Evaluation Factors from 2 Perspectives
Table 8 lists the factors based on the mean value of
the two groups, and the rank order of each factor, referred

to earlier in tables 4 and 6, providing a view of the
relative, perceived importance of each factor.
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Table 8
Rank Order of Behaviors Valued by Workers vs Managers in
YZ&Z CorQoration

Factor

EAL Engr
(N
15)

=

Managers
25)
CN

=

Rank
Difference

Production

1

1

0

Job Knowledge

2

2

0

Complexity

5

3

2

Attitude

3

6

3

Flexibility

6

4

2

Problem-Solving

9

5

4

Cooperation

4

12

8

Attendance

7

10

3

Follows Rules

8

11

3

Self-Confidence

11

9

2

Communication

13

8

5

customer Relations

14

7

7

Seniority

11

13

2

Social Relations

10

15

5

Appearance

15

14

1

(1) Managers and non-supervisors perceived a number of
variables the same way -- some of high and some of low
impact. The low impact factors were seniority, appearance,
and self-confidence. Complexity of work was rated moderately
significant, and the high impact factors were job knowledge,
production or quality, and flexibility.

These variables
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differed in rank positions by o - 2 ranks. (2) Another
cluster of factors showed differences of 3 - 8 ranks:
communications skills, customer relations, problem-solving
skills, social relations, attendance, follow rules,
cooperation, and attitude. On the surface the members
reported a good deal of agreement on what was important for
evaluation. To some extent this showed the high degree of
shared understanding of the organization's success values.
The communications devices (e.g., grapevine, meetings,
appraisal sessions, grievance meetings, bargaining sessions,
and publications) socialized the members to know what the
company officially said was important
production/quality, and flexibility.
appearance received lower marks.

job knowledge,
Seniority and

However, as discussed

above, non-production, i.e., non-achievement, factors like
acceptability of person and boss' influence were more
significant in determining evaluations than the talked-about
variables like achievements.

The production factors were

objective in nature and verifiable, offering little room for
supervisory judgment.

Without this discretion, managers

would lose control over subordinates and the labor process,
a situation completely untenable to them.

So although the

parties talked about achieving results as the means to
rewards, managers actually used judgments of multiple
variables (e.g., seniority, past appraisal, allocation
limits) to determine the most deserving EAs for upward cell
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movement.

The managers retained control by talking one way

but acting on contributions and rewards in another way. This
was further evidence about the fabricated nature of the
entire evaluation process.
Finally, an interesting phenomenon occurred when ranks
between the two research groups (EA/ENGR, and Managers) were
compared.

The subordinate group in the Engineering unit

(EA/ENGR) differed the most from the perception of their
supervisors. Between managers and their subordinates, only
two factors (job knowledge and production) had the same rank
position. It was clear that the subordinate sample of EAs
and engineers understood the impact of some of the
evaluation factors differently than did the Manager group.
This was surprising and puzzling because the EA/ENGR and
Manager groups resided in the same organizational setting.
Why did the rank discrepancies occur in the above
patterns?

I suggest two explanations that cannot be

validated from the survey data, but provided a rationale.
First, a number of the respondents in the EA/ENGR sample saw
themselves in conflict with supervisors over work procedures
and did not share a common "management" definition of the
situation.

Secondly, the Manager group may have responded

in terms of some ideal or "right way" of weighing appraisal
factors, which caused them to differ from their subordinates
who answered from a desire to expose what was wrong with the
system, emphasizing more of what should be present, rather
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than merely rating a group of neutral factors.

Other

written remarks on the survey returned by the EA/ENGR sample
indicated that a majority of the respondents were displeased
with the system, mainly because it did not recognize "good"
work with cell advancement or other promotions.
The power relations between managers and subordinates
created conflict and divergent interests. Employees sought
security and a small measure of autonomy, while managers
wanted to control the work environment so they could deliver
production and profits to the company. The parties saw the
"world" differently because they stood on different
plateaux.

CHAPTER 7
THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF APPRAISALS
The previous chapters have analyzed the setting of the
organization, the control strategies, and the belief systems
of the actors.

This chapter examines the individual and

group actions managers took to produce appraisal decisions
and the products of those actions such as AP forms,
documents, and a "rank-order" list. The analysis will answer
the question, "How are performance appraisals produced?"
The Big Picture
To understand the overall evaluation process and the
discussion which follows, I will describe the phases of the
general appraisal process as they involve managers.

In the

first phase, the immediate supervisor assesses employees'
performance, through feedback from engineers who assign
work.

The supervisor judges the employee's worth, comparing

performances against departmental goals and situational
variables like unplanned workload and unforeseen problems,
such as the introduction of a new service. Managers apply
their interpretation of shared performance objectives; rank
their employees from "best" or most productive to "last" or
"poorest;" integrate information about current cell position
225
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and time as an EA, and finally judge performance to produce
their departmental list.
In the second phase, all the supervisors under a
Business Line Manager (BLM) meet to "combine or blend" their
individual lists into a "subbranch" rank-order.

The size of

these combined lists range from 16 to 135 EAs. Managers told
me, "there is usually agreement because we know most of the
EAs discussed."

However, past performance and reputation

often haunt an EA during this phase.

John

w.

(a manager)

told me about Al, a union officer who worked for him about 6
years ago.

"Al was smart, but he spent too much time on the

phone running his extermination business. I had to keep an
eye on him, because he never seemed to push to get work
out."

Because of a reorganization, Al was transferred to

another supervisor who, according to John, "took a liking to
Al, and was fooled by him."

Louise began to rely on Al for

training new EAs and for coordinating assignments.

During

subbranch meetings, John argued that he had EAs who deserved
to move ahead of Al.

John, however (according to Louise),

seemed to "get his way" for a number of years because of his
long tenure, knowledge of the engineering unit, and
argumentative skills.

But Louise kept pushing Al

she

ranked him as the number 1 EA in her departmental listing
and finally was able to move him into cell 2 over John's
objection.

I believe her success in moving Al up was due to

several factors: her department moved to a subbranch
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separate from John's; his arguments began to lose weight
since he had less direct contact with Al; and John's
comments sounded like "a personality conflict", dating to
1986 when John wrote several memos about Al for alleged
incidents of harassment.
I label the third phase, "the group meetings", because
all managers meet to decide a final rank-order list.

This

is the most difficult and tense period because managers
compare and select EAs for cell placement from work groups
outside their area.
Phase 1 -- First Level Manager
Supervisors observe behavior and received performance
input from their engineers on EAs. Reno: "I look at what the
EA does for me.

Performance is based on whatever we see.

sometimes a picture book is used because EAs are not known
by name.

If EA does something special, it gets

communicated, so he may go up."

Arlin: "The basis of

evaluation is perception, not statistics.

With this method

you can't prove who's the top EA when you get into group
meetings because we don't provide statistics." Chuck: "I use
the observation of work habits, punctuality, 'BS-ing', and
who's on phone too much."

Ed B.: "I don't keep efficiency

records anymore because I rely on engineers who have direct
contact with EAs." Armed with these data managers make
judgments on the contributions of each individual against
departmental goals. Gen made an insightful comment: "We use
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objective standards, like production and quality, but I
interpret the application of the criteria."

Judy: "My boss

makes a judgment about my work, so it's not objective.
doesn't count the letters I type."

Reno: "We can justify

any action we take for moving people."
formal way of judging.

He

Arlin: "We have no

Even when we assign weights, it

still reflects my perception of the situation." Bob:
"Evaluations reflect a person's opinion and who says they're
right because personalities come into play.

I don't even

use numbers of cost reduction cases because they vary in
degree of difficulty."

Eddy: "When my engineers and I tried

to rate EAs, we had a number of ties, so we used 'tests of
significant differences'.

We look at spec delivery,

training, and how the person is used as a resource."
Employees are ranked from top performer to bottom
performer, based on a judgment of contributions.

Managers

also make an estimate of the appropriate band. This decision
is based on the current appraisal cell, a judgment of what
band the current behavior fits, and an assessment of which
employees deserve to move the most. Eddy: "The managers know
the current cell, so in working on new appraisals, we
project new levels.

Cell definitions vary each year because

of the people reviewed and the work conditions.
relative to what other EAs did that year."

Movement is

Two supervisors

commented on the impact of appraisal history.
sometimes use last year's rank as a criterion.

John W: "We
The EA who
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was higher keeps that position." Kurt supported this view:
"You look at past appraisals because you don't turn the pile
upside down."

Bill: "We back into appraisal.

We use

history of person, seniority, performance, and job
circumstances.

In a more

mature department (more service),

there's less movement." In essence, supervisors produce a
placement "wish list" for their EAs, based on individual
interpretations that were informally shared by all
supervisors. They had acquired these performance definitions
from talking to their peers and bosses. Bob told me: "I have
discussions with my BLM before the group meeting.

I learned

about the procedure when I asked by boss to tell me how
things worked."
The immediate supervisor who should know his/her
employees well, used observation and informal standards to
make the initial evaluation decision.

Thus, the element of

illusion entered the process at the beginning, pointing to
the mythical side of appraisals which many believe result
from accurate assessments of objective data, i.e.,
accomplishments.
Phase 2 -- Department Manager Review
After each supervisor appraises, rank orders, and
assigns a proposed

cell for EAs, all the supervisors in a

subbranch meet with their manager to produce a composite
rank-order, trying to balance all appraisals at 100%. Bud:
"In the past our goal was to balance at 100% more than focus
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on real performance differences.
performers.

We try to group similar

We don't use a fixed model of performance to

determine placements, but we look at what was accomplished.
we focused on those we knew.

We didn't vote much."

Each cell level is worth a specific percent of a
standard rate of pay.

For example, the top number 1 cell

has a value of 118.6%.

Cell 2 equals 115%, cell 3 equals

110%, and so on through cell 8, which is valued at 85%.
This group of managers uses a common technique to equally
allocate the number of possible upward moves among the 5 or
6 operations managers, allowing each supervisor to reward
his/her own people, based on his/her judgment. Arlin: "We
determine how many we can move and then allocate."

John J.:

"Before the group meeting, we were told how many upward
moves were possible."

Bill: "In our subbranch meeting the

supervisors put their moves in a priority listing.

The

allocation of moves is based on the department's balancing
percent and the number of people in the department."
There are never enough slots available to satisfy all the
wishes of supervisors, leading to a number of rules and
procedures to distribute limited rewards.
Final Phase -- Business Line Manager Review
In the past, the former 3rd management level met to
combine their subbranch lists to produce one rank-order
list, which was then divided into 8 groups or "cells" of
performance.

The method of "forming cells" was accomplished

231
by drawing lines through the total list so that all the
assigned bands averaged to 100%. This process was imperfect
and created artificial distinctions between individuals,
based solely on the need to balance appraisal. Chuck
mentioned: "I had a case where a BLM drew a line between 2
of my EAs who were tied because of balancing constraints.
one moved up, and one stayed at the same level and so was
angry.

The next year I was able to move the second person

up because he performed well and was seen as a victim of the
system by the other managers." Again it is evident that the
evaluation process is a sham because contributions are
devalued and replaced by the managers' need to balance a set
of appraisals rather than determine achievements.
These managers calculate how many EAs can be located in
each cell in order to reach the 100% point.

They discuss

candidates when a few people are vying for the one spot that
will place them in a higher cell.

Most 3rd level managers

do not know the work of EAs and have to rely on the input of
the 2nd level.
Bud, a Business Line Manager (3rd level), told me the
usual practice at these meetings is to share the
opportunities for promotion, i.e., the number of available
moves.

The BLMs believe that the candidates are so similar

and their performance is generally so unknown to these
managers that the most reasonable approach is to share
moves, which are often carried over from the previous year.
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As a result of the procedures, some managers do not end up
with an equal distribution of moves because of past "debts."
ouring the 1989 EA review, subbranch managers (BLMs) agreed
to balance each of their groups at 100% as a way to bring
those groups above 100% "into line", or to have them make
progress toward the 100% goal, producing a wide variation in
appraisal activities.

Large subbranches which brought in

new EAs had room to advance more people and still balance,
while smaller groups had no opportunity to move EAs because
their appraisals already averaged to 100%.
case things worked out differently.

However, in one

Phil, a BLM with 16 EAs

and no apparent chance to move his people, made a deal with
Bud, who had over 135 EAs, to "borrow" 2 of Bud's many
moves, so Phil could advance 2 "very deserving" employees.
For the most part, the 3rd level acted as tie-breakers
or overseers of the process.

Occasionally they had first

hand knowledge of performance, which allowed them to take a
stronger position in placement decisions. This again
demonstrates the impact and significance of visibility
within the organization.
Rules and Allocation Practices
Managers use a number of general, often unspoken rules
and some specific practices.

They think their best

performers should be rewarded ahead of employees who are
merely good performers.

The problems arise when individual
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managers disagree on who deserves the top positions which
are worth more money.
The group meetings allow managers to present their
candidates for top positions, listen to others, and reach
consensus on their overall rank-order list.

Supervisors

agree they will not get all they want, but that all should
get something.

Discussion of candidates, including personal

observations and challenges to suggested moves, is common at
all meetings. A number of managers recognized and commented
on the importance of talk or the supervisor's presentation
style in creating a cell move for an employee.

Bob: "Some

supervisors raise their voices and push their candidates
ahead."

Kurt: "The supervisor who speaks better, and sells

their person who is known (to other managers), gets cell
movement."

Eddy: "Since we can't prove performance, we have

to present the EA, using the boss's skill and eloquence."
Ed: "Managers with the best vocabulary get their people
moved, and these may not be those who did the best job."
The Union leaders recognized that the smooth talkers move
their people ahead. Through this bargaining, or "give-andtake" process, coalitions based on long-term working social
relations and shared perspectives are formed which move some
EAs, while others, possibly equally deserving, remain at
their current levels. These comments indicate the illusion
of equity surrounding the production and administration of
appraisals. They generally do not reflect contributions but
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the influence of other non-performance variables (e.g.,
manager's influence and presentation skills).
Decision-Making Conventions During Group Meetings
Specific techniques (see Appendix 5) include voting by
secret ballot, use of seniority, and flipping a coin. Arlin:
"I know I want to move someone if they're good for years,
but haven't moved." Bill: "I use tenure as a basis of
appraisals. I'd place a 4-year person above a 1-year guy. I
give preference to the one who's been producing longer."
There were few specific rules, such as rejecting double
moves and allowing the incumbent to retain his/her position
before a "newcomer." Bill went on to say: "When we decide on
unknown EAs, we look at last year's rating to break ties."
Kurt: "You look at past appraisals because you don't turn
the pile upside down.

History dictates cell movements."

Regina: "Managers accept incumbency as a reason to keep
someone in level over a newcomer." Rules are carried over
from year to year and applied when needed.

Modification of

rules are very common and emerge when old rules no longer
unravel roadblocks during the rank ordering process. Ed: "We
developed rules at the group meeting, but they don't work on
newer EAs, so we changed the rules (to fit the situation)."
Kurt cited a specific case where rules were modified.
"Rules changed as we went along.

When we got stuck

the rules didn't work -- we'd try a new rule.

i.e.,

Once we put
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some engineers in a higher cell because we were told more
money was available."
Managers also talk about other specific techniques they
use during group meetings to complete the rank-order
process.

Voting is a popular approach.

Bob: "After a 45

minute discussion, we turned to voting as a way out, a way
to move on."

Chuck continued this feeling: "Sometimes we

use voting just to get the session done."
were at a deadlock, we voted."

John J.: "When we

Regina: "Voting is tried,

but is unsuccessful because of division along party (BLM)
lines."

Eddy: "There is voting by party lines.

Those who

are undecided just flip a coin when it's time to vote."
Additional criteria emerged if, for example, 3 EAs have
similar performance records, undifferentiated by the
presentations of their managers. More specific criteria like
attendance or number of cost reduction cases or total
dollars saved will be suggested. Bob: "When people are even,
we look at attendance or a person's willingness to do
extra."

Chuck added: "In selecting EAs for moves we discuss

'going above and beyond', letters about the person, and
quality of teamwork."
is a factor.

As mentioned before, time on the job

Kurt: "The more consistent EA would get moved,

because he's performed over a longer period."
"Seniority is a factor.

Regina:

You must put in your time."

Managers whose EAs had such qualities support the new
rule, while others counter with a factor like the amount of
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volunteering demonstrated by their candidate.

One way out

of this dilemma was offered by Eddy who described how he
applied "a test of significant differences" to judge which
person was "better" than another. This involved discussing
and agreeing on factors such as training which add
significantly to department results or customer
satisfaction.

These arguments tend to be circular since no

single factor is acceptable to all managers because the
interaction reflects a win-lose pattern.
Eventually some managers wear down after long meetings
and concede on variables that do not favor their employees.
Supervisors also engage in types of behavior during meetings
that can be classified as "bargaining", compromise, or "give
and take" because, as Chuck put it simply, "You can't always
have the moves you want."

The following behavior

represented this approach. Ed: "At the meeting managers get
worn out and give in on pushing their people.
feeling to just put the EA somewhere."

There's a

Regina: "People are

slotted because of their boss's personality.

The one who

sticks to his ground gets a move for his EAs."
A number of political tactics are used.

Chuck: "Part

of the meeting activity is reading other managers for what
they're trying to do."

Ed: "I don't like the current system

of managers talking people into positions where they don't
belong."

Gen saw an adversarial relationship: "It's a dog

fight -- (placement) depends on how you make your case.

You
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feel like a lawyer because you must prove your case to get
your candidate a top spot."

John J.: "EAs are ranked

depending on the selling job of their boss.
honesty, which I don't find.

This requires

There's a 'buddy system' used

in voting which is not honest."

John w.: "During group

meetings, managers don't listen to each other's arguments.
They come up with reasons to shoot down the points made."
Reno: "All managers under a BLM merge by a 'give and take'
process.

We say things we can't prove.

we trade a cell l

person for a cell 3 (move)."
Managers also noted the uncertainty and lack of
structure surrounding these group meetings.
group meeting has no structure.
last year's placement.

Kurt: "The

You start by looking at

When it comes to deciding a level,

it's like 'darts in the wind' because so many factors come
into play: bargaining between supervisors; how well the EA
is known; the status of the EA group -- whether it is
growing or declining; and the money available (for raises)."
Regina: "There is little discussion about stated job
performance, because there is no agreement on criteria used.
What defines the cell are the people in it, not a specified
(formal) criteria by band."

Reno: "We don't have a

regimented system; there are no uniform rules." Again the
source of these rules was experience, trial and error,
bargaining, and convenience -- the need to produce a rankorder list within a certain time period.

A number of
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supervisors said that, after awhile, "getting the list done"
became the primary objective, replacing the original goal of
accurately assessing contributions {Blau, 1967). Because the
task of appraising performance is so subjective and the
setting of the group meeting is often so confrontational,
the convenience factor becomes very powerful in pushing for
a decision on appraisals. Managers wanted to produce some
form of an appraisal list and remove themselves from the
tense situation produced by the group setting.
Group meetings also purge or check individual biases
and perceptions against norms of production, customer
service, and manageability. Gen: "Group meetings 'iron out'
the different emphasis {of managers).

No one with an

attendance problem is likely to get an outstanding rating."
Just as supervisors believed in rewarding the largest
contributors, they also supported allocating moves to "share
the wealth." Arlin: "We feel we should share these moves.
The system depends on trust among managers."

John J.: "It's

a numbers game. Only so many people can be in the top
categories."

Kurt: "People have to wait their turn.

may deserve a move, but only 2, for example, get it."

Many
Bill:

"We work with the idea of sharing moves -- all departments
get a fair share of moves." However, comments from managers
and union officers along with data on distribution of moves
indicated that allocation is not completely equal for all
business lines.

This varied because some groups are
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considered more valuable (e.g., High Tech group) than others
(e.g., Services group) and because supervisors had unequal
ability to influence the allocation of moves. During the
1988 rate review for EAs, the Union filed a grievance on the
"unfair distribution of cell moves", because they were
concentrated in departments with experienced, "influential
supervisors", according to the Union president.

The

grievance committee prepared a cross-tabulation of moves by
departments which supported their argument that rewards were
not evenly distributed.
However, after the 1989 review, I calculated the
following Chi-square (Table 9) to determine if there were a
statistically significant relationship between appraisal
categories (high, middle, and low), and BLM or subbranch
groups.

The Chi-square (X 2 ) value was 9.353, df = 12, and

P.5o = 11.34.

The differences between observed and expected

were not large enough to conclude that the results were due
to random error.

I found that cell placements were not

related to the department or subbranch in which one worked.
This strengthened managers' arguments that they sought
equity and in fact allocated moves evenly.
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Table 9
1989 Aeeraisal Distribution of
Cell Placement by Subbranch (BLM}
NA

Total

35

0

97

61

58

3

137

1

10

6

0

17

6LO

5

27

18

0

50

8BO

1

5

11

0

17

TOTALS

38

149

128

3

318

subbranch

High

Middle

Low

Cells

1,2

3,4,5

6,7,8

lNO

16

46

2VO

15

580

Two additional Chi-square calculations, however,
supported the argument that cell position was related to
service as a EA, a factor managers admitted to, and to
gender, a variable I did not ask direct questions about, nor
an area that managers talked about. Table 10 tested for a
relation between cell position and length of service.
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Table 10
1989 Appraisal Distribution of
Cell Position by Service
service

High

Middle

Low

NA

Total

0-3

0

2

48

2

52

4-7

0

17

25

1

43

8-10

0

26

17

0

43

11+

38

105

37

0

180

TOTALS

38

150

127

3

318

x2 =

134.16, df

= 9,

and P.OOl

=

27.88. There was a

relationship between service and cell placement -- the more
senior EAs occupied the high cells (1 and 2), while the
shorter service EAs held the lower cell positions (8, 7, and
6). The observed differences were significant.
The second analysis (Table 11) tested for a relation
between cell position and gender of EA.
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Table 11
1989 Appraisal Distribution
of Cell Position by Gender
Gender

High

Middle

Low

NA

Total

Male

38

136

100

3

227

Female

0

14

27

0

41

TOTALS

38

150

127

3

318

x2 = 15.528, df = 3, and P.oo 1 = 13.82. There was a
relationship between gender and cell placement -- men
occupied the higher cells (1 and 2) in a significantly
different, i.e., higher, manner than women.
Overall, managers share moves, use interpretation,
observe and judge behavior, measure contributions, employ
multiple judgments, publicly discuss candidates, consider
past performance, and produce a list of relative performance
which they accept, at least partly.
The following table summarizes conventions (Appendix 5)
used by managers during group appraisal meetings.
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Table 12
summary of Grouo Decision-Making Conventions
Used by Managers of ZY&Y

Method

Situation Used

Outcome

* Voting

* Break
performance ties

* Placement, but

*
*

"
"
"
"

Seniority
Flip a Coin

"

"
"
"

"
"
"
"

"
"
"

"

inaccurate
according to
actors

"

"
"*

"
"
"
"
"
Mistrust,
ti

"
"

"

* Present

* Limited Slots

poor
listening, check
of biases

*

* Don't
recognize EAs

* "Old" data
selected

* Form
Coalitions

* Uncertainty,

* Create
decision without
agreement

* "Give and
Take"
- allocate
- bargaining

* Limited
rewards (moves)

* Satisfy, not
maximize goals
regarding cell
placement

* "Give In"

* Long, tension
filled sessions

* Most deserving
EA may not
receive reward

* Make New Rules

* Ineffective or
lack of rules

* Cells
assigned,
supervisory
mistrust

qualities
- attendance
- cost reduction
Picture Book

lack of rules
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AP Form -- The Record of Performance
During the first quarter of each year, managers
complete part A of an AP form (Appendix 4} which describe
the job tour and lists departmental goals. Some supervisors
carefully review this information, but most did not because
the language was general and could fit almost any EA tour.
After the discussion the employee and supervisor sign the
form. When the year was over, supervisors complete Part B of
the AP which describes the EA's performance.

Of course many

situations and priorities change since Part A has been
completed.

The manager recalled the circumstances through

notes, production reports, memos, recollection of
observations, or feedback from others. Chuck, Arlin, and
Eddy work in the same subbranch and told me they developed a
questionnaire to use with their engineers in order to
evaluate EAs.

This is an effort to make the appraisal

process more structured and grounded in shared
understandings of performance levels.
The AP form was described by managers as a ritual,
existing primarily for appearances.

According to Kurt: "The

AP does not match the cell assigned.

They aren't read and

exist as a formality." It is not used to produce or
determine a performance band, but as a record of performance
that provides legal documentation and feedback to
individuals. Bud, a 3rd level manager, saw it this way: "The
AP form is not a selling tool, but a tool of discussion."
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Arlin added: "A good AP write-up may not be linked to a
higher cell." The AP is rarely used to "present" candidates
for placement, but as a device to offer feedback, facilitate
discussion, help an employee develop skills, and to justify
cell location, which was determined prior to and
independently from this document. Chuck: "The form is often
done after the rank-order and cell assignments are finished.
EAs were mostly negative about the APs.

One employee

reported: "Management can use them how they wish."
said his contained "negative comments only."

Another

A third said,

"The AP was made to fit my rating." The implication of these
practices is to render the form important as an evaluation
tool since it is a clear fabrication and symbolizes the sham
of performance appraisals. Managers thought that employees,
knowing the impact of the AP, generally ignored its
contents, often declining a discussion and instead choosing
to merely sign the form on Part c, which lists the
performance level for a specific year.
Supervisors use language they describe as general,
cautious, and safe to avoid having to defend the lack of a
higher rating to employees or to the Union. Reno: "EAs
compare their APs and find the same words used in most
cases.

Managers do this to protect themselves."

John W: "I

put little information on the form because EAs and union
reps use it against us.

The statements are general.

cover myself against challenges." This creates an

I
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interesting dysfunction and contradiction: the AP, intended
to facilitate communication, feedback, and employee
development, actually inhibits and conceals information as
managers protect their judgments through the use of nonspecific, generalized language.

Some raters used a set of

terms and expressions which they apply to all EAs whom they
appraised. Kurt: "I noticed I began using the same words on
APs, which read the same even though EAs described were
placed in different cells."

Chuck: "An on-going concern of

mine is 'am I using adjectives consistently?'

I don't want

to use words that sound alike." Inability to make finer
distinctions for fear of grievances prevents supervisors
from offering more specific, written comments. Bill: "I
can't be too critical in what I write because the Union can
take you to task.
will compare them."

I try to be uniform in APs since people
After this Bill told me he relies on

informal, verbal comments to correct problems because he is
less restricted when talking rather than committing his
position to paper. Some managers did verbally give more
direct, specific comments that were later defended as
misquotes or interpretative differences.
Two Views of APs
Garfinkel (1967) raised a number of valuable questions
which can be used to analyze organizational records such as
AP forms which managers had to complete for every EA.
must be kept for 3 years, shared with the employee, and

These
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remain available to the Union officers when processing a
grievance.
The first question was, What's on the AP"? The form
(Appendix 4) contains the following information: the
employee's name, title, supervisor's name, and department
number; a section for the boss to describe the principal job
responsibility; an area to list the major assignments of
"unusual importance to the organization"; a space for
supervisors and EA to sign, indicating the job expectations
were discussed but not necessarily agreed on.

On page 3 the

supervisor "describes how well the principal purpose of the
job tour has been accomplished, documenting any significant
deviations in performance."

In part 2 of this page, the

manager is told to "document specific accomplishments for
each major objective."

Page 4 begins with a request to

"briefly list other significant accomplishments not covered
above." The employee had a space to sign indicating "he/she
had an opportunity to discuss results prior to
organizational appraisal sessions.
agreement."

It does not indicate

The final section of page 4 contains the

employee's cell placement, appraisal period, supervisors'
approvals, and EA's signature, acknowledging the employee
has had a chance to discuss his/her appraisal, but not
necessarily to agree with cell placement.
What problems are there in using information on the
AP?"

Most of the information appears as written narratives
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rather than descriptive scales, making the document subject
to more interpretation.

Also comparisons between EAs are

difficult because the form reflects the individual style of
the supervisor.

Some managers write forms that show

measurable performance differences.

Chuck: "A consistent

concern of mine is 'am I using adjectives consistently? I
don't want to use words that sound alike."
The comparison problem really concerns the employee and
the Union reps when they review APs for possible
inconsistencies.

Ken, an active rep, complained to me about

the time involved for him to study, analyze, and make sense
of the forms. Routinely, the APs create few problems for
managers because they have little need to compare their
words after the documents are written.

They become

uncomfortable during grievance or arbitration hearings,
however, when they have publicly to defend and justify what
they write.
What information was unavailable from the record?
Employee receive a general sense of their performance
against departmental goals, but no idea how they compare
with other EAs.

This is curious because the managers rank

employees to determine cell placement.

Employees see their

cell positions, but do not know where they rank in the band.
The form does not systematically contain an explanation
about the person's developmental needs. Some supervisors
commented about that deficiency.

Regina: "Since appraisals
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are always tied to money, the objective of development is
last."

Reno had similar thoughts: "At first EAs accept the

development theme, but then they get mad."
The organization has a number of "good" reasons for
creating "bad" records.

As managers repeatedly told me,

they were very guarded in what they wrote. Reno: "AP forms
are used carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the
person.

We don't want to hang later.

imply nothing.

We are careful to

Words don't match performance." supervisors

created the AP to meet company policy requirements and not
as a document convenient for union scrutiny.

Managers had

to complete the form, not provide a format for broad
comparisons among employees.

Their tactic is also to have

the forms completed as quickly and conveniently as possible
because of the number involved.

Kurt: "It's ridiculous to

rate 30 EAs I don't directly observe, let alone write 30
APs.

Do you know how long that takes?"

routinize the task.

Some managers

Eddy: "Some managers find it difficult

to write so they use phrases like "met expectations",
instead of making specific comments."

Judy: "My boss

xeroxed an appraisal form for two employees who performed
differently." The records were "bad" from the perspective of
those trying to analyze data, but "good" for supervisors who
must complete the form within a period of time.
"Is there uniformity in the APs"?

Managers act

uniformly in their cautious, non-committed style of
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completing the form to protect themselves from being
"trapped" later by questions.

The contents are not uniform,

on the other hand, when assignments and accomplishments are
compared, because individual managers describe assignments
from various perspectives due to different departmental
goals.
"What are the 'prevailing rules' of practice?"
Managers write the forms after the EAs are assessed, ranked,
and assigned to cells, so their descriptions of
accomplishments can thus match the cell selections. If
supervisors complete the entire form prior to the group
meetings which produced cell placement, they will risk
writing documents at variance from their appraisal band.
EAs can be described in glowing, positive terms, and yet
their cell positions may be low (8,7) and inconsistent with
the verbal descriptions, inviting challenges from employees,
who then ask, "Why is there such a discrepancy between your
words and my cell position"?
Performance Evaluation Models
During the research process, I saw that an interesting
comparison could be made between popular appraisal models
commonly held by the managers and intended to guide their
behavior and the actual practice found in the Engineering
organization.

I located two common evaluation models being

used in the research setting (Scott and Dornbusch, 1967;
Skenes, 1989) that reflect the "management" evaluation
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concept and were so similar I combined them into one
paradigm illustrated as the "formal model" below. Following
this description of evaluation theory, I analyze the
practice of evaluation models in the engineering
organization.
Formal Model -- What is Supposed to Happen
In the first step, managers set performance goals. The
rational objectives of the work group determine the
important activities.

For example, the department decides

it has to produce 50 specs per week to make a 10% profit.
The next step requires establishing performance standards.
Managers clearly define and communicate expected behavior
for job performance.

Managers then collect and record

performance data through observation and feedback from other
raters. Raters assess behavior by comparing employee's
behavior to the performance standards, noting situational
factors, to determine an evaluation. Supervisors compare the
evaluations of employees and assign individuals to a variety
of performance levels, reflecting a diversity of
contributions and achievements. After appraisal forms are
completed and levels assigned, the supervisor provides
feedback for development and salary administration purposes.
The discussion is to be positive with career planning as one
focus. Managers learn this idealized approach through
company training courses, professional and company
publications, and informal discussions among their peers.
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I..nf ormal Model -- What Actually Happens
Instead of selling goals to EAs, managers tell the
employee what upper management wants.

John described the

process: "I review each EA's responsibility with them.
Financial goals define department goals.

I tell my people

what the goals are, but don't get real buy in, just
acceptance."
The norms of performance are implied, varied, and
subjective.

Managers had a number of comments to illustrate

this situation.

Eddy: "Cell definitions vary each year

because of the people reviewed and the work conditions.
These definitions depend on the OM's perceptions."
use subjective factors."

Bob: "I

Chuck: "It's hard to know the

situation surrounding each spec, so hard data alone is
almost useless."

Ed. B.: "Now the criteria are subjective;

they used to be objective -- you know, figures to back up
hunches."
To produce data on appraisals, managers rely on a
variety of information sources: observation, feedback from
peers, mental and written notes, and impressions.
Supervisors and employees had a number of views. Chris said:
"One problem is they (bosses) can't always see you, so you
have to tell the boss what you're doing."

Chuck: "75% of my

opinion is based on what engineers tell me."

Ed B.: "I

don't keep efficiency records because I rely on engineers
who have direct contact with EAs."
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supervisors admitted to and support the use of
individual methods to evaluate performance.

Ed B.: "Work

varies so managers have to interpret what produced the
results."

John W: "Each manager uses his or her own

standards.

There's wide variation in what's considered good

performance.

Some stress numbers (efficiency, on-time

delivery), others, personalities."

Reno: "Evaluation

methods vary according to the values of the boss -- what's
important to him.

I hate to be had, so I check honesty of

people."
The appraisal process is marked by imperfect knowledge
and supervisory interpretation, so political tactics
permeate the group decision-making process.

Ed B.: "At the

meetings, managers get worn out and give in on pushing their
candidate."

Bud: "We try to group similar performance.

We

didn't use a fixed model of performance to determine
placement, but we looked at what was accomplished."
"We try to anticipate what others (managers) will do.
group meetings turn into complete shit because
not know other EAs.

Eddy:
The

managers do

In the present system, managers talk

people into positions they don't belong in."

Bob: "Some OMs

raise their voices and push their candidates ahead.

After a

45 minute discussion, we turned to voting as a way out to
move on."

Kurt: "Managers who speak better, and sell their

person who is known by others, gets cell movement for their
candidate."
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Managers reported that this phase contains a variety of
behaviors.

Some just announce appraisals, while others

discuss the AP form with EAs, who also display a range of
actions from just signing without discussion to skipping the
interview completely.

Chris: "The appraisal session is a

telling session because evaluation (the level) has been done
and approved."

Kurt: "Giving out cell moves is like

throwing bones to a dog.

People want to know why they

didn't move up or why they dropped.

Some don't even read

the forms, just sign them because no money is involved."
Bill: "Appraisals don't mean anything.
the cell one is put in.
the form'.

They do not reflect

Some EAs said, 'just let me sign

Others just want to know their cell."

one EA

reported, "The boss writes everything and you sign"; while
another said his boss "completed the form and discussed it."
An engineer who thought he hadn't advanced higher because he
"didn't play politics or socialize", said he "read and
signed the form even though I disagreed that it contained
all the facts the appraisal was based on."

Regina: "People

look at money, not appraisals (level or write-up)." Karen:
"Some refuse to sign the form, maybe 20 out of 400.
want to get feedback so they can react to comments."

People
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Figure 5 on the next page illustrates and summarizes
the broad process of appraisal construction actually used in
the Engineering organization. Three general phases produce
appraisals. A group of contextual factors (e.g., task
variation, size of universe, informal standards, and
existence of union) produce a good deal of uncertainty about
performance criteria. This is further complicated because
individual supervisors have unequal influence and knowledge
about workers' contributions. This uncertainty leads to the
use of a political process (e.g., coalition building,
voting, long meetings, and unequal influence of supervisors)
to actually assign EAs to performance cells. This model
contradicts the commonly held myth that individual effort
and achievement are recognized and used to assign
subordinates to appraisal cells.
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Figure 5
Model of Appraisal Production Actually Used in ZY&Y
Factors Internal to Unit

* Tasks Vary in Complexity
* Large size of Appraisal Universe
* Informal Evaluation Standards
* Presence of Union

Uncertainty

* Performance Criteria Vary
* Managers' Influence is Unequally Distributed

Political Process

* Coalitions are Formed Along Department Lines
* Managers Vote to Break Ties
* Long Meetings Wear Out Managers
* Power of Managers' is Unequal

Assignment of Appraisal Cells
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Additional analysis indicates that the political
process consists of a number of separate variables which
impact both the actual behavior and individual judgments of
managers. Because of this process, an individual's
evaluation placement can be described as a dependent
variable, affected by a number of other factors. The
specific independent variables involved in this political
process include the following:
1. Number of Available Openings -- advancement of
employees to higher bands depends on the number of available
positions. If the universe of employees has become stagnant
due to a business slowdown, there will be less movement of
employees.
2. Interpretation of Contributions -- employees'
efforts are measured against the perspectives of a large
variety of raters who see the organizational world
differently.
3. Uncertainty -- raters can't always know what to do
to capture a valid picture of performance. Since managers
have an unequal knowledge of employee's behavior, it is
impossible for all supervisors to be judging the same
behavior.
4. Political Tactics -- uncertainty over procedures
and lack of agreement "factor" the use of negotiations,
voting along party lines and "give-and-take" behavior in
order to structure the group meetings to favor a limited set
of candidates (Pfeffer, 1978).

5. Supervisor's Influence -- each manager provides the
initial input about each employee and then bargains, using
varying degrees of ability to influence peers. Those with
greater verbal skills obtain a larger share of rewards for
their employees.
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6. Goal Displaceaent -- the primary goal of evaluation
assessing performance -- becomes secondary to producing a
rank-order list, which then represents an account of
performance for that year. Accuracy -- the correlation of
performance and cell placement -- is distorted as the
primary task of the group sessions becomes to complete a
rank-order list (Blau, 1967).
7. Favoritism -- social factors, such as the ease of
managing people, their willingness to work, and attitude
filter manager's subjective judgments of the individual's
behavior. Someone who is "liked" is generally perceived to
be a better employee.
8. Job structure -- the nature and demands of job
assignments vary creating the opportunity for some employees
to have more time or resources to perform more successfully
(Kanter, 1977).
Table 13 summarizes the political nature of appraisal
construction.
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Table 13
Political Process Model of Appraisal Construction
Independent variables

Features
I

Number of Openings

Few -- Many

Interpret Contributions

I
Agreement -- Disagreement of
shared understanding
I

Degree of Uncertainty

Great - Small Knowledge of
Work
I

Political Tactics

High -- Small use
I

Boss' Influence/Knowledge

Influential -- Ineffective

Goal Displacement

I
Convenience: Easy - Difficult
Time Use:
Much - Little
I
Like
Dislike Employee
I
High -- Low Opportunity

--

Favoritism
Job Structure
Variable Mediated

I
Work Behavior, Habits,
Production
I

Dependent variable

Appraisal Band Placement
(Cell) and AP form

Conditions Affecting Appraisal Construction

The evaluation process of this organization is marked
by several subtle variables which give it a special
appearance.

These variables also affect the group decision-

making process. The nature of relations within the system
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can be described as contractual (Etzioni, 1961), producing a
set of work performances based on expectations of rewards.
Employees are involved in the unit because they are paid to
be involved.

Work relationships are marked by constant

examinations and negotiations over the terms of the
"contract."

The rewards are mainly financial (e.g., raises,

promotions) and secondarily status symbols (e.g., awards,
plaques).
The opportunity structure changed as noted earlier, and
now increased restrictions on one's chance for promotion
from EA to engineer without adequate formal education.

The

EA assignment was described by some managers as a "career"
assignment, meaning that people expected to spend their
entire company life in the EA slot. The process is also
heavily influenced by halo effects from previous years which
tie in nicely to the "cueing" system of appraisals.

The

previously used labels keep employees in certain performance
tracks, allowing them movement toward the top levels over
time. Many are disappointed because they never move up or
movement is very slow -- sometimes a single cell advance
took 10 years. Bob: "Those stuck in the same band for 10
years don't believe or accept the system. They feel if
they're doing the job, they should move up. The system takes
too much time to move (employees)."
Evaluations represent a summary of a sample of a whole
year's performances, based on the employee's degree of
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visibility and skill in managing his or her own impression
on raters. This imperfect sample is used and becomes an
official part of the employee's record producing a sense of
unfairness or lack of recognition. When managers write
summaries, they create performance abstractions which are
incomplete pictures of behavior, but taken as valid and
become part of the historical record of the EA, used·during
next year's evaluation process. Here they will affect the
new abstraction, producing a somewhat closed and distorted
loop of observation, feedback, and appraisal placement. This
process also detaches, strains, and separates the
relationship between a number of groups: boss and
subordinate because communications are guarded and
manipulative; bosses and their peers because it requires
trust to conduct performance-based evaluations, and
manipulation to gain in a politically-based, allocation
system; and groups of subordinates who compare themselves to
others and feel they deserve to be rated higher than those
they saw as less productive, knowledgeable, or senior than
themselves. The process is embedded in the use of verbal,
informal communication rather than formal, accurate feedback
because managers fear reprisals or grievances from taking
strong, firm positions on a subordinates' performance.
System Limitations
The appraisal system contains a number of factors which
limit movement within the appraisal plan.

The current EA
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plan has 9 distinct cells, each with a percentage value
ranging from 80% (cell 9) to 118.6% (cell 1).

The salary

administration portion of the plan "funded" the salary
increase needs by providing enough money to grant raises, if
the entire universe has appraisal percentages which balance
at 100%

The system thus is a "relative" appraisal approach,

comparing EAs against each other, rather than strictly
evaluating the employee's performance against a set of
individual standards. This produces a highly competitive
structure in which someone gains a cell when new members are
added or someone else moves downward.

Although participants

expected to move from lower to higher cells over time, there
are relatively few upward moves, due to the forced
requirement to balance appraisals at 100%. During the 1988
rate review, about 340 EAs were appraised and only 38 had
upward cell movement, while 6 individuals dropped one cell.
Over time all the actors accepted these artificial limits as
a legitimate part of the plan.

The small number of movement

chances helped the mass of employees accept their lack of
advancement which became reserved for a select few.

The

majority of workers were actually protected because it was
not the end-of-the-world to maintain one's status quo, and
the company provided job security and good benefits to most
employees which compensated for the lack of rapid movement.
Another less obvious system limitation concerned the
time spent annually to do the appraisal.

Although managers
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are familiar with the process, they find themselves
negotiating over who should claim the limited seats open for
movement.

Although the consequences of placement are

significant (e.g., salary increases, grievances), managers
are traditionally required to complete the task in about one
week, condensing the time to do a more adequate job into a
short time period.

This produces a more politicized

product, open to grievances and dissatisfaction and mistrust
among managers. Long sessions "wear down" managers, and they
"gave in and stopped arguing for their candidates." The time
constraints have dual consequences.

They help managers make

difficult decisions about distributing limited rewards by
drawing tight deadlines.

But the constraint also is

dysfunctional because it distorts the analysis needed to
evaluate the contributions of employees.

Instead, context

factors like time limits help produce appraisals rather than
in-depth reviews of actual performance.
The formal criteria to judge performance of EAs have
not changed since the first contract in 1967.

These factors

include "performance, ability, potentiality, level of
knowledge, judgment, ingenuity, initiative, experience, and
current salary."

These elements are not formally defined in

the contract and remain vague and open to interpretation and
application according to manager's perceptions.
The system is marked by a great deal of variation in
standards, work assignments, and supervisory perception,
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resulting in high levels of uncertainty. The goals of the
unit vary each year depending on the demands of customers.
These shifts send mixed messages to employees about the
value of their efforts. The uncertainty has implications for
both supervisors and subordinates.

Managers use the

dynamic, complex situations to keep employees off balance
and controllable.

Workers, wanting to succeed in the

organization, continued their efforts, hoping to present the
right or needed behavior at the moment, insuring their value
to the department.

Though uncertainty appears dysfunctional

at first glance, it also provides managers a tool to keep
workers in check.
The large size of the organization with, more than 600
employees and 300-plus EAs, fosters inaccuracies in judging
the relative worth of individuals.

The system calls for

placing all the EAs in a rank-order from number 1 to the
last EA, but no manager has information on all employees, so
varying degrees of inaccuracy creep into the system.
Supervisors have from 15 to 30 employees to appraise, so
they develop additional techniques to manage the evaluation
task.

Some managers may "copy" the same performance goals

for all their employees, even though they differ, just as a
convenient way to handle the same task for 30 employees.
Consequently, the formal aspect of the appraisal is
fulfilled, while the stated purpose of differentiating
performance for rewards may become lost.
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Knowledge of performance is incomplete and unequally
distributed among managers, who reported their task is
easier for the professional engineer group because that
group contains only about 90 people and their behavior is
more widely known, due in part to their more dominant
position in the occupational structure. The use and
distribution of appraisal data are critical issues for the
evaluation system.

As mentioned above, information on

performance is unequally distributed in the organization:
not all raters (e.g., supervisors, and engineers) share the
same data or interpretation of situations.

EAs perform and

manage their visibility differently, which becomes a factor
in their cell placement in contradiction to the official
organizational practice of judging work performance. This is
another indication that appraisals are illusions of actual
contributions.
The presence of a labor union influences the appraisal
system in several ways.

The Union is a legally sanctioned

body which is granted a number of rights by labor law.

The

first and most encompassing right is the company's
obligation to bargain over changes in "wages, hours, and
working conditions," before implementing change.
A great deal of uncertainty in decision-making resulted
from the need of the company to bargain. Management may wish
to introduce a more "efficient" appraisal or salary
administration system, but must convince the Union of its
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benefits from their perspective.

The company's bargaining

team (of which I have been a member for 4 years) tries to
predict the impact and acceptability of proposals, although
never certain of the Union's reaction. The Union and company
in this setting have struggled for years over the best way
to appraise EAs, with the company retaining the right to
appraise and grant salary increases based on a number of
merit factors.

However, the Union attempted annually to

alter the administration of salaries.
Looks Are Deceiving
The appraisal system is, on the surface, a merit-based
equity system, providing unequal rewards due to each
employee's contribution to production, quality, customer
service, etc.

The Union has sought an equality system, so

all members share the same rewards. The plan has had a gamelike quality because rewards are unequal and limited, and
the employees seek ways to gain the most from the
organization.

Behavior is often aimed at improving how one

is perceived, i.e., as more or less powerful, rather than at
accomplishing the department's goals.
A climate of futility engulfs the actors because
neither good nor poor performance is logically rewarded.
Individuals who believe they perform well, and have that
feeling validated by their immediate supervisors, may not be
rewarded according to their expectations. Other EAs who
perform poorly are not negatively affected either.

They do
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not have money taken from them even if they fall into a
lower performance band. It is also rare for a long-term
employee to be terminated for poor performance.
organization lived with its problems.

The

Forces keeping this

constant are a growing, profitable work unit which has not
faced serious pressure to reduce non-productive employees.
This discussion provides another dimension of
contradictions (contained in the Marxist notion) where the
company thinks it must perform certain actions (e.g.,
provide unequal rewards, give feedback) to help production
among workers; but, at the same time, these devices
undermine the credibility of the organization since these
tools are not used fairly and consistently among all
workers. In addition, the application of appraisal
techniques produce effects contrary to those intended by
managers.

Employees compare their rewards and feedback,

find them inconsistent with their perceptions of personal
contributions, causing subordinates to reduce efforts
instead of increasing motivation to accomplish
organizational goals.
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Table 14 summarizes the situational variables reviewed
in the preceding section.
Table 14
summary Overview of Context Factors in Evaluations,
ZY&Y Engineering Unit
Factor

Consequence

uncertainty, lack of
knowledge

Political Tactics
(e.g., voting)

Opportunity Structure

Use of more Formal
Education

Halo Effects

Slow Movement; establish
a "cue" pattern

Summary, abstraction of
behavior

Distortion; detaches,
strains relationship

Limitations - 100%
balance

Allocation of moves
before performance review

Little time to complete
evaluation process

Errors; increased use of
political tactics

Vague performance criteria

Large use of
interpretation, judgment

Variation in assignments,
standards

Uncertainty, greater use
of perceptions

Size and Knowledge factors

Seek shortcuts; data
lacking or weak

Union Presence

Constrains actions;
Forced to bargain
Demand information

Value Contradictions

Equity VS Equality;
Performance not
recognized
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Decision-Makinq Models
A key goal of this research project was to explain the

construction of appraisals as products of managers making
decisions, using shared understandings of performance
standards and behavior.

A model of organizational decision-

making {Table 15) proposed by Thompson {1967), frames an
explanation which fits the research setting.

Thompson

argued that the types of decision strategies managers used
are dependent on 2 situational variables: goal agreement -the extent members of the dominant coalition agreed on the
problem or situation (e.g., increase profits, appraise
fairly); and certainty of method

the degree the coalition

agrees on accomplishing the goal or solving the problem
{e.g., consolidate departments, use peer evaluations).

270

Table 15
Thompson's Decision-Making Models

certainty of Method

Strategy

aigh

High

Computational
(Rational)

r.,ow

High

Compromise
(Political
Bargaining)

aigh

Low

Judgmental
(Insight)

r.,ow

Low

Inspirational
(Leader)

Goal
,..--

Agreement

Each of these four strategies was used at some point to
explain decision-making in the ZY&Y engineering unit with
emphasis on appraisal decisions.
9omputational
There was high agreement on both what should be
accomplished and how this should happen.

For example,

supervisors agreed employees should be paid accurately and
in a timely manner, and they held that completing weekly
time-tickets was the best way to do this.

The appropriate

leadership style was to "compute" or develop a routine
procedure to collect, verify, submit, and store the
timesheets.
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political Compromise
Here we found low agreement by managers on the problem
or goal, but high certainty on the available solution
techniques.

Managers were not certain if they should stress

high productivity (e.g., more "specs") or high quality
(e.g., specs with few errors).

They however agreed that

classroom training would solve the problem.

Thompson

suggested that managers in this situation adopted a
compromise or bargaining strategy to gain consensus for
identifying the problem.
Last year during protracted discussions at staff
meetings, the six BLMs reached an impasse on how to appraise
EAs to improve the "battle ground" climate of previous group
meetings.

The subbranch managers did not know if they

wanted fair treatment (e.g., 100% appraisal balance) within
each BLM group, or whether they wanted to reward members for
the complexity of work and relative contributions of each
subbranch.

The decision was complicated by past injustices

and the need for fairness now.

Larry: "Years ago we

accepted that the High Tech group would balance over 100%
because they were formed by pulling the best EAs from other
groups, but now we should seek fair treatment for everyone.
If we don't limit the upward moves, High Tech will get even
more out of line, i.e., appraised average over 100%."

J.: "The good, deserving people just don't work in High
Tech.

We have a number of good people in Power also."

Ed
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Ken, the High Tech manager, was the target of these
gentle attacks, but he kept resisting these rational
arguments.

"If you limit my moves, I won't be able to

reward EAs who really contributed last year."

The curious

element of this conversation was that 7 of 8 BLMs agreed and
yet they couldn't quite get Ken to concede his point or
accept their perspectives.

Ken agreed in principle that

"all EAs should have a fair chance at receiving cell
movements", but he was slow to accept that his subordinates
(OMs) would have fewer cell moves. Eventually the coalition
of 7 "convinced" Ken that equal treatment should come before
his equity claim that he had more deserving EAs.
Judgmental
When managers agreed that appraisals were a means to
develop employees and compensate them fairly, but did not
concur on how to achieve these appraisals, the judgmental
model was used.

Many of the comments in the previous

sections indicate managers wanted to treat people fairly
rewards should match individual contributions -- but they
had a low degree of certainty about how to achieve this
equity situation because there were so many ways to evaluate
(e.g., observation, feedback, voting, work habits, job
knowledge, various supervisory perspectives, and amount of
seniority). Faced with this uncertainty -- "we can't prove

performance" -- supervisors made judgments using their
professional experience in comparing performance against
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shared expectations.

This was the dominant decision-making

mode of the managers.
Inspirational
Thompson described the use of this style when there was
low agreement on what must be done and a low level of
certainty on how to accomplish the goals.

In this high

uncertainty situation the manager made an "inspired" choice
based on his/her own personal experience and insight.

This

approach could be further described as one based on hunches
or intuition.

This method was also cited by Peters and

Waterman (1982} as the decision-making style of members in
organizations with strong, clear, and articulated cultures
when faced with uncertainty and incomplete information.
Managers in the research setting also faced conditions
of low goal agreement and confusion over ways to proceed to
solve problems. The very conditions related to appraising
EAs were often unclear and complex. Supervisors used to ask
me what the appraisal time period covered -- they were not
sure because it shifted during several previous reviews.
There was a random quality to observations. Managers
discussed issues in hallways, and at desks of other managers
in whom they confided. The need for meetings to discuss
appraisals spread informally, and ad hoc groups formed to
solve issues related to rating EAs, comparing performance
across department lines and deciding how fairly the most
deserving employees were treated.
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Thompson's models address a number of key issues about
managers and organizational circumstances which operated in
the engineering organization.

The essential process of this

group's life is decision-making to cope with

uncertainty

produced by incomplete knowledge about situations, including
performance, or limited capacity to process information.
Decision-making conditions really deal with processing and
assessing data.

Parallel to Thompson's work, one can

identify the decision-making modes reported by Daft (1986).
In lieu of computational, there is the rational approach
which mechanically identifies and solves problems. The
Carnegie model, developed at Carnegie - Mellon University,
is another term for bargaining or coalition formation, to
identify and select the problem.

Daft uses trial and error

in place of judgmental to illustrate using many small
decisions, checking results, and then trying new ways to
eventually solve a problem when managers were unclear about
which method would work.

Finally, the inspirational

strategy can be compared to the garbage can model described
by March, Cohen, and Olsen (Daft, 1986). There is great
uncertainty and a random quality to problems and solutions.
Decisions are a result of the interplay between problems,
solutions, actors, and choices, and often occurs "through
resolution, oversight, and the flight" of problems (Pugh &
Hickson, 1989).

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This study gave me an intensive, detailed look at an
organization and a chance to describe the context of, the
beliefs underlying, and the process itself of performance
evaluations.

This chapter summarizes my insights .through

the following sections: Features of Appraisals, What Do
Appraisals Mean?, Contradictions, With These Problems, Who
Wants Evaluations?, General Applications -- What Learn About
Organizations.
Features of Appraisals

On Credit
One of the most captivating aspects of evaluations is
its similarity to a credit-investment exchange drawn from
the financial world.

The company's appraisal system treated

the subordinate like an investor who risks his/her labor
capital (e.g., ideas, productive activity, customer service,
problem solving-skills, etc.) instead of money throughout
the year in hope of receiving a return (i.e., a raise or
promotion) in the future.

Key features of both the
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appraisal cycle and investment activity involve risks and
uncertainty.

The worker believes that "correct" behavior

throughout the year, although never guaranteed, will lead to
satisfactory rewards.

As a result the employee works "on

credit", engaging in activities (e.g. staying late,
volunteering for committee work) that he/she expects to "pay
off" in the future, annual review.
Managers bear little risk in this cycle and there is no
FDIC insurance to secure the subordinate's investments,
which may be assessed differently than the subordinate views
them.

The worker has few alternatives in this exchange and

must hope that his/her efforts will be appropriately
recognized by managers.

Lack of recognition or feedback,

even negative, heightens the employee's investment risk.
He/she extends performance "credit" during the year,
building reward expectations that may not materialize.
Managers are like friends without lunch money who take a
"catch-you-later" attitude to paying back on "loans", i.e.,
worker skills and efforts.

Since the appraisal system lacks

more immediate rewards, a year-long credit extension exists.
This is another version of the carrot-on-a-stick cliche:
employees keep chasing and reaching for rewards, which,
although close, remain just outside their reach.
This credit arrangement completely favors the company's
interest.

A worker is never sure his/her performance will

be rewarded, but continues to behave as though the
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investment will pay off.
employee have?

Really, what choice does the

He/she could demand more timely rewards and

performance reviews to monitor the status of the creditreward exchange, but holds back comments, sensing little
power. A key insight about the appraisal process is that,
while the actors believe that performance (reflecting a
"computational" decision) really counts for placement, in
practice the more significant variables are the political
forces, in the form of "judgmental" decisions, which come
into play to determine an individual's cell level (Thompson,
1967).
Controlling Workers
The appraisal system remains a tool to control the work
and indirectly the behavior of employees.

Although the term

is not applied to appraisals, there is a similarity between
appraisals at work and grade reports in school.

Both

devices allege to reflect the achievements of the individual
through a written report, but in fact both devices also
reflect the compliance (Edwards, 1984), timeliness, work
habits, interpretation, attendance, and social skills of
actors.

The report card controls behavior and acts as a

reminder of the subordinate's position -- he/she has limited
input which is given after the appraisal is completed, not
allowing for changes.
Because appraisals aid the control process, workers use
energy to create a more favorable impression (Goffman, 1959)
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of themselves.

Besides the expected cooperation and hard

work, some actors use obedience, i.e., following rules to
gain power and seize a measure of control (Hamilton &
Biggart, 1985). Appraisals reflect the power relationships
between managers and worker because both parties struggle to
do things by their own agendas -- company needs vs worker
interests.

The manager uses the threat of an unsatisfactory

appraisal to withhold general increases and the worker tries
to conduct him/herself in the most favorable light to
produce a good report card so he/she will receive the
incentives.
Myths -- Things Are Not As They Appear
Appraisals represent organizational myths -- beliefs
that do not operate in actual practice.

Many members still

believe that hard work will produce high levels of reward,
while at the same time accepting the political nature of
organizations with its favoritism and bias.

The myth

persists despite situations where most employees experience
discrepancies between performance delivered and annual
rewards, i.e., increased compensation and promotions.

The

evaluation procedure, however, seems to invalidate the
expectations of the "psychological contract" (Schein, 1983)
existing in the organization's culture.

That is, employees

believe that good work will be adequately rewarded, but in
actuality the majority of subjects expressed dissatisfaction
with the match between their efforts and the company's
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ability to provide rewards.

Simply stated, managers cannot

meet their end of the contract -- productive efforts are not
always recognized because they use a system of relative
performance in a situation with limited resources.

The

potential for compensation is always there, but employees
feel their efforts are simply not rewarded. Employees
fulfill their ends of the bargain -- the contract -- but
feel the company does not meet its part of the deal.

After

a while, employees make assessments of how much effort they
should give to match what they are receiving.

This

"checking" behavior is quite common in utilitarian
organizations described by Etzioni (1961) in his work on the
kinds of involvement used by different types of formal
organizations.
I can offer two reasons why workers, despite
dissatisfaction, persist in this myth.

First, individuals

generally hold assumptions that one's rewards should match
one's contributions (Kerbo, 1983). Workers are achievementdriven, living in a political-economy that honors and
rewards success in which one measure is the level of one's
financial compensation.

Money is the essential commodity in

this social world and those who strive for productivity
should be rewarded.

An overriding belief in equity binds

workers to the myth of appraisals -- where performance will
be fairly and objectively measured, resulting in appropriate
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returns.

This belief maintains the credit-investment trap

discussed above.
second, if workers were not to cling to the myth that
rewards match performance, they would lose their reason to
continue in the work situation. Employees need to retain as
much autonomy and control as possible to manage the work
situation.

Without this sense of control over one's ability

to achieve rewards, the employee would jeopardize the
psychological contract (Schein, 1983) created earlier.

The

experience of members in this organization attests to the
continuing strength of the appraisal myth, which managers
use to motivate workers to produce, follow rules, and to
continue investing their efforts for a future, uncertain
attainment of rewards.
Window Dressing
Formal evaluations also turned out to be a sham in
which managers ask for production and quality and promise
rewards (e.g., salary increases and promotions), but
generally fail to deliver or uphold their end of the
bargain.

Further, appraisals provide "window dressing" for

what really occurs.

The causal observer would see a program

to annually review an employee's performance and discuss
his/her developmental needs.

The job requirements and

achievements are recorded in some version of an appraisal
form.

As described above, the "store window" looks

inviting, a setting likely to offer challenging work and
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growth experiences.

However, once past the facade of

appraisals, one sees a number of discrepancies between the
talk of managers and their practices.

First, many employees

do not have a clear idea of what their jobs demand -- some
managers do not formally discuss expectations but take-forgranted that workers know what the job demands. Second, no
interim review occurs because conducting one requires time
and effort which managers believe they need to devote to
production aspects of their jobs.

They also do not like to

confront employees and make judgments about their behaviors.
Appraisals appear to be reward and development tools for
employees but they actually are devices which induce
defensive behavior. In light of this confrontation problem,
appraisals are actually used to appease workers and conceal
the uncertainties in the task of evaluation by using broad,
general language constructs which provide no development
plan because specifics are missing. Appraisals are also
cover-ups and fraudulent because managers mysteriously reach
a decision on an employee's work and then ex post facto
construct the form to coincide with the performance band to
which the subordinate has already been assigned.

The form

is really the window dressing, giving the appearance that
the evaluation was based on this document after some
sequence of objective measurements and steps were taken.
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mio Knows What?
A large amount of uncertainty surrounds the evaluation
process.

No one in the exchange knows for certain what

behavior is important at a specific time because of a number
of competing variables.

What are the job standards?

is the company stressing now?
person work under?

What

What conditions did the

Who is the supervisor?

How much

influence does he/she have with his/her peers?

I was

surprised to see the extent evaluation standards shifted
among supervisors, departments, and time periods.
Production remained the driving concern, but the evaluation
norms were so numerous and open to interpretation by
individual managers that both parties were confused. The
engineering organization is very complex, resulting in the
use of a plan which lacks clear direction.

The most formal

aspect of the EA plan is the AP {Appraisal Program) form. In
practice, the system is actually informal, where performance
is frequently "talked about" and thus open to interpretation
of shifting standards.

Evaluation decisions rely on the

shared verbal understandings of the behavior that defines
each of 8 performance cells.

At times the criteria are so

undefined and subjective that its products -- AP form, and
rank order list -- seem unreal and meaningless because the
sources used to produce it are so untenable.
Supervisors do not use a written set of descriptions to
classify performance into bands.

They repeatedly reject the
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notion of having a fixed, written set of descriptions.
After some reflection, it became clear that the bands used
for assigning evaluations to EA represented a cultural
~roduct

fashioned by the organization's members -- a

relative, flexible set of norms that are commonly, although
not completely, shared by managers.

These common, informal

understandings were produced by sharing experiences,
difficulties, and decision-making, especially in the group
meetings where multiple judgments are discussed and a rank
order list is fabricated after a good deal of negotiation.
The AP form represents a collection of judgments,
depicting higher levels of abstraction. Managers observe
behavior and make judgments about the value of that
performance.

These initial appraisals form the basis for

discussions which are farther removed from the actual
behavior.

The account on the AP form is taken as the

employee's indisputable performance, or what really
happened, rather than an impressionistic, interpreted
abstraction.

This is similar to the process, described by

Tuchman (1978), which substitutes the account-of-whathappened for the original event. Along similar lines, the
form is the focus of uncertainties about performance.
Managers are unsure of their observations and the
application of performance criteria, so it follows that
formalizing these perceptions actually produces a collection
of uncertainties or unverifiable judgments.
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A major problem for managers was the impossible task
they faced in knowing and appraising 300+ EAs who work under
unique conditions but must be compared to each other.

The

debate raged over whether appraisals were objective, i.e.
fair or subjective, i.e., biased.

My conclusion is that a

claim of objectivity is naive, mythical and a belief which
reinforces the actors' idea that diligent effort will be
seen, recorded, and rewarded.

Instead I found evaluations

were the interpreted perceptions, judgments, and biases of
actors in superior positions.

This argument was fully

developed in Chapter 7, "The Social Production of
Appraisals." Managers, even when they invoke the argument of
multiple supervisory judgments, cannot know all dimensions
of an employee's performance that are necessary to do a
complete appraisal.

Even with abundant information and the

ability to process it, managers filter the data through
factors like experiences, perceptions, and biases to arrive
at an "evaluation-in-process", i.e., a pliable judgment
which is subjective, and really not verifiable, rather than
an objective appraisal which can be measured.

To use a

research metaphor, I found appraisals were of a
"qualitative" rather than a "quantitative" nature.
A major reason for assessment difficulties was the size
of the evaluation universe -- over 300 workers -- making
knowledge of their achievements impossible to determine. An
unexpected revelation was the widespread use of something
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known as a "picture book" -- a collection of photos of all
members in the engineering organization which is produced
every 5 to 7 years.

The book is used to link names with

faces so managers can evaluate the employees.

This practice

demonstrates the unequal distribution of knowledge managers
possess about EAs and the impossibility of rating 300-plus
employees in the same job category.

Another surprise was

the connection between the past year's cell position and the
next year's placement.

Uncertain where to begin the

process, managers use performance history and current cell
to determine where the individual belongs now. The fallacy
of this procedure should be evident: if the system were
filled with errors in the past, any current rating,
dependent on the former cell, would be also inaccurate and
simply compound previous inequities.
Managers did not observe all performances, did not use
uniform methods to record what they saw, and relied on the
reports of engineers to help account for judgments.

In the

face of this knowledge-poor environment, managers used
techniques (e.g., coin-flipping, voting and verbal
presentation) to appraise employees which may not be
consistent with the observations and judgments of other
managers.

During the group meetings two curious activities

tended to occur.

When more "hard" data are available, they

will be used to decide cell placement. When less
quantitative data are evident, the raters will use more
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subjective items like impressions, compounding the
uncertainty that already exists.

One would expect that,

when only subjective variables are applied, the group would
push for more tangible variables like attendance. The
managers become caught in a cycle of increasing
subjectivity, although on the surface management thinks it
is conducting the appraisal process as "objectively", using
measurable data, as possible. Both managers and subordinates
probably would pref er a computational approach to reaching
evaluation decisions (Thompson, 1967) if such were available
because this would minimize use of subjective criteria,
which Caplow (1964) has argued has been unavoidable in
appraisals.
Let the Games Begin!
Appraisals also display the features of a competitive
games. The entire performance-evaluation cycle shows members
defining, interpreting, and reacting to work situations to
increase their gains and minimize their losses.

This is

like betting on a horse race -- you have a limited amount of
money or labor (e.g., ideas, energy, time) to speculate
(invest) on one of many unknowns (e.g., horses or
performance choices), hoping to win (raises, promotions).
The organization had limited resources for members and some
distribution methods had to be set-up to handle the
available rewards.

Managers and subordinates in fact often

cooperated to the benefit of each party (Buroway, 1979), but
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there was always an exchange process where each side, i.e.,
manager and subordinate, tried to gain rewards and eliminate
losses. Frequently, the process operated as a non-zero sum
game where everyone could win. Managers wanted production,
while subordinates seek recognition and compensation.

on

the negative side, managers want to end down-time and
inconvenient appraisal methods, while the workers tend to
avoid complex and difficult assignments whose rewards were
uncertain, not timely, and inconsistent. Linked to this
process is the strong belief, especially among subordinates,
that they are entitled to advance in the system.

Managers

talk about the desirability and benefits of a merit plan,
but in practice they recognize the value of using seniority
or experience.

I conceptualized this as a cueing system

where actors take their place in line and move along each
year, as other actors leave the "line".

An additional

consequence of entitlement is that average performance is
rewarded, not fitting the perceived value of those
contributions.
The actors are driven by actions and decisions which
are convenient, pleasant, or non-confrontational.

This is

evident in the attention given to producing a rank order
list, rather than assessing actual performance, which
becomes a secondary issue, overridden by the task of
producing a piece of paper containing relative performance
ranks.

Ironically, most of the discussion in the
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organization centers on the need to identify and reward
individual performance, while the key activity and problem
are to produce a rank order list. These activities take on
the quality of games in which competing groups of actors try
to maximize their gains in the manner of Crozier's findings
(Pugh and Hickson, 1989).
The game-like quality of appraisals also shows the
existence and consequences of competition, a taken-forgranted component of most games.

The idea of competition is

either assumed or rarely verbalized, but its value provides
the basis of the appraisal plan.

Placing employees into

bands of relative performance rests on the idea of pitting
individuals against one another for limited rewards in the
form of cell advancement, salary increases, and promotions.
This driving zero-sum process contrasts with the much
verbalized concept of teamwork or collaboration, which
receives a lot of lip-service, while the plan in actuality
continues to predominantly reward individual effort.
The unequal distribution of rewards establishes a winlose interaction and ground rules.

Since the number of top

spots are limited by company definition, some employees will
win while others will lose in the evaluation game (Crozier,
1964; Pugh and Hickson, 1989). The actors engage in a wide
set of techniques (e.g., "brown-nosing", volunteering,
transferring to powerful managers and highly visible
departments) to win the game or remain ahead.
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Making the Right Choice
Decision-making styles were exposed during the games.
Appraisal decisions were political because of the high
degree of uncertainty in the organization. The conditions of
uncertainty described above led to the use of political
tactics to decide appraisal levels. Much of the process is
rooted in coalition building, negotiation, subjectivity, and
give-and-take behavior. These activities were too widespread
to be classified as an aberration of the normally orderly
sequence of decision-making steps.

Group meetings to

discuss appraisals are just one example of the indirect,
informal, and unscripted way the Engineering organization
produces appraisal bands.

Evaluations reflect the political

nature (i.e., on-going power struggles) of organizations in
a concentrated time period, using a wide range of commonly
shared procedures and conventions described in Chapter 7.
Another discovery was that managers used verbal
presentation of candidates during group meetings rather than
utilizing the written AP forms or other such supporting
documents.
preference.

There may be several reasons for this
First, it is more convenient and faster for

managers to talk about their candidates than to write about
them.

Second, supervisors adjust their strategies for

advancing people when they see how the meeting is
proceeding.

Verbal exchange is a more adaptive and flexible

approach than committing one's position to a written form.
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Third, most of the supervisors use an aggressive style,
creating a setting with a poor listening climate.

Some even

admitted that "we are not listening carefully to the merits
of other's candidates, but are concentrating on what we will
present about our employee."

Some managers are not too

adept at written skills but have developed confrontational
verbal skills which they rely on during group consensus
meetings.

As additional evidence of managers' problems with

formal, written skills, recall the difficulty they reported
about writing AP forms to reflect differing performance
levels.

Supervisors had to depend on non-specific words to

diminish the chance of grievances.

Even with this caution,

some forms contained the same words, while employees were
situated in different performance bands. Managers present
and push employees they want to reward, and since no one can
prove whose performance is best (because standards shift or
don't exist and decisions are based on managers'
interpretation), supervisors use voting, coin-flipping, and
calling-in favors.
As the meetings stretch over several days, and more
impasses are reached, fatigue sets in and a number of
supervisors concede in trying to move their own candidates
and thus allow other managers to gain moves so that the
group meeting process can end. This is further evidence of a
politically driven allocation process which places the
managers' needs to create a rank order ahead of their stated
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goal of evaluating the relative contributions of their
employees from "top" to "bottom".
The decision-making strategy desired and the one
actually used differed significantly.

Managers and

subordinates preferred what Thompson (1967) called a
"computational" approach which depends on high levels of
agreement on performance standards and methods to complete
evaluations.

The problem remains because there is no

agreement on standards or review methods and the differences
are rooted in power struggles and political differences.
Because of these factors, managers have to use bargaining
techniques to trade the rewards of some employees for the
moves they really want, i.e., their highest priority
employees, by sacrificing deserving but not high priority
candidates.

This last group of decisions involves

management judgment which makes the voter uncomfortable over
his/her decisions and leaves the majority of employees
dissatisfied because the evaluation does not match the
worker's view of his or her contributions.

This might be

referred to as "distorted evaluation perception", an
organizational malaise produced by parties seeking gains in
a political system of limited resources.
There are different activities involved in evaluating
performance of individual employees and the tasks needed to
assign people to performance bands. Managers individually
did not have a problem appraising their workers. The real
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problem came when all the supervisors got together to
compare their EAs.

Disagreements surfaced over who had done

a better job compared to a larger group of EAs. The real
problems surf aced when managers had to select good
candidates for a limited number of upward moves.
conceptually, the first stage of activity is judging
performance against departmental goals to reach a conclusion
about someone's contribution for the year.
The second stage shifts the focus to selecting the most
deserving employees from a large pool of candidates, through
the use of negotiation, coalition formation, and
presentation skills.

The first stage is mainly an

individual effort by the manager, while the second phase
involves a group experience, requiring the

presentation of

many individual, diverse and private perceptions to a group
intent on personal agendas. Decisions that a supervisor
reaches individually "may not hold up" when presented to the
group.

Managers feel a loss of power and trust during these

group, consensus-seeking meetings.
A summary statement on the informal model of the
appraisal process developed will help place a number of the
factors in a clearer perspective to offer a theory of
evaluation, begun in the last section above.

In simple

terms there are four parts to the evaluation system of the
Engineering organization.
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How Are Appraisal Decisions Made?
I. The first stage is assembling all the data on
behavior that constitute the employee's performance,
including meeting departmental production goals; cost
reduction; and problem solving.

This aspect constitutes the

data to be judged, measured, or evaluated.
II. The second phase consists of the manager's
individual assessments of the individual's work, production,
social skills, and all work-related behavior.

This process

may be aided by organizational products like company
guidelines, training courses, or even appraisal forms (APs),
but a key feature is the individual manager's judgment of
behavior, based on shared values, which he/she interprets
and applies.
III. The third phase, the political process, is crucial
in the production of appraisal positions and consists of a
number of separate variables which influence both the actual
behavior and individual judgments of managers.

Performance

can actually improve in terms of goal achievement, for
example, but individuals may nonetheless not advance due to
political factors.

An individual's evaluation placement can

then be conceptualized as a dependent variable, affected by
a number of other items.

The specific independent variables

involved in this political process are detailed in Chapter 7
and include the following: number of available openings,
interpretation of contributions, uncertainty, political
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tactics, supervisor's influence, goal displacement,
favoritism, and job structure.
IV. The outcome of these factors produces the final
phase of the evaluation process -- the placement into a band
which reflects a collection of those defined by management
to exhibit similar performance. Cell placement is the
bottom-line, the most significant and tangible measure of
attainment in the appraisal process.

Regardless of the

verbal or written feedback given to employees, the key
factor is the evaluation category to which the employee is
assigned.

This cell reflects a position in one category of

the stratification scheme and determines the employee's
chance for and size of a salary increase. Almost any comment
or action other than a cell move tells the individual that
he/she or their manager was not good enough to obtain a
reward for them.
Class Differences

A Contrast of Interests

One of the most arcane aspects of evaluation programs
is the way they represent social class differences,
reflecting a political judgment by a member of the
administrative (capitalist) class concerning the work of the
operative (worker) class (Kerbo, 1983). The administrative
group sets the agenda, makes and enforces rules, evaluates
performances, and decides salary increases.

The worker

group implements objectives, interprets rules, performs, and
receives feedback.

The first group is interested in
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obtaining productivity and making profits, while the second
group seeks to maximize their economic condition so they can
"make a living" and raise a family.

For the latter, work is

a means to an end -- economic survival.

The administrative

class views work as an end itself and the worker as a tool
to achieve goals.

Appraisals mark and record these

differences and collection of judgments, separating the
administrative and worker classes.

It should be noted

generally that, in Western capitalist organizations, workers
do not write evaluations of their supervisors, but take
direction and utilize little autonomy and discretion in
contrast to the formal authority universally shared by and
expected in managers.

These groups exhibit the qualitative

differences noted above which are symbolized by the
evaluation system and specifically seen in the appraisal
form where a permanent record is created.
Social class issues are also apparent when you consider
their impact on movement vis-a-vis education, race, and
social interests.

The casual observer of the engineering

unit would say "we have a middle-class organization.

These

workers earn between $21,000 and $42,000 annually, own
homes, drive new cars, and send their children to college."
A closer look reveals that differences exist in social
interests and that appraisals help construct and maintain
these shared understandings.
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I did not find overt decisions based on race or
education, but in contrast, saw managers make efforts to
advance both those with relatively less formal education and
also women and minorities. Work performance was considered
before educational attainment, gender, or racial status when
movement was decided.

In fact evaluations were used to

bolster the evaluation chances of these groups by minimizing
the significance of education, while emphasizing the
worker's achievements -- further evidence about the
judgmental, socially constructed nature of evaluations.
However, when interests are considered, the impact of
appraisals on class issues becomes more pronounced.

The

"interests" factor is clearly demarcated between managers
(administrators) and subordinates (workers).

The first

group produces appraisals which affect the financial
conditions and lifestyle of the second group. Managers
establish and implement policy decisions and direct and
evaluate the work effort of subordinates.

This group has

different social interests than the worker group, namely
maintaining control and making profits, while the worker
class seeks to gain more autonomy over the work situation
and to increase their economic status.

Managers give lip-

service to empowering the worker but they remain in the
director's chair regarding all significant decisions, while
subordinates exercise an advisory role.

Formal evaluations

highlight, emphasize, and center these distinctions.

The
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flow of appraisals is downward to the subordinate who can
complain but not change decisions because that is
"management's discretion".

The worker only indirectly

"creates" an evaluation by his/her ability to manage
impressions which are judged by those in power -- the
managers.

Subordinates express unofficial opinions about

managers but these are qualitatively distinct from the
formal documents produced by managers who are authorized by
their position to judge subordinates (Scott and Dornbusch,
1967). Appraisals thus point out class differences between
the powerful and powerless.

They draw a definite boundary

of separation between the parties even though their
lifestyle, income, and place of residence may not differ
significantly.

What Do Appraisals Mean?

Appraisals have different meanings for the several
groups in the engineering unit.

Managers see them as a way

to control workers for productive effort, so they have an
instrumental nature and are a tool of control.

For

subordinates, evaluations are "tollways" to rewards on which
they paid tolls (e.g., gave effort and ideas, took orders,
gave up autonomy) in order to gain increases and promotions.
Sometimes these "roads" carry them down long, rough paths
which do not always take subordinates to their expected
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destinations.

However, appraisals continue to be viewed as

a negative but necessary conduit to financial and career
movement. Under the current merit system, evaluations are
entrenched as a way to measure relative worth of
individuals.
When the presence of the Union in considered, I found
its officers acting as a protector against "wrong"
appraisals, i.e., those contrary to the talked-about
observations of others in the department (e.g., peers,
engineers, other managers). The Union officers placed more
attention on and used the AP forms to a greater extent than
did managers, who viewed this document as a formality
required by corporate policy.

Also managers were aware of

this form's impact and intentionally used non-specific or
useless descriptions, further rendering the document and its
discussion, a management-driven ritual.

The Union leaders

always requested these documents for grievances and
arbitration cases, confirming management's fears by taking a
literal interpretation of the words used to record
performance.

Their intent was to compare APs, reveal

management inconsistency, and demonstrate the company's
gross misuse of the appraisal system. Evaluations were
"battlegrounds" and evidence of poor management, which the
Union was happy to use to make their case against the
judgment of managers.

Appraisals represented tangible

products on which issues of control, power, conflict, and
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favoritism could easily be focused.

They provided the Union

officers with rich material to show their members why their
presence was vital for the protection of workers.

Appraisal

forms and performance bands created on-going evidence of the
discrepancy between managers' opinions and the real value of
subordinates.
Oddly though, the parties saw both the descriptions on
the AP form, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, and
supporting statistics, as real.

This means managers and EAs

accept and use these products as accurate reflections of the
match between performance and cell position, even though
these two groups expressed doubt over the validity of
performance levels, especially those indicating acceptable
performance.

After the process is over, participants tend

to take the products for granted, without a great deal of
on-going questions.
The existence of a union places pressure on managers to
create written appraisals, discuss them with EAs and to
assign performance ranks.

Because appraisals are the

continuing subject of a debate, managers are forced to be
more careful in how evaluations are constructed and
communicated.

This monitoring process is almost completely

missing from the appraisals completed for managers
themselves.

I contend this difference is due to the Union.

I believe that appraisals done of managers by their
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superiors are even more inconsistent and mysterious than
those done on EAs.
The subjective nature of appraisal decisions are clear
in the case of managers who reported that "I haven't had an
appraisal in 30 years" or that "I got mine walking down the
hallway".

Upper management, not forced by union pressure to

follow formal review procedures, begin with good intentions
to appraise and offer feedback to develop other managers.
This "talk" contrasts with the inconsistent treatment which
follows.

Other problems, projects, and needs of the

business block and derail the evaluation procedure for
managers.

There are no job standards or they are so poorly

communicated that they are dysfunctional.

The appraisal

bands for managers include groupings such as "far exceeds"
(objections) and "fully meets" (objectives).

This is a

clear example of the mythical nature and sham-like quality
of appraisals because some managers have never formally
discussed their expectations.

The understandings are taken-

for-granted by both parties making the process a ritual of
organizational life rather than a device to reward
performance.
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Contradictions

After intensely studying the problem of appraisals for
several years, I realized they created a number of classic
Marxian contradictions where a procedure required by the
capitalist system produces an outcome that opposes or
contradicts the original objectives of the organization
(Goldman and Van Houten, 1977).
Bureaucratic organizations need to motivate large
number of employees for high productivity and profits, so
they use appraisals.

Workers however compare their efforts

and the recognition given and when these two variables are
not commensurate, the worker withdraws his/her involvement
and reduces efforts (i.e., motivation).

Appraisals aimed to

increase production actually reduce it when employees are
dissatisfied due to individual evaluations.

Appraisals are

also intended to give feedback so workers can improve and
experience personal development.

However, little feedback

and development, if any, occurs because the primary emphasis
is on establishing groups of relative performance.

The

process, aimed at insight and communication between boss and
subordinate, actually produces less knowledge because the
practices conceal information, not reveal it.
The Union reps' perceptions of these forms caused
managers to exercise caution and employ techniques, such as
general descriptions, to control potential adverse effects
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of APs during future comparisons.

The overall effect is to

render the appraisal form a largely ceremonial and useless
document. The APs are an appraisal convention that manages
appearances in the system of interactions.

Through the

documents both parties appear to be doing their jobs:
management -- appraising and developing, while the Union
protects workers by citing management errors through
specific words and phrases which do not, in their view,
match the individual's performance. This is one example of
ritualized conflict between managers and union officers.
Managers, cautious over possible confrontation (e.g.,
grievances), use non-specific language for convenience and
consistency.

The evaluation of a large number of employees

requires a good deal of time which could more profitably be
used to perform other managerial duties.
Related to the feedback contradiction, the company
stressed employee development through appraisal techniques.
Although the allegation of development was seriously
challenged above, employees seek more movement and
advancement which the organization cannot deliver. Promises
of "development" raise false expectations in workers who
then slow their efforts once the development myth is
recognized.

The illusion of personal development linked to

advancement results in subordinates who are hard to control
and direct toward department goals.

Employees now raise the
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question: Why should I take that more complex assignment?
What's in it for me?
The organization also uses appraisals to reward
employees and make them happy.

Edwards (1984) pointed out

how different rewards gain compliance from different types
of employees.

This procedure, instead of making workers

happy and compliant, produces dissatisfaction when workers
compare their performance-reward equation to that of their
peers.

Those who feel underevaluated reported

dissatisfaction and lower motivational levels.
timeliness of the reward is also a factor.

The

Employees who

wait each year for advancement are dissatisfied to a larger
extent than newer actors.

What the company defined as a

reward (e.g., higher performance band) is transformed to a
neutral or even a negative outcome, largely due to the long
waiting period and feeling of entitlement -- a sense that
the reward is deserved because of seniority and not
individual performance.
Another significant finding is that the control aspect
of appraisals is subtle or concealed, because, while the
plan is aimed at rewards and development, for the most part
employees are caught in a system which they know fails to
adequately recognize their achievements and is
little change and slow cell movement.

marked by

The plan produces

caution in employees who constantly compare their rewards
and those of peers to perceived accomplishments and
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complexity of work to determine if the "contribution-reward"
equation balances (Etzioni, 1961; and Thompson, 1967).
Instead of employee development, the evaluation system
produces overly careful employees with low motivational
levels. This outcome is similar to the findings of Kanter
(1977, 1979) where she reported on the widespread phenomenon
of "powerlessness" which also accounts for low motivational
levels. Limited information and advancement chances plus
blocked careers produced a powerless group of employees,
i.e., the majority of the 300-plus EAs. It is ironic that a
system so driven and concerned with eguity and fairness
actually produces inequities by basing rewards on allocation
methods and political factors instead of on contributions,
skill, and knowledge.
Finally, evaluation procedures are aimed at identifying
future managers and inducing workers to be more like those
in authority positions.

However, the inadequacies of

administering evaluation programs such as lack of standards,
negotiated judgments, and advancement by seniority and
allocation methods rather than actual performance produces a
separation, both in ideology and physical proximity, of the
workers from the managers.

Turning to a broader impact, the

appraisal process separates managers and subordinates,
revealing structures of power and stratification.
Appraisals represent the power relations existing in a
complex unit.

Management assesses performance in support of
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organizational goals in order to control profits and costs
and to keep people on tasks through an equity system of
matching contributions and compensations. Fisher and
Sirianni (1984), in attacking the traditional view of
organizations as instruments of efficient production, note
that organizations are also "tools for the pursuit of
personal, group, and class interests." These researchers
point out the tension between the organization's "production
and political" systems. I found the evaluation process
points out this very tension.
The evaluation process exposes the uncertainty and
inequity of managers' decisions, giving subordinates a great
deal of material for criticism and conflict.

The interests

of the parties are revealed and so polarize the actors
instead of bringing them closer together. In fact some
former subordinates promoted to professional or managerial
positions still share views consonant with their former
levels.

They think the company is not looking after the

interests of workers but is more concerned with making
profits.

So a device aimed to identify workers for

promotion to managers actually creates and solidifies
negative feelings about the agenda of the engineering
organization.

306

With These Problems, Who wants Evaluations?

There are appraisal problems from all the perspectives
of the key actors. In the face of this, one can ask, "Why
have evaluations?"

I pose several answers to this

persistent question.
The first reason appraisals persist is the existence of
a strong set of myths.

Subordinates continue to believe

that appraisals provide tangible evidence of one's
achievements and worthiness for promotion.

This is the

equity myth where individual's are rewarded according to
their contributions.

This belief fuels individual effort,

personal achievement, i.e., the American idea of success.
Workers want success and evaluations off er on-going signs of
recognition that things are progressing well.

The second

part of this myth is the manager's persistent position that
appraisals control workers.

They insist on it as a tool to

reward and motivate, while at the same time complaining that
correct evaluations are difficult to do.

They insist on the

efficacy of appraisals while at the same time holding that
good people continue to perform regardless of the situation.
Another way to explain the persistence of appraisal is
tradition.

Organizations have always used some means to

measure performance for reward distribution.

Subordinates

want it as a gauge of where they stand on the "path to
success" to reach the American dream.

Managers want it as a
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control and motivational tool in the highly uncertain world
of human behavior.
A related finding dealt with the position taken on the
possibility of change.

If managers didn't accept the

benefits of change in employees, they would lose a major
reason for their existence -- controlling and guiding
workers so they could be more productive.

If changing

employee attitudes were unlikely and motivational levels
were fixed, what value do evaluation systems offer?
Management believes and acts as though performance change is
attainable through supervisory feedback, but individual
managers reported that their efforts to change the work
habits of individual employees, after repeated feedback over
by as much as a five year period, failed to alter the
individual's behavior. I attribute this lack of change to
"the structure of interaction" (Boudon, 1981). Rewards and
punishments are either not available or not applied through
the appraisal-feedback cycle. There simply is very little
reason for employees to alter behavior because nothing
really bad will happen to them (i.e., no downgrade, salary
reduction, or termination).
The second reason evaluations continue is that they
maintain the power game in which managers and subordinates
each simultaneously seek to maximize their gains, while
controlling losses.

The appraisal is the barometer of how

each side is doing.

Managers are challenged to be accurate
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while workers manipulate their resources to come out ahead
in the report card game.

Managers invoke the use of

multiple judgments and unique work situations to gain the
upper hand in the contest, while subordinates obey, present
themselves as favorably as possible, using skills and
knowledge.

Without appraisals there would be no reason to

play this control-manipulation game.

If no one were keeping

score, what would be the point of playing? Both parties seek
to win the contest.

Managers want productive efforts, while

subordinates seek rewards
The third rationale for appraisals is tied closely to
the second.

Curiously, actors in the unit continue to

accept the products of the evaluation plan (e.g., AP forms,
rank order lists, and cell assignments), while recognizing
that the process produces a great number of inaccuracies due
to size of the universe, shifting performance criteria, and
the large degree of uncertainty, exemplified by managers'
need to rely on a picture book to identify whom they are
appraising. Appraisals however provide a broad range of work
rules and expectations which guide the efforts of actors and
make sense out of doing tasks assigned by others

the

worker will be measured on certain performances, so these
become important (Blau, 1967).

Without the rules or

pretense of judging work, there would be a conclusion that
"nothing counts."

In addition, appraisals support the need

for order in the organization.

Although problematic,
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evaluations attempt to control, interpret, and reward
behavior.

They send the message that managers care what the

subordinate does, providing a sense of order to the vast
number of tasks performed during the year.

Without

appraisals the participants would be taking a leap toward
chaos.

What would guide their behavior?

Personal agendas?

What would happen to the need for consistency in large
bureaucratic organizations?

General Applications -- What Learn About Organizations

Many of the conclusions discussed above can be
generalized to a broad range of organizations. This research
illustrates that knowledge in organizations is unequally
distributed (Tuckman, 1978; Becker, 1986).

Engineering

managers did not share the same data on employees.

These

differences were due to context factors such as size of the
universe and physical layout of the work facility. Managers
were "bounded" (Cohen & March, 1972), i.e., limited, in
their ability to observe and understand all behaviors
occurring because other work tasks had to be completed.
Organizations contain shifting sets of priorities; and
evaluation tasks, although constant, are generally not a top
priority compared to customer satisfaction and profitmaking.
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This research also supported Kanter's (1977) work on
the impact of job structure on opportunities and power.

A

key element of a powerful position and one that enhances
one's chance for a higher evaluation is the degree of
visibility the position affords the actor. It is necessary
to be visible for one to receive recognition for
performance.

Behaviors gain value when they are critical to

the organization and are visible (Salancik and Pfeffer,
1974).

Size impedes the equal distribution of performance

knowledge; and supervisors adopt techniques such as voting,
coin-flipping, trading candidates, and sharing the
allocation of moves to manage the great deal of uncertainty
surrounding the unit, especially that created by appraising
individual contribution.
Another generalized finding is that appraisals
symbolize one of the dominant values of our culture
success -- which is measured by hierarchical movement and

financial rewards. Appraisals focus on accomplishment as a
report card or road map of the individual's success in
society.

One dimension of social class is economic power

(e.g. place of residence, income) which is also influenced
by one's formal appraisal.

Employees, like athletes, seek a

new, better contract for next year because of their
contributions for the past "season."
Through evaluations we again see a process which is
intended to motivate subordinates and make prof its but which
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in actuality produces contradictory outcomes like withdrawal
of involvement and increase in administrative. This result
is more evidence that capitalistic structures produce a
number of contradictions.

Related to this condition there

is the separation between manager and subordinate produced
by appraisals that are initially intended to increase
communication. Also the appraisal process stresses feedback
between the parties to bring about change; however, in fact,
the production of appraisals actually results in more data
being concealed as managers seek convenience and a way to
diminish confrontation.
The major insight I found was confirmation of the
mythical nature of appraisals and the foundations of
organizations in general.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued

that much of organizational life reflects myths (i.e.,
fictional beliefs) to help the unit meet external needs and
rules to deal with imperfect internal situations like
accurate measurement of contributions.

The myths create

programs (e.g., appraisal plans), campaigns, and a unique
culture which is really a "ceremony" to avoid and suppress
what is really happening.

Evaluation programs purport to

measure and reward individual contributions, but actually
are control devices for managers.

The process is

subjective, yet the results (e.g., forms, bands, raises)
appear to be very objective and are taken as tangible signs
of achievement.

Another insight concerns the idea of
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egualitv (Kerbo, 1983; Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983).
Again, actors in the system talk about the need to reward
only people who make real contributions, yet the
organization is moving in the direction of providing equal
rewards for all members (e.g., equal lump payments).
Management has an interest in controlling subordinates
so they undertake programs like the "Tech-Pro Plan", in my
setting, to create the impression of equity (i.e., rewards
match contributions) when actually managers try to
distribute a large segment of raises equally to avoid
problems and increase ease of administering.

Organizations

continue to reflect differences in verbalized beliefs and
realized actions.

As Caplow (1964) pointed out, evaluations

are always based on more than skill, knowledge and
performance, and include the impressions of all actors and
the political climate of the organization.
Two other issues for organizations are the social
construction nature of organizations (Becker, 1973, 1982,
1986; Goffman, 1959; Blau, 1967) and the decision-making
style linked to this paradigm.

Organizations have an on-

going, dynamic, negotiated quality which is keenly revealed
in how decisions are made.

As I demonstrated in Chapter 7 -

- "The Social Production of Appraisals", managers constantly
interpret the behavior of subordinates and other managers in
light of current situational factors (e.g •• , customer
demand, senior management edicts) to define what is valuable
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and who contributes to the current goals.

A curious

phenomenon of organizational life is the actors'
expectations that departments will be run rationally and
decisions will be made systematically, probably because
large companies with resources are "expected" to be orderly.
others (March & Cohen, 1972); Pfeffer, 1978; and Thompson,
1967; Peters & Waterman 1982) demonstrated that decisions
are not rational, but based on intuition, experience, and
past practices while generally ignoring statistical data.
In my setting, managers faced with uncertainty (e.g.,
multiple standards, incomplete knowledge of performances)
made decisions on subjective hunches and general
impressions, rather than by systematically recording and
counting production results, even though such data were
available.

The overall impression someone creates through

their production is more significant than the actual numbers
(e.g., orders written) developed.

These judgments are used

to create a performance band appropriate to what a manager
perceives. Discussions about decisions are widespread and
operate to confirm or solidify the constructed decisions.
Organizations are the setting for more than the pursuit
of company goals (Fisher & Sirianni, 1984).

Evaluations

reinforce this position by the use of the game metaphor to
discuss a number of power issues (Crozier, 1964; Kanter,
1977; Buroway, 1979; Kipnis, 1984; Mechanic, 1962).

Actors

perform in a way to mirror the features of games, seeking to
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win rewards and cut losses.

The contest {Turner, 1960)

involves gaining more power {i.e., influence over limited
resources) and making other departments more dependent on
your group. The nature of games is conflict over competing
interests and values which is especially evident in unionmanagement relations.

The Union leaders seek the granting

of higher wages and better benefits, equally to all members,
while managers via discretion offer unequal raises,
promotions and rewards, based on actual contributions.
During bargaining both parties try to shift the balance of
power.

The officers want more explicit control over working

conditions, as managers protect sacred areas {e.g.,
appraisals and rewards) by fighting over supervisory
discretion.

Organizations provide a context for the pursuit

of instrumental goals (e.g., profits) as well as personal
agendas {e.g., financial security and recognition).
Adapting and Applying Theories
In this final section I want to accomplish two
objectives -- discuss how three sociological theories
informed my study and secondly, apply the findings of
Scott's {1985) study of peasant resistance to my research
setting to demonstrate the flexibility and explanatory power
of sociological theories.
My research was informed by three general theories
which, though distinct, utilize overlapping explanations. I
applied the following theories to account for performance
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appraisals: power/critical, open system, and social
construction.

Open systems has the strongest application to

organizations, while the power and critical models address
both the micro and macro levels of society. Social
construction is connected to organizations through the
relatively new field of organizational culture.
The power/critical theories demonstrate the conflict
and class differences organizations harbor. To move away
from the elitist, narrow view of most traditional management
theories, I used an historical framework to analyze the
conflict between managers and union officers over the
administration's evaluation and reward policies.

The

persistent variations among the actors emerges through
examination of class differences between administrators and
workers.

A contextual approach helps to sort out and make

sense of the issues. Rule-making activities are shaped by
the political struggles among members of the administrative
class.
Second, the open systems approach discloses how changes
in the environment place a newly defined emphasis on
customer relations for appraisal purposes. A problem for
actors is the shifting nature of performance standards. An
open organization, reacting to a complex, dynamic
environment, reveals a high degree of uncertainty which must
be managed by bureaucratic devices (e.g., voting, use of

316

seniority, and concealing of performance data to protect
managers from confrontations).
Closely linked to open systems is social construction
theory which contends that decisions and structures are
produced and maintained by members interacting to understand
and create meaning in their setting. My analysis supports
the tenets of this theory in a number of areas.
Participants develop rules and conventions to produce
appraisals as they struggle to classify large numbers of
employees.

In fact, rules are constantly modified to fit

the situation managers face in assessing subordinates.
These practices remain in effect until managers encounter a
new problem.

Group discussions and the impact of more

powerful members change the procedures.

This give-and-take

process clarifies beliefs about fairness and seniority, for
example, and diffuses the shared understandings among all
participants.

As Pettigrew (1979) argues, new leaders or

environmental conditions change the beliefs of established
organizations which was evident in my setting when the
company began to emphasize customer relations, producing
decentralized decision-making at the operative levels.
Social construction theory parallels my analysis of the
process to appraise subordinates. To an outsider, it appears
that supervisors make an objective assessment of their
employees' contributions and assign them. to an appropriate
band.

Closer examination reveals the final placement is
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first due to the manager's individual judgment and then a
public presentation of candidates at a group meeting where
other managers negotiate the final appraisal placements.
There is a discrepancy between Blau's (1967) assertion
that what is easily measured becomes important, since in my
research, managers continue to value production but lessen
their emphasis of it, and proceed to use subjective
impressions, especially when "objective" data is lacking.
Another divergence between critical theory and my analysis
concerns managers who agree the evaluation system is faulty.
The critical theory predicts distinct ideological positions
for subordinates and managers, yet my research shows a
surprising convergence of belief about the negative features
of the plan.

This agreement could be due to managers and

EAs beginning their careers at the same position and the
dissatisfaction supervisors report about their own
evaluation treatment. In some ways, second level managers
have more in common with their subordinates than with their
superiors.
My second objective for this section is to explain
variables by applying paradigms from a different study. This
type of analysis occurs when I adapt the concepts Scott
(1985) used in his study of the conflict between rich
landowners and peasants, focusing on the devices each side
employed to get their way or to resist domination -- in the
case of the peasants.
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First, I will briefly review Scott's salient points and
illustrate how they apply to the present research to expand
our understanding of appraisals as control devices in an
organizational setting rather than a rural community as in
Scott's study. He argues the peasants in his ethnography
employ non-rebellious, passive strategies to resist adverse
changes in technology and exploitation by landowners who
seek higher profits in a market-driven environment. When the
landlords raised rents and changed social practices like
feasts, the peasants resisted by subtle sabotage, evasion,
and ridicule. Both parties take action to make gains or cut
losses and do not simply submit to the conditions.
The two classes of workers in my setting are managers
and subordinates represented by EAs.

The managerial group

see its legitimate role as maintaining high production and
prof it levels, an ideology based on the long standing belief
that managers have a right to "run the business" (e.g.,
making decisions in the interest of the company). The EAs
are represented by a union which defines its role as a
protector of the working man/woman, especially in the area
of wages and benefits.

Its "charter" emerges from past

management injustices (e.g., unfair wage treatment). The
parties share a common ground -- both need to maintain job
security in a competitive market, but there is significant
disagreement over wage administration, benefit programs,
appraisal judgments, and company policies.
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one can ask, "Who is heard more in the debates?"
surprisingly, the Union officers have louder voices or
managers have very sensitive ears because the company gives
a good deal of attention to union questions and complaints.
Their voice is also strong because they have an official
grievance procedure and the help of free government
resources (e.g., National Labor Relations Board). The Union
issues a monthly newsletter, generally criticizing
management actions without being too specific. This aligns
with Scott's description of resistance using ridicule and
non-rebellious approaches (e.g., stealing grain).
Also, officers use an interesting technique to keep
managers off-balance.

They deride the salary administration

decisions regardless of the treatment EAs receive. For
example, one year the company guaranteed to grant raises
equal to 4.5% of the existing payroll, but in fact delivered
6.5%.

The Union paid little attention to this gain and

attacked the way managers appraised EAs and delivered
increases.
Each side rationalizes its position. Managers say they
want to reward new, lower-paid employees who are making good
contributions to objectives, so they divided the universe
into four experience groups and rated contributions in each
category.

The Union leaders argued this action violated the

contract which called for treating everyone as a single
appraisal group.

They contend managers use this scheme to
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favor younger, more educated EAs while the Union seeks
fairness for all employees. Both parties use different
versions of what constitutes equitable wage treatment.
Who is winning the argument?

Victories shift between

the parties depending on the issues. The company
surprisingly also employs a passive strategy by reacting to
problems and answering grievances rather than filing their
own charges of unfair labor practices.

In this way the

union is winning since they shape labor-management relations
by selecting the topics to debate. However, the company
holds the ultimate weapon -- economic rewards and job
security.

Managers appraise performance, authorize

overtime, approve expenditures, choose to apply force
reductions, and introduce computer programs to produce
"specs" usually written by EAs.

Officers resist by not

following all the work rules, slowing down "spec"
production, and by ridiculing managers' decisions to solve
day-to-day obstacles.

The company introduces "Quality

Improvement Teams", i.e., Quality Circles to indirectly
involve EAs in meeting the company's agenda. Some
subordinates participate to a limited degree because they
believe managers will never use the ideas generated by the
group, choosing to implement management's plan due to cost
considerations. Applying Scott's (1985) approach illuminates
the relationship between managers and employees as one
marked by the company's effort to dominate workers and the
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union's adjustment to these forces through forms of
resistance that are non-rebellious and passive, but which
are abundantly filled with ridicule.
The use of Scott's perspective and the critical, open
systems, and social construction paradigms demonstrates the
ability of sociology to adapt general explanations to
material situations (e.g. evaluation systems) and to utilize
more specific theories (e.g. critical and social
construction) to account for and "lift the veil" from
processes affecting those whose contributions are evaluated
(e.g., student, subordinate, manager, and faculty member).
Sociology makes a significant contribution toward
understanding social entities like organizations through its
broad explanatory power, multiple approaches and
flexibility.

APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. How would you describe the appraisal process around here?
2. How are appraisals accomplished?
3. What are the routines or common practices (conventions)
associated with appraisals? (forms, group meetings, lists,
4. How are appraisal forms used in the process?
5. What behavior is evaluated and what is most significant?
6. How do evaluation methods vary across departments?
7. What are the rules for deciding on appraisal levels? Who
selects them?
8. Who evaluates?
9. What criteria are used? How do you know who belongs in
each performance category?
10. How objective or subjective are the criteria?
11. What is the basis for granting rewards (salary

increases, promotions, good working conditions, autonomy?)
12. What consequences do appraisals have?
13. What do appraisals mean to employees and managers?
14. Why do appraisals exist in this organization?
15. What values are assumed in doing evaluations?
16. Why do employees accept the appraisal practices?
17. Do you believe the results of your appraisal system?
18. What type of system would work better?
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APPENDIX 2
APPRAISAL BIOGRAPHY INSTRUCTIONS
The following questions are part of a research project I am
working on to complete a graduate degree. Your responses and
not your identity are of interest to me. However, if you
wish to discuss your comments, please contact me.
No individuals will be identified in the research document.
The university sponsoring this project has formal procedures
to protect the research subjects, and my methods have been
reviewed and approved as complying with their standards.
Please complete this cover sheet before responding to the
attached questions. You will need to use additional paper to
answer the questions.
When you are finished, please return all material to me,

unsigned, in the enclosed envelope.
LENGTH OF SERVICE (circle one)
1. O - 2 yrs
4. 16 - 20 yrs

:

2. 3 - 7 yrs
5. 21+ yrs

3. 8 - 15 yrs

JOB CLASSIFICATION (circle one)
1. Supervisor
2. Engineer
4. Information systems Member
6. Professional (PAE)

3. EA
5. ISA
7. Salaried-Graded

Thank you for your help in this research project.

Mike Bochenek
3142
AT-34
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Appraisal Biography/History

1. How does the appraisal system or process work around
here?

2. What is your current appraisal category?

3. Has there been a change in your appraisal level during
the past several years? What happened?

4. Why aren't you appraised higher than your current cell or
band?

5. How has the evaluation process affected your career
movement or salary treatment?

6. How are the AP or MAP forms How are the AP or MAP forms
used in your evaluation?

7. What changes would improve the appraisal process? Why
needed?
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s. Rank the following factors by the impact you feel

supervisors assign to the factors in determining an
employee's performance (appraisal) level.
l = most important, an4 16 = least important.
each nwnber only once).

(Please use

Seniority or time on the job
Flexibility; ability to handle a number of jobs at once
Difficulty or complexity of work
Attractive appearance of subordinate
Job Knowledge
Production and Quality
Communications skills
Customer Relations
Problem solving skills
Personal (Social) relations with supervisors
Self-confidence
Attendance
Follows rules
Agrees or cooperates with management
Attitude
Other (please specify)

APPENDIX 3
PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION GUIDE

When I selected the problem of appraisals, I began to
think of methods to collect data. One benefit I had was that
my job assignment immersed me in evaluation issues from two
vantage points. First, I heard grievances about the
deficiencies of the system and saw how managers tried to
justify appraisals. Second, as an employee I also was
affected by evaluations.
To begin a systematic examination of the setting, I
complied the list below, hoping to collect certain types of
data. Based on experience, I thought that looking at the
broad categories of Artifacts, Language/Symbols, and
Stories/Themes would be useful. As a start, I included terms
that seemed to belong under each heading. To some degree
these groupings matched my research questions -- Context
(Artifacts), Culture (Language), and Beliefs (Stories).
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Artifacts

Language/Symbols

lists

productivity

old-timers

rules

rank order

short service

meetings

cells

fast movers

computer list

contract

deadwood

grievances

structure change

degrees

interviews

excuses

experience

justifications

favoritism

balance

easy work

Stories/Themes

performance
relative performance
rules
movement
percent increase
dollar increase
Initially, I tried to record observations and events
which fit the above structure, but found this method too
cumbersome and time consuming as a member of the
organization, so I focused on settings where evaluation
activities were concentrated such as, supervisory meetings,
union-management bargaining and grievance sessions, and
management training programs. During these events, I made
notes about beliefs, methods, and issues related to
appraisals. This was supplemented by formal interviews and
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individual conversations I had with all types of employees
in the everyday life of working in the research setting.
I also used word processing software (MSWORD) to list
and then sort special language and observations by themes
that emerged from the data. For example, I selected and then
sorted quotes from interviews to cluster subjects' responses
into manageable groupings. I had access to past bargaining
minutes and the notes I wrote during the past five years
which were essential to capture the Union's view of the
problem. I also worked as a facilitator with a group of
managers to improve the process for evaluating EAs and thus
heard debates about assessment issues. This was a rich
source of data on management values.
I observed meetings, grievance hearings, bargaining
sessions, training programs, and many informal
conversations, all of which produced a wealth of data. My
observation methods became rather informal over time and I
would recommend an approach that was more systematic and
which could be achieved through the use of "observation"
forms.

APPENDIX 4

Appraisal Program
(AP)

Last name, initials

Employee Number

Title/Rank

Organization Number

Immediate Supervisor

Next Higher Level Supervisor

INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPERVISORS
At beginning of appraisal cycle or new job:
1. Type or print all information above.
2. Following appropriate discussions/planning sessions
with employee and your supervision, complete Part A,
Sections 1 and 2 (p.2), and secure "Approvals for
Part A".
3. Discuss approved Part A with employee and request
his/her signature (p.2).
4. Give employee a copy of form.
At end of appraisal cycle or upon transfer:
1. Complete Part B, Sections 1, 2, & 3, using input from
employee as appropriate. Discuss results with
employee, request his/her signature following Part B,
and sign as indicated.
2. Complete Part C with official Annual Performance
Appraisal and Appraisal Period. Secure approvals as
indicated, then share with employee and request
his/her signature.
3. Give employee a copy, if requested.
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2.
PART A

1. Describe the principal purpose/responsibility of the job tour. Use
appropriate documents as reference material.

2. List major assignments/objectives of unusual or particular importance
to the Organization or individual job tour (as few or as many as
necessary). Be specific about the source of information to beeeeeee used
for evaluation and, as appropriate, performance standards or measures
for these assignments.

Approvals for Part A

Immediate Supervisor's Signature

Date

Next Higher Level Supervisor's Signature
(Assistant Manager Minimum)

Date

Employee's signature indicates that Part A has been discussed with
him/her. It does not necessarily indicate agreement, but that the
employee has had an opportunity to discuss responsibilities and
assignments/objectives.

Employees's Signature

Date
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3.
PART B
1. Describe how well the principal purpose/responsibility of the job
tour has been accomplished, documenting any significant deviations in
performance (positive or negative) compared to normal expectations for
the job tour.

2. Document specific accomplishments/results for each major objective
listed in Part A, Section 2.
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4.
PART B (Continued)
3. Briefly list other significant accomplishments/results not previously
covered in Part B, Sections 1 and 2.

Employee's signature indicates that he/she has had an opprotunity to
discuss results/accomplishments with the supervisor prior to
organizational appraisal sessions. It does not necessarily indicate
agreement.

Employee's Signature

Date

Supervisor's Signature

Date

PART C
Annual Performance Appraisal

Appraisal Period

Immediate Supervisor

Date

Next Higher Level Supervisor (AM Minimum)

Date

Other Required Signatures, as required

Date

Employee's signature does not necessarily indicate agreement, but that
the employee has been advised of and has had an opportunity to discuss
his/her performance appraisal.

Employee's signature

Date

APPENDIX 5
APPRAISAL CONVENTIONS

During the interviews, a number of specific shared
practices or conventions were cited by the respondents,
providing a picture of the techniques commonly used by the
Engineering organization to construct performance
evaluations. Below is an alphabetical listing of these
conventions and a brief explanation of their meaning in the
research setting.
accomplishments, look at - managers focus on results
allocation determined - in the face of uncertainty, subbranches of the unit

decide to share moves to ease the

group meeting process.
annual review - evaluation occurs at least once a year to
mark significant changes in performance
AP's written to fit level - a widespread practice is to
write the AP(appraisal form) after the levels have been
determined by other means, effectively ignoring the
appraisal forms.
appraisals, employers give lip-service to - employees feel
that managers go through the motion of evaluating them
without always giving a sincere effort.
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§J?praisals to administer salaries - evaluations are
perceived as mainly a device to grant or deny raises
§J?praisals, back into (salary determines $) - salary is
actually used to determine the appraisal band, instead of
the reverse.
appraisals, doing for a long time - managers have been doing
appraisals for so long that they have become
institutionalized, taken-for-granted.
balance point of 100% - groups work toward this

goal as a

guide for distributing rewards. All appraisals percents are
added and an average is compared to 100%. If the average is
greater than 100%, some individuals must be dropped to
achieve the 100% figure.
balance, seek band to place people in - managers seek to
place people into groups of similar performance, based on
perceptions, and group discussions.
bargain - common practice in group meetings where
supervisors discuss qualities and achievements of their
employees and listen to presentations of other supervisors
in order to decide which EA's should advance a level;
activity marked by give and take.
BLM intervention - third level of management becomes
involved to break deadlocks and move process along.
~ook

of pictures to identify unknown EA's - every 5 to 7

years the organization produces a book with pictures of all
members of the unit's employees. Managers often use this
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book to identify who they don't know, but who they are
attempting to evaluate. This is a clear example of the state
of imperfect knowledge about performance that exists in the
unit.
book of results (track results) - a collection of "hard"

results like efficiency and quality used to give feedback to
employees during the year.
book, numbers - same as above, but falling out of use as

soft factors like attitude and customer relations become
more prominent.
bosses' ability to sell candidate - managers vary in their

ability to present and sell their employees to peers.
cell deterained, then write AP - practice of determining

cell placement before writing the AP form, which some people
consider to be the incorrect sequence.
cell history, past; labeling - cell position from last year

is a key determinant of where EA will end up this year; it
is a point where the current "race" begins.
cells assigned after appraisal - usual sequence is to

appraise performance, then to determine what cell this
behavior fits.
·coalitions foraed - during group meetings, some peers form

coalitions along business lines to support candidates for
movement.
competition used - a subtle, rarely verbalized belief that

forms the basis for the evaluation system.
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confrontation avoided

- managers try to avoid problems with

employees because these discussions are uncomfortable for
both sides.
consistent use of adiectives - supervisors try to apply
similar words to describe performance to avoid
inconsistencies that might lead to grievances.
criteria, non-specific

- the unit uses widely held, but

non-specific evaluation criteria, applied somewhat
differently by each manager.
data, sul:>jective used - supervisors stress different factors
according to the situation of their individual departments.
discussion goals - used by managers to stress what's
important and what will be used to evaluate performance.
engineers rank EA's - engineers are not systematically used
as sources of feedback on EA's to rate their performance.
This has become a practice in the last 2 years since an
organizational restructuring.
feathering - the practice of seeking smaller distinctions
between performance within the same general performance
band.

It lessens the impact of both raises or drops in

performance.
feedback - comments or memos about performance used to
correct behavior or establish reasons for cell assignments.
Sometimes the descriptions are too general to be useful to
employees - no clear action is prescribed.
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forms. sign - employees are asked to sign the AP form to
establish a record of their awareness of their status.
giving in - after long, tense group meetings some
supervisors concede their positions to move the meeting
along.
group agreement - managers seek consensus among peers on
performance levels as a way to legitimate the final rank
order.

This agreement is reached after a series of group

meetings where managers present candidates, and object to
those offered by peers.
incumbent priority - when 2 EA's are equal in performance,
the incumbent will have preference for moving ahead, or
retaining his/her position.
interpretation, individual - managers use their perceptions
and judgments to decide on the appraisal group of their
employees.
judgment on complexity of work - one of the judgments
concerns the complexity and difficulty of the person's
assignment.
judgment, multiple - consensus and final rank order
positions are shaped by the multiple or varying decisions of
managers.

This practice is a common defense to grievances

on appraisals.
justify extremes - managers explain and account for their
decisions to a greater degree for candidates at the top and
bottom of the rank order.
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knowing your fellow managers - experience with peers

influences coalition building and cell placement.
knowledge of a lot of EA's - managers who know the

performance of many EA's can have more influence in
assigning cells.
lines for cells drawn by BLM's - during the past few years

the third level managers (BLM's) had the final slay on where
lines would be drawn, in the rank order, to determine cell
placement.
list in priority order of moves - each year supervisors

identify in a priority sequence they want to advance.

These

are the people most likely to advance if openings are
available.
list, rank order

- a list of names, produced annually,

reflecting the relative performances of the appraisal
universe.

This list is the basis for assigning employees to

cells, and is important to the union in identifying
grievance situations.
listening, poor - the quality of paying attention during

group meetings, as managers focus on selling their
candidates.
lists adjusted - rank order lists are adjusted (changed) at

various stages of the process.

Part of the activity is to

combine lists of all supervisors who report to the same
boss.
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money availability - knowledge that additional funds are

available for raises can change the performance position of
some employees.

Some employees may be left in their current

cell because movement to another level will not provide them
a larger increase.
moves, shared - a common practice is to share the number of

moves available, especially when move candidates are
identified for movement than the group can accommodate
because of the 100% balancing requirement.
negotiation among peers - there is give and take among

managers regarding movement so that all can gain something
for their people.
notes to record feedback - use of written documents and

computer reports (quality, production, attendance) to
evaluate performance.

Once more commonly used because it

was more available.
notes, mental - use of memory and impression formation to

determine appraisal.

More convenient for managers to use

because it requires less effort, but criticized by the union
because method lacks ability to measure, weight, or verify.
This is a more common device because the engineering
assignments have changed from filling orders to satisfying
unique needs of customers.
performance , history of - appraisal history is used to see

where candidate deserves to move now, and it often
represents old baggage the employee cannot drop.

In the
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absence of recent data, some managers cite ex=periences from
prior years.
performance , look for unusual - in evaluatil'llll.g performance
data, managers look for activity that is unus:ual or stands
out to distinguish the employee.

This might

be

participation in committees, or diligent work:. habits (rarely
away from the desk) •
performance questionnaire - managers use a qtaestionnaire to
collect the observations and judgments of the!!ir engineers on
EA's in the department.

This is a recent praiactice because

managers have less contact with EA's since a

restructuring

change the levels and hierarchy of authority

2 years ago.

performance spread among EA's examined - somea supervisors
not only place subordinates in relative perfc:::>rmance
positions, they also note how great the diffearence is
between positions.

This might be compared tc:::> a "qualitative

standard deviation".
performance to responsibilities compared - a

very common

practice is to compare what the individual hems achieved or
contributed versus the goals of the departme:r.nt.
area of key activity in the process.

This is an

Once t:tnis completed,

managers try to decide the relative value of

the

contributions.
performance definitions shifting each year -

definitions of

what constitute each band of performance is J':"lot written and
changes somewhat every year. Managers prefer

this
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arrangement because their work conditions vary throug:m:iout
the year.
predict where (bow> levels will turn out - each year
managers, relying on the person's appraisal history, -try to
predict what level the individual will fall in this r-eview
period.

Evaluations do not occur in a vacuum, but al..,.,,ays

with a concern for the consequence of what cell will -this
appraisal produce.
presentations - managers present data on employees in
public arena containing other supervisors.

a

Superviso:rs sell

the achievements of their candidates, aiming for cell
advancement.

The success of these activities depends

on the

argumentation and presentation (verbal) skills of man agers.
read motives of supervisors - a subtle activity of ma nagers
to gauge how difficult bargaining for cells will be,

and to

plan strategies to handle problems.
review by upper management - a check and balance devi ce to
insure or at least give the impression of bias elimin_ation.
Most evaluation decisions of lower level supervisors
supported and not reversed by top managers.

are

Occasion~ally

they have a candidate they want to advance.
rules - shared and generally accepted practices to ma_nage
group meetings and determine cell placement.

Manager-s use

similar rules in selecting candidates for both the t04p and
bottom positions, because these groups are more
easier to agree on.

evid~nt

and

The rules shift when the focus a.....re the
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middle ranges because candidates appear indistinguishable,
calling for rules to separate the likenesses.
rules changed to fit situation - as situations change during
and between meetings, managers suggest alterations in
decision making methods.

Entwined in this situation is the

need by supervisors to sell or convince peers of the need to
buy into new guidelines.

This is a delicate process because

a guideline that solve a placement dilemma for one manager
will create problems for other supervisors.
self-interests of managers; protect own people - managers
guide their actions around increasing gains for their
employees.
seniority to break ties - when a number of EA's are vying
for a cell move, and managers are at an impasse, unwilling
to concede, time on the job, or service with the company
will be used to settle the debate. The selected EA may not
be the best performer, if there even was a way to determine
that abstract condition.
standards , individual - managers apply , generally accepted
and shared performance norms, but use their individual
interpretation of these standards to quantify performance.
statistics used - some supervisors collect and use
performance data (cost reduction, efficiency) to sell their
candidates.
subjectivity accepted - managers accept and do not want to
change their peer's use of interpretations to appraise
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employees.
system, buddy - friendships, team solidarity, and coalition
formation are used to place candidates.
temper, stubbornness used - supervisors exhibit entrenchment
behavior to obtain moves by wearing down their peers.
visibility - employees who have greater exposure increase
their chance for movement, by making their supervisor's
selling job easier. Seeing someone perform is more
convincing than being told how well someone performed.
vote by s\lb-braneh, not merit - deadlocks over placement are
often settled by voting for candidates, even when managers
don't know the subordinates. Thus voting along sub-branch
lines, rather than performance or merit, is common.
weights, assigned - in an attempt to quantify the evaluation
process, managers assign values of performance to certain
categories of work. Productivity would have a higher weight
than cost reduction activity. Several years ago, the
organization formalized this practice by identifying 5
performance variables (production, quality, cost reduction,
customer relations, and problem solving) that managers would
assign points to in order to decide cell placement. In
actuality, some managers would still decide on the cell,
using individual methods, and then create the form,
adjusting the weights of variables to match the position
they had already selected.
words to justify cell placement - managers carefully select
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adjectives to describe and justify the cell placement of
employees. New managers would complete the AP form, and
after cell positions were determined by large group
meetings, realized or were told that their descriptions were
too positive or superlative for the low position the EA had
been assigned. Some supervisors maintain a non-specific
posture in written from, but are more open and direct
verbally.

APPENDIX 6
SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE
During the analysis to develop themes and issues from
interviews and observation, I heard a good deal of
interesting, rich,

and unique language used to describe all

aspects of evaluations and life in the Engineering
organization. Below is a listing of specialized language
grouped by the following six categories: Conditions/Context,
Forms, Impression Management, Procedures/Rules, Qualities,
and Reaction/Consequences.

CONDITIONS/CONTEXT OF EVALUATIONS
animalistic (how managers acted during appraisal meeting)
apathy
bad system
banging my head (employee has feeling of no reward)
bottom-line (cell position as main factor in system)
can't prove who's

in top group

career job (manager's view of EA's job)
caught off guard {boss wants to know status of jobs)
comic relief (impact of system)
different set of measures (for different work)
dreaded (managers'

reaction to evaluation sessions)
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dumb system
entitled (people feel they deserve movement)
expect to move up
exposure (a way to move ahead)
favoritism
group goals (shared by EA's)
job rate ( managers' favor this to standardize salaries)
jobs are different
lump sum approach
my guy is better (managers' exhibit self-interests)
need competition (for results)
no agreed on criteria
no guarantee for movement
not fair (cell placement process)
numbers game
objective (supervisors' have this illusion about the plan>
pain, a (appraisals)
pension training
pot of money (managers want to control these rewards)
quota
relative performance
rules of the game (accept outcome of the system)
sense of cooperation in some departments
slow movement plan
stepping stone (how EA's see the EA job)
supervisors see their own world
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system sucks
takes the right steps (but no guarantee of movement)
takes too much time to move
throwing bones to a dog (rewards to EA plan)
too much negative stuff
we can't prove performance
wired (employees feel promotions are predetermined)

FORMS USED TO COMPLETE APPRAISALS
ammunition (AP used to get cell move)
don't buy the form
don't want to hang later (caution over content of AP)
formality (how AP forms are seen)
JIM's (form showing needed correction)
tailor forms (possible to write form to fit job)

IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
ability to BS
blow their own horn
have to market EA's (manager wants to sell EA)
snow their bosses
you have to do a selling job for yourself

PROCEDURES/RULES TO PRODUCE APPRAISALS
accepts incumbency (to select person for movement)
allocation

348

back into appraisals (performance is secondary)
balance
bargain
blend (combine lists from other managers)
buddy system (use of coalitions)
buy in (seek consensus)
carry-over from past years (impact of past appraisals)
catch-22 (to move up, some must move down)
checks and balances
consensus
cut and dry (appraisals not honest, but automatic)
darts in the wind (problems in assigning cell position)
don't turn the pile upside down (rank order remains fixed)
favorite boy (someone selected for special treatment)
feathering (a greater spread of appraisal points)
fill slots (move people just because spaces open)
finding a grain of sand ( how appraisal process works)
flip a coin (way to break ties)
generic wording (to avoid problems with union)
get worn out (effect of long group meetings)
give and take process
group decision-making (determines moves)
horse race (race to move ahead)
interpret (judging value of individual's contribution)
iron out differences (purpose of group meetings)
it's a game
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lawyer (boss' role in moving candidate to better spot)
like 2 friends talking (how appraisals should operate)
managers side with each other
match people against each other
mental notes (way to collect data)
merge
move off of center (need to decide on cell placement)
numbers book (use of hard results)
supervisor gives in (supervisor concedes in meetings)
party lines (business lines followed in picking people)
picture book (needed to identify employees for evaluation)
push EA's ahead
put into a pot (no reasons for choices)
rationalize measurement
rules
score (amount of time allowed to perform job)
selling job (use of AP's)
selling job of boss
share moves (how to distribute rewards)
sharing moves (managers support this idea)
slots of performance
slotted EA's into bands
slotting
smooth talkers (get moves for people)
someone gives in
take turns (putting EA's in top position)
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tests of significant differences (decision making tools)
those with best vocabulary (get rewards for subordinates)
throw in the towel (concede candidates during meetings)
track results
trade
vote by party line
wait their turn (EA's must wait to advance)
way out, look for (break tie)
we change the rules
we drew blood (problems in creating rank order list)
we have to present the EA's (using verbal skills)
we use consensus (to select positions}
you don't know my person (lack of knowledge makes impasse)

QUALITIES USED TO JUDGE PERFORMANCE
above and beyond (normal job duties)
beyond the call of duty (rewards)
challenged
clearly above the rest
coming on strong (new EA doing well, but no move)
conduct themselves as professionals
contributions toward the common goal
cost reduction (number of cases and amount of savings)
customer relations
cut costs
do many things well
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does the junk work (difficult, old projects)
don't embarrass the boss
easy to manage
emerge from the pack
get the best from person
getting the job done
give me less trouble (helps image of EA)
good (performance)
good technically
how much is this EA worth to me
inconsistent
jumps the gun (over-reacts)
listen to the customer
make money ( for the department)
making things go smoothly
must sustain performance over time
not being told what to do
on time (to work in morning and after lunch)
on time delivery
on-time performance
one of the family (being included increases rewards)
overdues (late work, past due dates)
personalities get involved (more than just work)
problems (negative behavior employees can create)
productivity (worth of individual)
specs (main product of organization)
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stand out (few are so visible)
stick to standards
take action on problems
top producer
total package of contributions
training (not normal part of EA job, so rewarded)
what's he done for me
who does special things
willingness to do extra
work ethic
work habits

REACTION/CONSEQUENCES TO EVALUATIONS
abrasive statements (negative)
appraisals are joke
appraisals hurt the organization
bands (created by the evaluation process)
blending lists is a killer
bumped (lowered from top, unlikely after attaining level)
can't always have what you want (managers' reaction)
can't move the masses (only a few move up each year)
carriers of bad news (Supervisors)
chasing the carrot (appraisals motivate)
clash of chemicals (boss & worker may not get along)
deadlock (group meeting is at an impasse)
dog fight (process of picking people for movement)
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final product (rank order) is shit
give in
gung ho (when appraisal's good)
hands are tied (boss can't move people)
hit with the data (annual feedback session)
impasse
in-group (exclusion is reason for no movement)
just let me sign the form (people don't want to talk)
let things go (OM's attitude toward people)
long service EA's have no choice (about accepting appr-.)
meeting turned into complete shit (didn't know EA's)
met expectations (words used to be non-specific)
nit-picking
pacify complainers (reason for some rewards)
past recorded remarks (remains with person)
pawns (Supervisors use each other to gain moves)
people are insulted by their appraisals
people are pegged with the wrong cell
people are surprised (by appraisal results)
river keeps flowing (little effect of appraisals on un_it)
sheriff is in town (helpless when told appraisal)
soften the blow (about movement)
spinning their wheels (good work but no advancement)
stuck in an appraisal band
swimming across the lake (sign of progress above other:s)
task to be avoided (managers' feeling about appraisals )
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temper corrections over time (take time to fix errors)
to produce a starting line-up ( why appraisals exist)
treading water (staying the same)
unfair (how top rated feeling about lump sum)
victim of the system (good person doesn't advance)

APPENDIX 7
APPRAISAL ALTERNATIVES
This section examines ideas to improve the evaluation
techniques of the Engineering organization.

Suggestions

come from both subjects' comments and the researcher's
analysis of the setting. It should be noted that a major
division of the alternatives is very basic - fix the
purposes and techniques of the existing plan or eliminate
appraisals completely and turn to automatic pay increase
schemes. Can appraisals systems be changed to overcome the
problems discussed above?

A simple response is yes, but a

more difficult question for managers is "Should appraisal
systems be saved?" and "What are alternatives to
evaluations?"

First I will discuss three broader, more far-

reaching alternatives, followed by suggestions for
improvements offered by employees which propose changes to
the existing procedures to improve or fine tune them.
Researcher's Proposals

The first alternative is to abolish the existing
procedures for banding employees in groups of relative
performance, give all workers a general increase, and
concentrate on employee development through skill
assessment, continuing education, and job rotation.
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approach will greatly reduce competition between employees
and concentrate on ways to involve and develop the worker.
Managers would resist this because their "hammer of control"
becomes a rubber toy, and the union leaders, despite years
of criticizing the appraisal practices, would lose one of
their key rallying points, the poor judgment of managers.
Workers would benefit the most because wages would now be
equally, rather than inequitably distributed.

Peer

relations would improve because perceptions of unfair
treatment would be lessened. Instead of appraisals workers
would compare relations with supervisors and the nature of
rotational assignments as new standards of equality and
fairness.

Development reviews would now be the focus of

boss-subordinate reviews without the judgment of performance
to filter discussions.
A second alternative is to have peer-evaluation, using
a system designed by managers with recommendations from
subordinates.

This is similar to the series of "Focus

Groups" the company instituted to define problems and
recommend solutions.

The rationale is that insight about

problems and solutions comes from the individuals directly
involved with the issue. This solution is a sham because
managers have the final decision about suggested remedies
and can easily reject ideas as "not in the best interests of
the business." Setting aside these issues, the alternative
could be set in motion by seeking volunteers from various

357

groups of workers, based on job assignment.

These groups

would meet to define the problems with performance
appraisals, identify causes, and recommend solutions.

The

second phase would reconvene a sample of employees to
develop ways to try out their ideas, one of which would be
peer-evaluation, arguing that co-workers often know more
about the contributions, skills, and knowledge of peers than
the sanctioned group of raters, i.e., supervisors.

This

approach would directly address one of the major
shortcomings of the existing system

the problem of

knowledge, in which knowing, reviewing and assessing
behavior are key factors. This solution, however, is greatly
restricted by the size of the organization, unclear
objectives, and an unequal distribution of information.
Supervisors do not have equal knowledge of what all
employees are doing, yet are expected to make appraisal
decisions about some of these "mystery" employees.

As

mentioned earlier, this uncertainty dimension engenders the
use of negotiations, voting, and coin-flipping.

Peer-

evaluation would provide "good" eyewitness data from which
managers would then make the final decision, based on
employee recommendations.
The third alternative is a totally worker-designed
evaluation plan.

The outcome may be the same as in

alternative number two, but the process would be different
because workers are free to design their own plan, based on
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their situation and needs.

In this approach management

would turn over control to the workers, a proposal likely to
cause conflict since managers will still distribute raises.
One way around this issue has been mentioned earlier -grant the same raise or general across-the-board increase to
everyone.

The company is already moving in this direction

with the introduction several years ago of the "Team Award."
Another solution to the dilemma caused by the appraisalfunding split would be the creation of a worker co-operative
where the roles of managers and worker fuse into a single
function (Lindenfeld and Rothschild-Whitt, 1982).

Under

this arrangement, employees fulfill two requirements of the
evaluation role: knowledge of the work, its context and of
individual behaviors from daily peer-level contact.

In

addition a worker co-op "authorizes" or legitimates the
granting of raises, normally reserved for managers.

This

arrangement places responsibility and knowledge in a single
group, reducing some of the separation between managers and
subordinate caused by the current system.

Employees would

work in groups to discuss and reach consensus on the
contributions and rewards of its members, producing a
greater feeling that appraisal decisions are coming from
peers who know contributions rather than from managers who
impose judgments and play favorites based on old
relationships rather than current information.
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Proposals from Interview Data

Structure
Ideas on the arrangement of new or modified procedures
are grouped into several categories: new groupings,
restrictions, band changes, techniques, and total
elimination.
The first set of ideas concerns new ways of grouping
the appraisal universe.

Currently all employees in the same

job category - EA or Engineer - are treated as one appraisal
universe, regardless of service or nature of the work,
although these factors are informally weighed by supervisors
during the process.

Participants strongly suggest that only

those who perform the same type of work should be compared
to each other.

This would produce a number of formal

appraisal categories, causing problems for administrators
who argue they can more accurately distribute the appraisals
along a normal curve when the group is large rather than
when the universe is small.

There is a good deal of faith

in the "normal curve" concept.
An example of this proposed separation would be to
remove those classified as EA's, who work in "services and
support", and are not directly contributing to engineering
specification production, from the "normal" mass of
employees who produce "specs".

Informally, those outside

the mainstream of production are treated differently, and to
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many observers, negatively, when compared to the line
groups.
Another idea is to use seniority to group people and
link them to different pay levels.

Some also contend that

new employees should have a separate category.

The reason

for these suggestions is to treat people fairly.
Interestingly, participants do not appear to understand the
appraisal pay plan, because the current plan uses a
"maturity" or experience curve which does link time on the
job to potential pay levels, based on appraisal category, so
the system already has a seniority sensitive variable time-in-level.

The other significant factor in determining

the possibility and size of a raise is the appraisal band
assigned by managers.

Both of these variables interact to

establish a target pay figure.

The actual raise is affected

by a third factor - the total amount of money available for
raises.

The organization traditionally does not have enough

money available to pay everyone at their target pay
prescription.

During the past several years, the

"shortfall" amount has reduced projected raises by
approximately 35%.
The union does not support the creation of special
appraisal groups, believing this is a management device to
manipulate the system to the disadvantage of employees with
more seniority.

In general the union seeks equal wage

treatment for their members and wants them evaluated as a
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single group, regardless of service, education, or
complexity of work.
Another group of suggestions seek to end or greatly
reduce the restrictions in the plan.

People want to end the

requirement for the universe to balance at 100%, or they
want to end "caps" placed on the number of employees who can
occupy specific appraisal levels.

The capping restrictions

occurs in the clerical universe, where no more than 55% of a
particular level can be assigned the top classification of
"A", and in the professional engineer category, where only
20% can be defined as outstanding.

Another denunciation

of these caps is the claim that managers often fill their
quota with employees who do not deserve to be in the top
group.

one problem with this argument, in face of the lack

of formal performance criteria, is the issue of who defines
top and under what conditions?
Employees and managers want to end restrictions on
movement because people feel moves are warranted.

However,

in a system of relative performance, by definition, the top
is relatively better than the rest of the group, even though
that difference may be very small.

There could be large or

small perceived differences between appraisal groups, and
these suggestions seem to respond to the need for greater
equity.
Several suggestions dealt with the number of appraisal
groups or job categories.

A number of supervisors supported
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the idea of moving from 8 bands to 3 nominal categories of
"top, good, and bottom", because it reflected the way they
went about the process of placing employees into 8 groups.
Managers also felt it made more sense to work with

J

broad

categories reflecting distinct types of behavior than trying
to find much smaller differences required in a plan using
almost J times the number of bands.
The professional engineers' group did switch 2 years
ago from a 8 band structure to a 4 category structure.

The

new groups are outstanding, accomplished, other, and
unsatisfactory.

Twenty percent are in outstanding, with

almost all the remainder in accomplished.

There was one

person in "other", which is intended to be a temporary
status for a year to identify and work out performance
problems.

The last band is also intended to be short term,

in effect producing a plan with only 2 bands - outstanding
and accomplished.

This should make it easier to classify

engineers, because unless someone is outstanding or a poor
performer, they will be placed in accomplished.

These broad

distinctions make the manager's job easier and leave less of
a negative feeling in the majority of workers who perceive
themselves as satisfactory.
Another idea to aid grouping is to create more than one
job level for the EA position.

One of the earlier problems

mentioned was the disparity in work performed by different
engineering departments.

This suggestion would assign EA's
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to different levels based on complexity of work, making it
easier to compare workers in the responsibility groups.
While this concept addresses the problem of comparing unlike
work, it doesn't change the problem of grouping people
within levels, and would create a reward-advancement
structure motivating EA's to try to reach the top level of
EA work, while past hierarchical practices normally placed
fewer individuals in top positions and more at the bottom,
producing the classic pyramid form.
A number of ideas focused on more specific technigues.
The current system uses a relative comparison approach,
contrasting the performances of actors against one another.
An employee may do well, but not progress when compared to
his or her peers.

The first technique is to use an absolute

system, comparing each person against established goals,
where it would be possible for more people to be classified
as outstanding.

People believe this technique would allow

for more recognition and lessen the need for and value of
political bargaining.

In effect they feel this method would

eliminate the small number of moves possible in the rank
order concept.

This would be like a teacher's ability to

assign any quantity of grade types, based on ability to meet
course requirements, rather than on a normal curve
distribution, which imposes an artificial, but convenient
limitation on the number of students who can earn specific
letter grades.
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Allied to this concept is the suggestion to more
clearly communicate expectations and provide more frequent
feedback to allow individuals to adjust behavior to meet
goals.

Managers don't like more frequent feedback sessions,

because it would require more work on their part and another
opportunity for disagreement.

Union officers have

complained during several bargaining sessions that EA's
should haves semi-annual feedback meetings so they can
correct errors, and eliminate surprises, which usually
translate to employee dissatisfaction and disappointment.
To date this idea has been given lip-service, at best, by
managers who claim to be too busy managing other parts of
their jobs.
The individual or absolute comparison approach fits
with the suggestion to stress employee development during
reviews instead of concentrating on just an appraisal of
past behavior.

This notion fits the company's current

emphasis on career development which requires both managers
and subordinate to assess the individual's strengths,
weaknesses, and areas of interest.

This could lead to a

better match between employee development and the company's
needs for specific skills in a changing, more complex
workplace.
A final technique is to use seniority for the majority
of the increase amount, plus a smaller merit adder or bonus
amount, to recognize special achievement.

This alleviates
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the problem of appraising the majority of people correctly
because everyone will receive some additional money, while
the exceptional few will receive extra.

This approach

minimizes the impact of evaluations, but does not solve the
problem of how to accurately select employees for the merit
increase.
The final sentiments in this section reflects
frustration rather than specific alternatives for
empowerment.

People want to eliminate the appraisal system

and to end the use of competition which permeates the
system.

These ideas were expressed earlier when employees

called for measurement of achievement against individual
goals rather than use of a rank order, and the increasing
reliance on automatic pay increase or progressions, rather
than the use of a merit plan.
In a union environment all of these suggestions are
subject to the bargaining process.

For the past 23 years,

management has succeeded in retaining a predominantly merit
based system, but with the introduction of lump sum bonus
payments several years ago, the company seems ready to move
toward a greater use of automatic pay delivery rather than
just merit to reward workers.
Control
Participants offered ideas related to control of the
process in several directions.

There was a strong feeling

that managers should control the rank order and cell
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position of their own employees.

In the past supervisors

would nominate selected individuals for movement, but this
was moderated by the political process of group selection
discused in earlier chapters. Managers feel that because
they know the work of their people the best, they should be
the only ones to rate their employees.

This approach

eliminates a check on individual bias, but places the
evaluation responsibility at the position best situated to
know what actions were taken and how significant these
behaviors were for the department.
A contrary opinion on this issue argued that the boss
has too much power regarding appraisals and does not have to
justify his or her decision.

This stance, if extended,

would call for the increased use of diverse opinions from
many supervisors to factor out judgment errors, which really
means the positions taken by a minority of managers present
at the group meetings.
A popular suggestion, but a difficult one to implement,
is to restrict performance data to the previous year and not
prior periods, which happens when managers do no have recent
knowledge of the individual's efforts.

Supervisors could be

required to list the date of the event to justify its
inclusion in the performance review.

This idea could

support the formal use of the "critical incident" method,
which isolates specific, important events during the year
for special examination.

This would tend to require a
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recent and important action to judge, rather than slipping
into the use of reputational frames, saddling the individual
with an old and possibly no longer valid burden.
Next is the idea to increase the use of documentation
to support later reviews.

This procedure may sound

automatic, but at least half the managers do not use written
notes, or numerical data to produce an appraisal.
on impressions from daily interactions.

They rely

The use of records

could provide a more acceptable match between the judgment
of performance and a performance evaluation.

Employees and

union leaders seem to feel better - that justice is served when extensive documentation is used to produce an
evaluation.
Subordinates felt that managers are afraid to praise
and reward people because it might cause workers to slow
down or put supervisors in a weaken position for next year's
evaluation process, setting up expectations that all this
praise will lead to a raise or higher rating.

As pointed

out in an earlier chapter, this inability of the appraisal
system to payoff on expectations for good work it creates,
is a major shortcoming and dysfunctional feature of the
system. The plan is set up to use good work and results as a
motivator, yet managers are reluctant to use this device
prematurely because they may have contradictory results in
subordinates.

An

interesting and unique suggestion came from

a manager outside the research site.

He wanted the

368

evaluators themselves to be appraised for the kind of job
they did during and after the group meetings.

He felt this

consequence would help the supervisors do a better, focus
them more on their task, making for a superior product.
Tools
A number of specific ideas were offered to improve the
evaluation production process.

Participants wanted a

greater use of measures to improve objectivity, and clear
goals needed for individual improvement.

Along similar

lines, people suggested the use of standard, written
performance categories for greater consistency.

This idea

is repeatedly rejected by supervisors who want the
convenience and freedom to use their own shared, but
individual judgements on what constitutes various levels of
performance.
contributions.

Related to this could be a report card of
What people continue to cry out for is a

system that recognizes "good performance" and appropriately
rewards this behavior with salary increases or higher
evaluations.

People are willing to accept a system they

feel is fair to both good and weak performers.
A second set of ideas deals with developing managers or
managing a better program in general.

Managers have asked

for more training on how to do appraisals, but ignore
suggestions they are not comfortable with.

In general

terms, a supervisor suggested that an outside, professional
group should develop a set of procedures for managers to
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use.

He was looking for a "deus ex machina" solution which

is not likely to occur.

A final idea in this group seemed

to have potential - use a consultant or facilitator to
conduct the group meetings and produce the desired balance.
A final innovative concept suggested a formal mentor
system matching good and poor performers.

The top

performers would provide examples, and share secrets to
success.

This idea would have to establish rewards for top

people to participate, and some poor achievers might not be
able to change because of the influence of multiple factors
beyond the control of the mentor.

One example could be the

simple condition of a poor match between employee's
interests and skills and the demands of the job.

When the

engineering unit was restructured several years ago, the
engineer's job changed to take on more administrative
functions along with the traditional task of analyzing
customer's orders.

Many engineers could not and have not

adjusted to the new demands, and a mentor is unlikely to
alter behavior learned over a 25 year period, especially for
a group that is very close to retirement eligibility.
Rewards
The existing appraisal system is strongly linked to its
ability to reward participants.

A large focus of activity

is on the fairness of the work-reward relationship to gauge
its current state of fairness.

In this light managers felt

they need greater control over rewards to compensate their
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employees and give them an incentive to excel.
Traditionally, the first level supervisor recommended the
performance level of his or her employees, but actual
increases resulted from additional negotiating over cell,
and money available for increases.

Managers feel cut off

from direct influence on salary increases.
A dominant theme throughout the research was for
management to reward performance, ability, and effort and to
eliminate the perceived bias, and subjective decisions that
produce the final cell placements.

A specific suggestion,

cited earlier, is to replace the 8-cell appraisal structure,
used for EA's, with 3 broad categories of top, good, and
bottom.

Subjects feel that the current structure restricts

movement because of the requirement to balance all
appraisals to 100%, limiting the number of moves each year.
Ironically, the 3-band structure used for the professional
engineers creates the perception of less movement, not more
advancements.

The advantage, however, is that there is no

requirement to balance to a specific point.

Instead each

employee "funds" the pool of available dollars, based on job
level and years of experience.

The total available money is

then allocated by managers to "pay employees the same, who
performs in a similar manner."

Supervisors have less

restrictions, but hold meetings at various levels to seek
consistency of pay treatment for employes with perceived
like performance. An additional advantage is that a specific
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cell position does not limit the size of a potential raise,
as is now the case with the EA plan.

During the 1989 review

90 of 92 technical-professionals received a salary increase
or special performance award, resulting in a much wider
distribution of financial rewards. The union leaders
rejected this plan during 1988 bargaining because it gave
supervisors more discretion for salaries, while the union
seeks to reduce manager's judgments, and make the plan more
automatic, and predictable regarding pay treatment.
Other ideas to improve rewards called for the
following: each department should receive a "pot" of money
which the supervisor would use to reward his or her
employees.

The rationale for such an approach centers on

the concept of greater accuracy of supervisory judgments
because of the proximity of supervisor and subordinate.
With this ability, managers could also reinforce the
contribution-reward relationship that is a main feature of
large utilitarian organizations (Etzioni, 1961).
Participants also want general increases and job rates
that all employees will receive and move to.

This will

eliminate or greatly reduce supervisory discretion about
raises.

This suggestion would also eliminate Individual

Performance Awards (IPA's) which 50% of the employees can
receive, based on performance and manager's judgments.
Employees prefer equal treatment because they do not believe
management can fairly and accurately access performance.
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Finally, supervisors want to see the reinstitution of
"feathering", a procedure that allows for single percentage
increases or decreases in performance ratings.
a single pay point for each cell in the EA plan.

Now there is
If someone

is in cell 5, the target percent is 100% for example.

Under

feathering, the employee could be assigned a percent within
the range of cell 5.

Individuals could be placed anywhere

from 98% to 102%, as long as the total of all percentages
for all 8 cells balances to 100%.

Feathering allows more

movement which is however smaller in magnitude.

The size of

raises is smaller, but during downturns in business, the
drop in percentage is less difficult to accept.
The union is opposed to this concept because they feel
the advantages - larger upward moves, which are more likely
- outweigh the likelihood of drops in cell position, which
during normal business conditions, are much less common.
The largest negative impact occurs if there is a layoff and
management needs to balance the universe which has lost all
the employees located in the 85% group.

This results in a

new balance much higher than 100%, so many people must drop
a cell to again reach the 100% mark.

Feathering eased the

pain of this compression because each step downward was only
1% instead of 5%.

More people must be affected, but the

negative consequences are spread more widely.
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Forms
There was a mixed review on the value and use of the AP
form.

Managers reported a number of problems mentioned

above, but some report the form is useful if it is
customized to each EA's job, or shortened for the manager's
convenience.

A broader and more general suggestion seeks to

replace the negative perspective contained on most forms to
a document highlighting the achievements. skills. and
potential of each EA.

This approach would fit well with

the use of general or automatic increases.

The majority, if

not everyone, would be rated at least satisfactory making
them eligible for a salary increase, thus providing a symbol
of achievement, which seems lacking in the current plan.

APPENDIX 8
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

The research process is never finished.

Each project

or problem is merely a phase in trying to uncover new
answers and explanations for the social world. In the
present study a number of questions arose that were simply
beyond the scope of the study and could not be answered
during the course of research. These issues are discussed
below as ideas to expand research in evaluation processes
and organizational structures.
Values and Beliefs
1. The dissertation has argued that performance
evaluations were a myth -- they did not mirror workers'
contributions, but were the products of other subjective
variables. In the face of this, why was there such a gap
between beliefs and practices?

The majority of the actors

believed in the value of good performance, saw the unfair,
unpredictable outcomes, and yet continued to function in the
organization.
2.

Managers held to the efficacy of feedback on

changing behavior, yet a number reported little change after
sharing performance information.
change from feedback?

Why was there so little

Were expectations unrealistic?
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Does
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the reward system provide incentives to maintain the status
quo?

Would an increase in fear of negative rewards and a

shift from the value of "don't hurt employes" increase the
impact of feedback?
3.

Supervisors defended the merit pay plan as the best

way to reward and motivate people.

But, what effect would

there be on production if workers received group or
automatic increases?

Managers believed people would "cut

back" and become uncontrollable.

It would be informative to

compare the morale and productivity of equity and equally
based organizations. An extended comparison with a Japanese
company would be enlightening.
4.

The organization's culture harbored a widespread

feeling of entitlement supported by the use of seniority and
the value assigned to consistent contributions.

Researchers

should investigate what forces produce such a strong
attitude among the EAs that longevity should translate to
rewards. This could be linked to the high degree of
uncertainty in the organization. Tenure was a variable the
EA controlled by good attendance and by not looking for
another job.
structure and Control
l.

The managers rejected the practice of using formal

performance descriptions, but could more formality move the
appraisal process from being political to focusing on
performance and not the construction of the rank order list?
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2.

What additional bureaucratic procedures, like

requiring a 100% balancing point, could be changed to
produce a better match between achievement and appraisal to
diminish the performance myth?
3.

How do the appraisal systems of other technical

work groups compare to the approach of this engineering
unit?
4.

What effect would actual increase in decision-

making and power by subordinates have on the unit? How valid
are Kanter's (1977) conclusions about opportunity structure
and power?
5. Can supervisors shift their traditional control role
from watchdog to resource person? would the organization's
culture resist change? What conditions facilitate or hinder
this change? A comparison to a Japanese setting would be
informative.
6. The ZY&Y organization used a traditional set of
utilitarian rewards (e.g., raises, bonuses).

What would the

impact be if a larger set of alternative, more symbolic or
normative rewards (Etzioni, 1961) were available from which
the employe could choose? Could the experiences of
alternative organizations (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979) be
adapted to bureaucratic arrangements?
7. Information represented power in the organization.
What performance impact would occur if more significant data
were available to all employees?

Would additional
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information increase the subordinate's feeling of commitment
or acceptance of one's assessment?
8. To what extent was a technical degree needed to
perform the professional engineer's assignment?

What

environmental forces were increasing the demand for formal
education?

Who was defining this requirement: the company

or the academic/professional community? Was a process of
professionalism active and who was orchestrating such
activity?
Process
1.

The production of appraisals and cell placement

caused problems for managers, in part because the shifting
rules and individual judgments created so much uncertainty.
What would happen if formal standards were developed and
used by the managers? What would the consequence be if these
performance norms were developed jointly by managers and
subordinates?
2.

The most stressing phase of the process was the

group consensus meetings used to combine individual
appraisals into one rank order.

Could a appraisal plan be

developed that would eliminate the group consensus meeting?
What effect would this have on the power structure? What
position has the influence to bring about this change?
3.

What would be the consequences of eliminating the

evaluation system completely for everyone, except those
judged to be unsatisfactory? Would motivation and
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satisfaction indices increase if the competitive climate
were vastly reduced?
4.

Along the lines of 3 above, it would be interesting

to study the effect of dropping the evaluation part of the
plan and focusing on career development instead.

Would

actors accept the termination of appraisals, which they
criticized, and embrace personal development, which they
claimed was lacking in the organization?

The appraisal

system provided a convenient focus for member's complaints.
Where would these criticisms be directed if evaluations were
eliminated? Would the Union lose status and influence among
the actors?

APPENDIX 9
REFLECTIONS ON THE PROCESS OF
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION RESEARCH

The formal research process began in May, 1988 when I
completed a dissertation proposal, selecting performance
appraisals at my work organization as a topic.

The process

formally ends when the author has reviewed his work for the
last time, adjusting words and meanings to reflect his
latest stage of knowledge about the topic. A number of
thoughts occurred when I reflected on the written phase of
the research.
studying the engineering organization as a participant
observer made it possible for me to more completely
understand what took place and what actions meant.

This

role placed me at a clear vantage point to see "the big
picture" from an historical perspective.

When members

discussed the "quartiling system", I knew this referred to a
previous appraisal plan, discarded for the current 8-cell
plan, which managers attacked as too difficult to administer
compared to an even earlier three-level system of top,
middle, and bottom. I was not a tourist in some alien
location, but a comfortable member who knew the language,
customs, and sources of power and information. I was content
379
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in this terrain. I believed I knew the answers to many
questions I had to ask.
However, there was a down side to this apparently
advantageous position of keen understanding.

The researcher

learned a great deal from living or working in the setting
and felt he knew the interaction patterns.

This could,

however, cause one to overlook an important or emerging
process because the once inquisitive, curious eyes are
dulled by the familiar.

The researcher thinks he knows what

is important and falls into the taken-for-granted trap that
the sociologically uninformed members experience. Data were
overlooked or completely ignored because they did not fit
the patterns which emerged and were verified over the course
of the research.

The frame of reference of the participant

observer was like a camera's view finder: parts of the
landscape were selected for inclusion in the picture, while
other features were excluded because they did not fit or
appear not to be a very interesting view for the
photographer/researcher.
Doing research was at once standing inside a circle of
activity and observing the events inside the boundary. It
was a slow, interactive, and reflexive process in which
planned activity (e.g., survey questions) led to unplanned
actions -- development and use of new questions to answer
puzzles that occurred from planned work.

Questions were

posed, insights gained, then new questions asked as the
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search to understand the organization's processes and
structures continued in another direction.
An example of this on-going adjustment occurred when I
first used my interview questions.

I originally included a

question that asked what were the values of the
organization, but quickly realized after 2 interviews that
subjects couldn't tell me this directly.

I had to analyze

their comments and infer my own conclusions.

Secondly,

after several interviews, I recognized the interviews flowed
more smoothly when I abandoned the strict use of the
questions and adjusted the questions to each subject, often
letting their comments guide me to posing new, unplanned
questions.

These interviews proved more interesting and

insightful, leading to even more questions for future
interviews.
The discovery process took the following steps:
observation and data collection; the grouping of data into
related themes; looking for meaning and movement to insight.
This sequence was constantly informed by readings,
organizational experiences, feedback from my dissertation
committee and teaching.

The last activity provided a useful

exercise to gain a deeper understanding of organizations by
deciding how to explain variables that supported research
hypotheses or questions.

The teaching activity cut away a

great deal of confusion as I attempted to illustrate the
meaning and application of theory.
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Participant observation research also places you in a
unique relationship with your subjects.

I knew many of the

subjects for at least 4 years and some for 20 years, prior
to the research, so I had established a good relationship
with most of the people.

It became apparent that subjects

must trust you to talk to you.

I assured everyone that

their identity would be protected, but I don't think that
statement alone would have convinced people it was safe to
talk to me.

I believe the subjects trusted me because of a

sense of honesty and integrity we established in prior
encounters.
Once people learned I was working on an advanced
graduate degree, they saw me as an expert who should have
"the answers".

The exposure of participant observation

intensified this reaction, putting me under pressure to
perform, make excuses, or play the role of resident expert.
Part of my full-time job was to advise managers how to
handle personnel problems, especially those related to
labor-management relations.

Perceived knowledge about

organizational devices like performance evaluations
overlapped my formal duties and made it confusing to draw
clear lines between answering "work" questions and analyzing
the organization for research purposes.
There was also uncertainty and frustration over
wondering if you're doing worthwhile research -- something
worthy of a Ph.D candidate.

You have doubts about the scope
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of your topic, whether you asked the right research
questions, used the appropriate data collection tools,
analyzed with the clearest perspective, captured the most
significant insights, and tested your original questions
properly.

You wonder if this effort will first make a

contribution to sociology and secondly add to management
literature in a way to make organizations more human, and
less manipulative of employees. There are always a number of
ways to organize, conduct, and complete research.

You hope

that your wisdom and insights pointed you in the direction
of clear, logical, and sociologically sound research.
The self-doubts intensified after I submitted the first
draft of my dissertation.

I became very worried that my

work was not up to standards of other students.

I was

surprised at this stage when I got feedback about having to
add quotes, charts, and tables. Why hadn't I thought of
this?

During the next round of comments, I was told I had

too much description and not enough sociological analysis.
I've made these same comments to my students, but hadn't
seen the same shortcomings in my own work. I felt bad about
the comments, not because they weren't valid, but because I
had made them.
to happen.

I didn't know better?

A strange thing began

I started to see the committee's comments as

more helpful, valid and useful as I revised my work.

I

began to stress and expand on the mythical quality of
appraisals, which a dissertation was supposed to do.

I
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thought about the implications of my findings and tried to
explain them rather than just describe the variables.

Then

a simple discovery occurred -- I was learning how to write a
dissertation by making mistakes and receiving feedback from
my committee members. Experience was an invaluable, although
painful, teacher.
Finally, undertaking research for a dissertation
pointed out a feeling I've had since returning to graduate
school in 1981 -- the feeling of living in at least two
distinct worlds. I lived in a work organization and
participated as a graduate student, while also teaching
part-time and holding the social position of husband and
father. Pursuing the Ph.D placed me in a situation distinct
from everyone I knew outside school. It was a world filled
with observing, analyzing, and writing about organizations,
while most people just "worked" without critically examining
their organization. It was a viewpoint of constantly
questioning the taken-for-granted world of collective life.
This dual vantage point produced frustration because certain
conditions came to light which could be explained
sociologically, but which I was not in a position to change
through the application of social science principles.
Action, rather than analysis, was the preferred mode of
achievement in our society. Knowing without doing was
disconcerting.
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I dealt with abstract variables when I wrote my
proposal and began my research. I felt removed from the
"real" world, at least the social world around me as I
worked with concepts few people understood or cared to
comprehend. There was a great emotional tension to have your
"feet" into several worlds operating at such dissimilar
levels of abstraction. co-workers added to this tension when
they asked about progress on my dissertation without any
idea of the tasks involved in its production. Although I did
not share specific findings with managers, they would not be
surprised about the mythical nature of evaluations, but they
might be amazed about the terms I used to characterized the
process. To offer some sense of the experience, I started
using a football metaphor. I told people that finishing the
dissertation was like the Bears having the ball on the 1yard line with no limit to the number of downs to score.
However, for every few inches forward there always was a
loss of ground or confusion over the next play to call!
Teaching provided an adjustment device for me to
translate the reality of individual inquiry through an
explanation to a captive audience of students. I never
belabored my dissertation topic, but I used it to illustrate
qualitative research methods, labor-management conflict,
decision-making and the impact of the organization's
structure, values, and processes on actors. Teaching bridged
the gap between the worlds of work and research by demanding
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that I translate, explain, and impart the meaning of all
those abstractions I have wrestled with individually.
Doing research created a feeling of achievement, but at
this phase of working to complete the dissertation, it was
not completely satisfying because specific feedback or
affirmation was missing. Part of this deficiency was due to
being a graduate researcher, working apart from professional
leadership (e.g., dissertation committee members and other
interested professors) and the informal influence and
benefit of peers, i.e., other wandering, uncertain students.
Being a part-time instructor placed another burden on me:
was I more of a student or teacher as I guided my own
classes? I would have gained more by pursuing the degree as
a younger, full-time student, but also realized that
maturity, specialized interests, and diverse experiences
made for a better, more open-minded researcher.
The research process reinforced my earlier point -- it
is like self-discovery -- never fully completed, but a
source of adventure, frustration, growth, insight and
achievement.
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